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Notes from the Editor 
 
The articles and essays in this issue of Homeland Security Affairs all reflect – in some 
manner – on how we, as a nation, approach the process of homeland security. Ranging 
from specific suggestions for procedures and systems to more philosophical discourses 
on guiding principles, each author (or set of authors) offers a unique perspective on the 
overriding question of “how do we manage the security mission in the face of perceived 
threats?”  
 
In “Organizational Innovations in Counterterrorism,” Daniel R. Langberg argues that 
today’s national security environment demands whole-of-government approaches to meet 
the security challenges of the twenty-first-century. These challenges include terrorism, 
trafficking in persons, and cyberspace security. At present, our national security system is 
organized along functional lines, with weak coordinating mechanisms across functions. 
Langberg suggests that the counterterrorism community offers a practicable model for 
national-level interagency coordination. 
 
This need for coordination is emphasized by James Steiner in “More is Better: The 
Analytic Case for a Robust Suspicious Activity Reports Program.” Steiner outlines the 
suspicious activity report (SAR) process, from collection through analysis, and looks at 
the validity of concerns that an expanded SAR program represents a threat to civil 
liberties. He then presents two analytic requirements for the collection of more – rather 
than less – information through the SAR process to increase the probability of identifying 
pre-operational terrorist activity and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
critical infrastructure protection. 
 
Robert T. Mahoney also offers a model – for preparing emergency responders to deal 
with terrorist attacks as well as routine emergencies. “Threat-based Response Patterns for 
Emergency Services” proposes a process by which emergency service departments can 
conduct a comprehensive risk assessment as a basis for developing new response 
patterns. These new patterns acknowledge that a terrorist crisis condition is different from 
the daily, routine conditions for which most first-responders are trained. 
 
This process of developing new patterns of response may need to be implemented at the 
federal level as well. Albert J. Mauroni argues that the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) has erred in applying Department of Defense (DOD) concepts and scenarios, 
based on responding to weapons of mass destruction, to the threat of chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. The DOD military response to support state 
and local emergency responders is not appropriate for today’s conditions. In “Homeland 
Insecurity: Thinking About CBRN Terrorism,” Mauroni identifies a methodology for 
reviewing DHS CBRN-response policies and suggests there are more moderate, 
sustainable strategies for dealing with CBRN terrorism.  
 
Twenty-first-century security threats are also the topic of Raphael Sagarin’s “Natural 
Security for a Variable and Risk-filled World.” The key to addressing these threats, 
according to Sagarin, may lie in a common solution framework based on adaptability, 
which applies the basic tenets and specific strategies of natural security systems to the 
analysis, planning, and practice of security in human society. As he observes, natural 
security is adaptable; organisms in nature achieve adaptability through a decentralized 
organization where threats are detected and responded to peripherally, by managing 
uncertainty and turning it to their advantage. This adaptive capacity is illustrated in how 
U.S. troops have used organizational structure, uncertainty, and symbiotic relationships to 
respond to and protect against IED attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Adaptive capacity, along with resource robustness, is cited as the basis of community 
resilience in “Building Resilient Communities.” Drawing on an interdisciplinary body of 
theoretical and policy-oriented literature, Patricia Longstaff and colleagues provide a 
definition of resilience and suggest a framework that will serve as a tool for guiding 
planning and allocating resources. This is accomplished by examining resilience 
attributes according to five key community subsystems: ecological, economic, physical 
infrastructure, civil society, and governance.  
 
Another aspect of community – racial and ethnic diversity – and the role this diversity 
plays in perceptions of threat is the subject of “Homeland Security and Support for 
Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Omniculturalism Policies among Americans” by 
Fathali M. Moghaddam and James N. Breckenridge. Using a representative probability 
sample of more than 4,000 Americans, the study presented here found a majority 
preference for omniculturalism that cuts across American sociodemographic differences, 
yet predicts critical variations in the perceived threat of terrorism, the priority of 
terrorism, confidence in government, and support for aggressive counter-terrorism 
measures. These preferences, according to the authors, deserve the attention of homeland 
security professionals. 
 
As always, we publish these essays and articles with the goal of furthering the homeland 
security debate. Your comments and contributions are welcome at www.hsaj.org. 
 





Organizational Innovations in Counterterrorism: 
Lessons for Cyber-security, Human Trafficking, and 
Other Complex National Missions 
Daniel R. Langberg 
 
All too often our national security and foreign policy institutions are slow to learn 
lessons from their own successes and failures. Lessons are identified and applied to an 
even lesser extent across different institutions and missions. But when problems and 
solutions are systemic – due to systems designed for a much different era – the 
experiences of one discrete organization or community can offer valuable insights to an 
entirely different set of actors.  
One issue that demands particular attention in the contemporary security 
environment is how best to apply whole-of-government approaches to complex national 
missions, ranging from combating terrorism and trafficking in persons to securing 
cyberspace. These and many other twenty-first-century security challenges require an 
agile and integrated response; however, our national security system is organized along 
functional lines (diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, etc...) with weak 
coordinating mechanisms across these functions. Today, there is no definitive model for 
integrating capabilities and funding for inherently interagency missions. 
Recent reforms in the U.S. government counterterrorism community provide a 
valuable case study on this subject for several reasons. First, the terrorist threat is 
representative of twenty-first-century national security challenges that are complex, 
trans-border, and fraught with multiple sets of networked, non-state adversaries. 
Second, like all multifaceted problems, counterterrorism requires a holistic approach to 
address; in this case, the law enforcement, financial, diplomatic, military, legal, and 
other dimensions of the terrorist threat. Third, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 
led to the most systemic review and subsequent set of national security reforms thus far 
in the 21st century. 
 The creation of the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP) within the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to conduct counterterrorism planning and 
assessments provides one model for integrating high-priority, high-complexity, multi-
agency missions. Interagency teams for other national missions, such as cyber-security, 
should be seriously considered to support the National Security Staff in strategic 
management of end-to-end processes (policy, strategy, aligning resources with strategy, 
planning, execution, and assessment) and to fulfill functions such as: 
• Clarifying interagency roles and responsibilities; 
• Conducting integrated policy analysis and teeing up policy options; 
• Developing national strategies;  
• Conducting deliberate, dynamic and/or contingency planning; 
• Conducting assessments of the nation’s progress in meetings its goals and 
objectives; and 
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• Conducting long-term assessments on the changing nature of the 
threat/opportunity. 
Certain key enablers must be in place for any interagency team or organization to be 
fully effective. These include: 
• A reporting chain to the president; 
• An institutionalized linkage to the National Security Staff; 
• Requisite authorities;1 
• Congressional support and clear jurisdictional ownership;  
• An untangling of overlapping mandates and authorities; and  
• Interagency national security professionals with critical experience and skill sets 
(e.g., planning and assessments, negotiation, appreciation of diverse agency 
cultures, etc.) and interagency and intergovernmental organizations with 
planning, execution, and reach-back capabilities. 
The 9/11 Commission found that the counterterrorism mission is in need of “joint 
planning” and “joint action” to ensure that unity of purpose and unity of effort are 
achieved. The Commission further recognized that the National Security Council staff, 
consumed with managing day-to-day crises, was unable to fulfill the functions of 
strategic planning and oversight and was therefore incapable of effectively managing a 
whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism on its own. Attempting to rectify 
these deficiencies, the Commission envisioned the National Counterterrorism Center as 
fulfilling these roles and “breaking the older mold of national government 
organization.”2    
In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) established 
NCTC to serve as the U.S. government’s locus for counterterrorism intelligence and 
strategic operational planning. Part of the NCTC mandate was “to conduct strategic 
operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of 
national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland 
security, and law enforcement activities within and among agencies.” To accomplish 
this, the IRTPA established the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning within 
NCTC and gave it responsibility for developing interagency strategic operational plans, 
assigning roles and responsibilities for plans, coordinating interagency operational 
activities, monitoring implementation of plans, and conducting assessments.3 
In February 2010, the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) released a report 
– Towards Integrating Complex Missions: Lessons from the National 
Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning – that 
studied DSOP in depth and found it to be a promising example of a national-level 
integrating mechanism for a complex mission such as counterterrorism.4 The 
Directorate conducts a broad range of integrating functions including interagency 
planning, assessment, and resource oversight to help ensure a holistic approach to the 
mission. Although this fledgling institution continues to face the inherent challenges of 
operating in an outdated system, the concept it embodies – an interagency mechanism 
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to support the National Security Staff in strategic management of a discrete mission – is 
worthy of consideration in other contexts. 
Imagine, for example, an interagency cyber-security team chartered by the president 
and reporting to him through the National Security Staff. The team would report to the 
president, but could be housed in the Department of Homeland Security in the near-
term for administrative and other support.5 It would consist of a permanent cadre of 
subject matter experts and individuals trained in strategic planning and assessments 
working alongside detailees from across the government. A cyber-security team could 
assist senior policy-makers by analyzing policy options, teeing up decisions, and 
developing planning, resource, and assessment products related to cyber-security. More 
specifically, an interagency cyber-security team could: 
• Develop a comprehensive national cyber-security strategy that identifies goals 
and objectives and assigns roles and responsibilities; 
• Conduct interagency contingency planning to consider how the nation would 
respond to a variety of cyber attacks;  
• Conduct dynamic planning to disrupt or respond to an actual attack; 
• Conduct assessments to determine if the nation is making progress in achieving 
its goals and propose actions to increase effectiveness; 
• Conduct long-term assessments to consider what the cyber threat might look like 
in the future; 
• Perform various resource oversight functions in support the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB); and 
• Integrate perspectives of other mission partners such as intergovernmental, 
private sector, and non-government stakeholders. 
Today, no entity has responsibility for deliberately fulfilling these functions on a whole-
of-government basis for the cyber-security mission. Other interagency mission areas 
have integrating mechanisms in place, but most are not fulfilling these roles. For 
instance, the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC) – also established by the 
IRTPA – does not have an equivalent to DSOP that looks beyond the intelligence 
community to conduct planning and assessments with all counter-proliferation 
stakeholders.   
Or consider human trafficking, a twenty-first-century national security concern that 
has been linked to organized crime, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and terrorist 
financing. Similar to counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, and cyber-security, 
trafficking is a complex, multifaceted challenge that does not fall under the jurisdiction 
of any single executive branch organization. The anti-trafficking challenge unites nearly 
thirty offices in at least seven major U.S. government departments and agencies, as well 
as numerous intergovernmental and other mission partners. Out of recognition for the 
need to integrate these diverse capabilities, the President’s Interagency Task Force 
(PITF) and supporting Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG) were established as 
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policy-coordinating bodies and a Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC) was 
created to serve as an information clearing house.6   
Despite these developments, the anti-trafficking mission is still without a national 
strategy that establishes goals and objectives and delineates roles and responsibilities. 
There is no national planning and assessments capability that can integrate the 
perspectives of all mission partners. What would an interagency planning cell within the 
HSTC look like?  Reporting to the president through the SPOG, this interagency team 
could lead all stakeholders (interagency and intergovernmental)7 in strategic planning 
and assessments for the anti-trafficking mission. 
The PNSR study identifies several important lessons from the DSOP experience that 
are applicable to other mission areas. First, this case study demonstrates the importance 
of a reporting chain to the president. The director of NCTC reports to the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) for the intelligence aspects of the NCTC mission but reports 
to the president for DSOP work on whole-of-government planning and assessments. 
This chain of command and proximity to the president convey an informal authority 
that is beneficial, if not necessary to lead an effective interagency team.   
In addition to a direct link to the president, just as critical is a seamless and 
institutionalized linkage to the team’s customers in the interagency space – including 
relevant National Security Staff Directorates, NSC Committees, and OMB staff. These 
relationships are necessary to stay relevant and add value as organizational 
arrangements and policy priorities shift within and across administrations.   
Moreover, the linkage to Congress is just as critical. The lack of congressional 
oversight and funding mechanisms that can look holistically at a complex national 
mission such as counterterrorism or cyber-security will also inhibit the effectiveness of 
any interagency team. A congressional champion is critical to resource the team and to 
provide streamlined oversight of the national mission. Furthermore, Congress must 
resource the participating departments and agencies that are being asked to contribute 
to a mission that may not be a core part of their mandate. 
The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS)8 is an example of the “lead agency” approach to integration. 
S/CRS was established in 2004 to support the secretary of state in leading and 
coordinating U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The office has 
made progress integrating U.S. government capabilities to prepare, plan for, and 
conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities, but these efforts have been hindered 
as a result of S/CRS being buried within the State Department and without strong and 
consistent congressional support.9 
In addition to the informal authority brought about by proximity to the president, the 
relevancy derived from an institutionalized relationship with the National Security Staff, 
and the formal authority derived from a champion on the Hill, other systemic 
impediments will plague any future interagency team just as they have plagued DSOP. 
For any complex, multi-agency mission such as counterterrorism or cyber-security, 
untangling overlapping mandates and authorities to ensure that all actors understand 
the need for the existence of, and leadership from, an interagency team is necessary for 
the team to achieve its full potential.   
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Any planning cell – including DSOP and S/CRS – will suffer from a lack of civilian 
planning and assessment capacity resident throughout the U.S. government. Until a 
government-wide human capital system is established to provide personnel with the 
necessary experience, expertise, and incentive, an interagency team will struggle to find 
sufficient numbers of individuals with the right skill sets. Beyond trained individuals, 
entire departments must be prepared to provide planning and reach-back support to 
personnel deployed to the field or to an interagency team in Washington.10    
Complex national missions such as cyber-security, reconstruction and stabilization, 
and anti-trafficking in persons demand an integrated approach. Formal integrating 
mechanisms are needed to support an overburdened and understaffed National Security 
Staff. The experience of the Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning within the 
National Counterterrorism Center offers many valuable lessons for future interagency 
teams and provides insights into the challenges associated with operating in an outdated 
system. Before true integration can be achieved, the overall national security system 
must be modernized and recalibrated to put national missions ahead of parochial 
interests. Absent holistic reform, however, much can be done to improve on existing 
approaches and bolster mechanisms that enable the United States to bring all its 
capabilities to bear in the twenty-first-century security environment. 
 
Daniel Langberg is a founding member of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) – a 
comprehensive effort to improve the U.S. government’s ability to meet the strategic challenges 
of the twenty-first-century. He currently serves as deputy director for interagency teams and 
planning and was recently the deputy director of the first-ever comprehensive study of the 
National Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning.  Mr. 
Langberg is also an analyst at the Institute for Defense Analyses where he conducts research 
on a variety of issues related to complex contingencies and interagency affairs. He may be 
reached at dlangberg@pnsr.org.  
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1 For a discussion on a range of possible integrating functions and authorities, see: Project on National 
Security Reform, Towards Integrating Complex National Missions: Lessons from the National 
Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (Arlington: Project on National 
Security Reform, 2010), http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_nctc_dsop_report.pdf.  
2 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New 
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the National Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (Arlington: 
Project on National Security Reform, 2010), http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_nctc_dsop_report.pdf.  
5 The current national security system cannot accommodate an entity like DSOP standing on its own in 
the “interagency space”—the space below the president and above the departments.  Just as DSOP is 
housed within NCTC inside the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, any new team will require 
an organizational home for administrative and other support.  One option for a long-term solution is to 
build a capacity in the National Security Council staff to either a) house and manage priority teams or b) 
manage priority missions along with the overall system from a central hub. For a thoughtful discussion on 
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Threat-based Response Patterns for Emergency Services: 
Developing Operational Plans, Policies, Leadership, and 
Procedures for a Terrorist Environment 
Robert T. Mahoney 
 
America is at war. Unlike most of America’s past wars, this war is being fought 
simultaneously in multiple locations overseas and within our borders. Our military 
continues to function in its traditional role as the front line troops overseas, but the 
frontline duties at home in this war of terrorism have become the responsibility of those 
who have not been tasked with that previously: America’s emergency services.1 
Several of our communities have been attacked and/or threatened. Thousands of our 
citizens and hundreds of our emergency personnel have been injured and murdered in 
this war at home. Yet, there is little in the experience, organization, structure, training 
and response patterns of the emergency services that have prepared them for this role as 
war fighters. 
 Numerous directives and guidelines have been produced at all levels of government 
concerning preparation, protection, recovery, etc. from terrorist attack,2 but how to 
incorporate that information into the day-to-day operations of the emergency services 
and their response patterns has been largely left to the discretion of the emergency 
services themselves. How those operational changes develop and evolve will require an 
understanding of a series of steps and dynamics that will have to be taken at the 
individual community and departmental levels in order for those agencies to adopt and 
adapt to their new war fighting tasks.  
In spite of the fact that the terrorist threat to the United States has been realized for 
many years, and even after the disasters of September 11, 2001, not all emergency 
service departments have fully absorbed the lessons of that day. Some have not 
coordinated the work of each of their operational and administrative elements to create 
response patterns that specifically address this changed and highly dangerous 
operational environment. Unfortunately, at times the work of these different elements 
can become parochial and self-focused, and they may fail to coordinate their response 
pattern development efforts to reach a collective, functioning, best outcome that 
benefits the entire department. This condition may be reflective of, among other 
possibilities, insufficient organizational structure, ineffective leadership, individual 
personality differences, or a lack of a common understanding of the purpose and 
primary objectives of the organization itself. Such parochial difficulties, particularly in 
the current operational environment created by terrorism, can result in a lack of 
efficiency, a loss of effectiveness, duplication of effort, unnecessary expenditure of funds 
and resources, loss of public trust and confidence, increased danger to department 
personnel, and the loss of life and property. 
Correcting this condition can be largely addressed through an awareness and 
adoption of a professional methodology that conforms a department’s organization, 
planning, leadership, functioning, training, and response pattern into one that has a 
common understanding of the nature of the threat environment and of the fact that the 
department is involved with war-fighting.  
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A Form of War 
As previously noted, a department responding to terrorism is involved in a form of 
warfare. In this current state of conflict, it is referred to as “asymmetrical” warfare, 
which for the purposes of this article will mean the forces, means, and capabilities of the 
terrorists are dramatically out of balance with that of their enemies. Given that, the 
terrorist must try to compensate for this imbalance by selecting targets, using tactics 
and weapons, etc., that provide them with an impact greatly in excess of their size and 
resources. Since terrorism is a form of unconventional or “asymmetrical” warfare, it is 
useful to note certain situations from past wars which can highlight the difference 
between routine and crisis conditions and thinking as regards to response patterns.  
The Civil War battle of Antietam was the bloodiest battle ever fought in America. In 
one day, 22,719 were killed. At Antietam, there is a small, triple arch, twelve-foot-wide 
stone bridge over the Antietam creek, now known as Burnside Bridge. Union General 
Ambrose Burnside, following orders, sent multiple waves of soldiers to attack across the 
bridge. Although each successive attempt was decimated, he nonetheless kept repeating 
the tactic he had been trained in, which was the then currently accepted method relied 
on routinely in past battles.3  
Fifty years later, in World War I, French Field Marshal Joseph Joffre, British General 
Sir Douglas Haig and other allied commanders, sent attack after attack out of the 
trenches for months, against the German machine guns, at the Battle of the Somme. A 
half million soldiers died in that one battle; 60,000 British on the first day alone.4 
Joffre, Haig and the other commanders apparently found it impossible to change 
methods and tactics, or to realize and adapt to the changed threat (weapon) 
environment.  
Both these warfare examples are indicative of a thought process that displays the 
difference between routine and crisis preparation, thinking, recognition, and response. 
Both examples demonstrate the use of the routine form of thinking and response. 
Conversely, the British admiralty had a number of wooden warships under 
construction on the day they received word of the battle between the first ironclads – the 
Monitor and the Merrimac – during the American Civil War. They quickly accelerated 
plans to have iron plates bolted to the sides of their new ships, recognizing that the 
operational environment had permanently changed and that wooden hulled ships were 
no longer sufficient and could not serve as the core of their navy.5 While some senior 
naval officers probably failed to accept that their routine methods had to be changed, 
the organization as a whole grasped and understood the crisis condition that existed, 
and started to develop methods that addressed their new operating environment.  
The purpose of this article is to consider how a number of operational and 
administrative skills and abilities, familiar to emergency services but not necessarily 
suited to meeting the current terrorist condition, should be re-examined and corrected. 
This article will demonstrate how those familiar elements are not isolated, independent 
issues, but are in fact parts of a continuum of the same problem (the threat) that must 
be addressed comprehensively to meet the requirements of, and to operate in, this new 
terrorist war-fighting environment.   
In order to create appropriate response patterns it is first necessary to completely 
understand the nature of the terrorist threat and risk that a department can be facing, 
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both generally and to the responding entities specifically. This is done through a risk 
assessment process. 
This article reviews what an emergency service department should understand about 
the elements of 1) threat, 2) risk, 3) security, 4) resources, 5) crisis leadership, 6) 
training, and 7) planning. This article then reveals how gaining an understanding of 
each of these elements both informs and improves all the other elements. Such 
knowledge enables these elements to be mutually supportive in the development of 
counter terrorism response patterns. This process uses a series of understandings, 
transitioning in sequence from one element to the next, and each builds on the 
previously gained knowledge. These transitions are: 
Transition 1: Understanding Threat Informs Risk Analysis 
Transition 2: Risk Analysis Informs Security Mitigations 
Transition 3: Security Ensures Resource Allocation for Terrorist Events 
Transition 4: Terrorist Events Require Crisis Leadership Skills 
Transition 5: These Issues, Addressed Through Training and Plans 
THE TERRORIST ENVIRONMENT 
Records of the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland show that 
worldwide there have been over 10,000 terrorist attacks on police facilities and officers 
since 1970.6 Hospitals have also been attacked as part of wider terrorist actions. In the 
Mumbai, India, terrorist attack in November 2008, the terrorists attacked the counter-
terrorism forces while they were responding from their headquarters, killing several of 
them, including the commanding chief of the Anti-Terrorist Squad.7 
The 9/11 Commission Report noted that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who planned the 
attack on the World Trade Center admitted to having sent Dhiren Barot (aka. Issa al 
Britani) to New York six months before the 9/11 attack to conduct surveillances of the 
World Trade Center and other targets.8 The video tapes he made were found in a 
computer seized in Pakistan in 2005. Barot was sentenced to 136 years in prison for 
terrorism in the United Kingdom in 2007 and copies of the tapes he made were released 
to the public by Scotland Yard. Among the targets he photographed and concentrated on 
were a Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) firehouse and the police 
presence in the vicinity of the World Trade Center.9 
In the United States, as in other countries around the world, the use of “secondary 
devices” or bombs, to kill and injure first responders as they arrive at a scene, has been a 
tactic used by terrorists and is an attack method that first responders and their 
departments have become aware of. Under such conditions, responding units know they 
need to have a heightened sense of security as they approach such a scene, but the above 
information suggests a further threat. 
Barot’s video taping of a fire station as part of an array of targets, the bombing of 
hospitals and police stations as targets themselves and/or as part of a wider attack on a 
primary target, is a clear indication that the terrorists understand the high target value 
these first responder personnel, units, and locations represent. However, recognizing 
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the possibility of terrorists targeting and attacking the first responder locations and 
resources –  as prime objectives themselves – is generally not part of the operations and 
response planning of first responder units and departments in this country. Past 
terrorist actions indicate that such occurrences are foreseeable risks that emergency 
services should consider including in their planning.10  
The May 2010 attempted car bombing of New York City’s Times Square is an 
instructive event. The initial call transmitted from the police on scene was for a car fire. 
The first arriving emergency service was the fire department, which responded 
according to routine protocol to commence a fire suppression operation based on the 
information that had been received. Due to their counter terrorism awareness, the 
FDNY quickly assessed and realized that the situation was potentially a vehicle-borne 
improvised explosive device (VBIED) and took appropriate action. Had this not been 
done and had the device exploded, it is probable that the department would have again 
experienced the highest casualty rate among the emergency services.11 
It is important to understand that, nationally, most of the response patterns currently 
in place for routine operations are insufficient to address the types of situations a 
department will encounter in responding to an ongoing terrorist attack such as the 
Times Square incident. New plans must be created for these situations. There is a 
process that can be used to assist department leaders and planners in developing threat-
based response patterns, one that uses the transition of knowledge gained in each 
element to assist in the development of the next one. It starts with a fully inclusive risk 
assessment.  
TRANSITION 1: Understanding Threat Informs Risk Analysis 
Determining which threats a department faces does not necessarily mean there is an 
equal risk associated with each of the threats. To develop appropriate response patterns 
to terrorist threats, a department must convert knowledge of threats into risk.  
A formal process of conducting a risk assessment within a department is the initial 
step in developing plans, policies, and procedures to address operations within the 
current terrorist environment. Risk assessments use established protocols and 
algorithms in their analytical process. These protocols can be complex and/or 
proprietary in nature, depending on which of several available methodologies is 
selected. The following is a simplified review of the sequence of steps that a risk 
assessment may contain. It is not a detailed explanation of each of the elements involved 
in every step of the process, but rather an overview of the objective of the steps leading 
to an organized indication of risk. With this knowledge a department or organization 
can proceed to the development of response operations suitable to address the known 
and identified threats and risks. Without this knowledge a department will resort to 
guessing about the actual functional condition of their capabilities and counterterrorism 
profile. 
Risk Assessment 
The first step in the elimination of internal parochial planning concerns is conducting a 
risk assessment, and the first part of that is determining the nature of the threat 
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scenarios the department is likely to encounter. The process described below focuses on 
the terrorist environment as the specific threat being addressed, as compared to 
ordinary or routine response circumstances. While it is recognized that the current 
interest in an “all hazards” approach to planning has significant utility and appeal, the 
array of situations an emergency department can find itself involved in may already 
include many, if not all of the naturally occurring, unintended, and accidental 
emergencies present in an all hazards approach to planning. Departments whose 
territory and response activity include blizzards, earthquakes, tornados, or other 
cyclically occurring emergencies may have become prepared and conditioned to manage 
such matters through years of response to such emergencies. However, large explosive 
charges, the use of chemical and radiological weapons, directly attacking department 
locations and personnel, etc., presents a much different set of circumstances for which 
departments are not as prepared. Existing natural hazard response plans may or may 
not need up-dating, but planning for and responding to terrorist activity is different 
than other emergencies.12 Addtionally, plans based on terrorist risk assessments can 
bring benefit to departmental capabilities in responding to an “all hazards” 
environment.  
The Risk Assessment process being discussed in this article consists of seven 
sequential sub-elements: 1) threat, 2) criticality, 3) vulnerability (likelihood), 4) 
response and recovery capabilities, 5) impact (consequence), 6) risk, and 7) needs. 
1. The threat component permits a department to identify the types of terrorist 
weapons it needs to consider and protect against, as well as the means by which 
each of those weapons can be used against the department. A specific threat is 
dependent upon the terrorist’s objectives, motivations, and capabilities, as well as 
the target attractiveness of the department’s assets to the terrorists. 
2. The criticality element permits the department to rate the relative importance of 
each of its assets in accomplishing the department mandate. Establishing this 
hierarchy of criticality also suggests which assets require protection from the 
terrorists’ methods of attack. 
3. The vulnerability component evaluates the amount of security an asset has as 
compared to the possibility of a successful attack upon it. Noting the specific 
vulnerabilities per type of attack also suggests potential security enhancements to 
counter those vulnerabilities. 
4. The response and recovery element measures the capability of the department to 
respond to and recover from each of the types of attack upon the department 
itself. This is not to be confused with response patterns for operations in the 
terrorist environment generally. 
5. The impact (or consequence) part of the assessment measures the percentage of 
loss of the assets’ criticality to the department that would occur due to a 
successful attack. This metric also represents the relationship between the 
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terrorists’ capabilities to achieve their objective and the department’s ability to 
protect against it. 
6. The risk component demonstrates a hierarchical rating of the assets for each type 
of attack as a result of the threat, vulnerability, and impact analysis. Each of the 
department assets is compared to every other identified asset to demonstrate 
their relative risk. 
7. The needs component permits a department to review various security and 
recovery solutions that would serve to reduce the level of risk the department 
faces from a terrorist event.13 
Threat 
In this country, responding to terrorism is an experience limited to a very few 
emergency services departments. It should therefore be an area of concern for those 
departments that have not yet considered it as an issue. The range of terrorist threats to 
a department is identified by the types of weapons used or sought by terrorists. 
Emergency responders know them as Weapons of Mass Destruction, or WMD. Included 
in this category of weapons are: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, 
and explosives. In addition, an analysis of recent terrorist tactics and methods shows 
that more conventional types of weapons and tactics, associated with the “small unit 
type actions” displayed in the Mumbai attack, can also be devastating to emergency 
services. 14 
The likelihood of a department encountering any or all of these forms of attack is a 
variable driven by the full range of conditions and circumstances unique to each 
department and its location. A departmental liaison to, or membership in, a regional 
Fusion Center or a Joint Terrorism Task Force can serve as the source for current and 
realistic threat information.15  
Note that the level of existing threat is entirely outside the control of a department 
when considering WMD’s. The amount of threat from these types of weapons is 
controlled by, and exists solely within, the terrorist element itself and the actual 
prevention of WMD use is not normally within the capacity of local first responders. 
Unless the department is capable of neutralizing the terrorist organization itself, or 
changing the beliefs, objectives, means, or capabilities that drive their attack 
motivations, the department will not be able to “prevent” an attack. The terrorist 
organization always retains the option to change the location of its attack to another, 
“softer” target in order to satisfy its objectives. Thus, that attack is not “prevented,” but 
only “deterred” onto another location. 
Criticality 
Every department has a mandate or reason for its existence. That reason may be found 
in enabling legislation, a charter, or mission statement. The initial process in doing a 
risk assessment answers the question, “What do we do?” The best answer is one that 
views the department mandate at a high level. For example, for a fire department the 
answer “We put out fires.” is not as comprehensive or accurate as “We prepare for and 
respond to emergencies that threaten life and property.” Opening the range of 
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possibilities in this manner facilitates thinking about the development of a list of critical 
assets.  
Few departments have assets and resources that are not necessary to some aspect of 
the department mandate, but not every resource or asset is critical to the mission. The 
criticality element of the assessment allows a department to evaluate which of its assets 
are the most important ones for accomplishing its mission.  
All departments function as networks of assets and elements that interact with each 
other, either operationally or administratively or both. It is the linkage and the 
frequency of linkage between these elements that can define the networked structure of 
the department and the criticality of those elements.   
The terms used for describing the different types of elements in a network are 
“nodes”, “links”, and “hubs”.  A node can be a particular building, a piece or type of 
equipment, or part of a process, etc. The links are the elements and/or parts of a process 
that serve to connect nodes. This can be a physical, administrative, or operational 
“pathway” that connects or creates interaction between nodes. A hub is a node that 
multiple other nodes link to. The more links there are from other nodes to a particular 






In theory, the hub with the largest number of links is the most critical in the department 
network and each of the subsequent hubs have their hierarchy established in a similar 
manner. While network theory recognizes there are many factors available for use in 
this calculation,17 for the purposes of this risk assessment discussion, Diagram 1 displays 
a notional example of a department’s assets on a chart based on the number of 
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operational communication interactions between some of these elements in a 
department; many other criteria can also apply. 
While each of a department’s assets is “critical”, it should be clear that each of them is 
not equally critical. Each critical asset’s importance to the range of different factors that 
make up the department mandate is an indication of its position in a hierarchy of 
criticality.  
These assets, owned and operated by the department, each make an important 
contribution to achieving the department mandate.  Their final position in the hierarchy 
will reflect an analysis using a common set of factors that make each of them critical to 
accomplishing the department mandate. Such factors can include the number of 
casualties that will occur from the loss of this asset, the percentage of the department’s 
ability to function that will be lost due to the loss of this asset, the cost of replacing the 
asset, etc., but these factors will not apply equally to each asset. Combining the ranked 
assets with these factors will result in a hierarchy of all the assets’ critical relationship to 
the completion of the department mandate. 
Vulnerability 
An array of attack weapons and methods are available to the terrorists for them to 
potentially use successfully against any asset. Clearly, not every weapon would be 
appropriate for use at each site or against each asset, yet an asset may have a wide 
spectrum of weapons and tactics that can be used against it. 
Note that the use of a particular type of weapon is influenced by many factors 
external to the department. The objectives of the terrorist element, their chosen means 
for achieving these objectives, and their capacity for having and using a particular type 
of weapon are all factors that would be considered. There must be a corollary between 
the objectives of the terrorist organization, their capabilities and methods, the 
importance of an asset in achieving (or preventing) their objectives, and the security 
conditions at the asset to deter the terrorist. Diagram 2 below provides a notional 
example of how these conditions result in the different types of threat, weapon(s), and 
attack scenarios that a terrorist might choose to use against an asset, depending upon 
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As revealed above, each of the identified department assets can have a vulnerability 
to multiple, selected types of attack. Understanding vulnerability consists of knowing 
both certain specifics about the attack method verses the security conditions that exist at 
the asset. Some elements of an asset might serve to deter an attack – i.e. the security 
procedures in place at the asset are believed to be sufficient to deny terrorist access 
(fences, card readers, etc.) – and such an attack could be detected before it is completed 
because of other procedures (CCTV, lighting, etc.). There is also the probability that 
once the attack is detected, it could be interdicted before it is carried out. Other aspects 
of an asset might be so lacking in security that it would attract an attack. In short, it is 
necessary for a department to look at itself as the terrorist would in order to determine 
its vulnerabilities.  !
It is the difference between the offensive aspects of an attack and the defensive 
abilities of the asset that provides an indication of the likelihood of a successful attack. If 
an asset is highly vulnerable to a particular type of attack, and attacking it with a 
selected type of available weapon would serve the terrorist’s objectives, then the 
probable vulnerability or likelihood of a successful attack at that asset might be high. 
Conversely, even if the asset is vulnerable but the terrorist element doesn’t posses that 
type of weapon and/or attack capability, or attacking that asset would not serve the 
terrorist’s objectives, then the probability of attack would be lower.  
A department can be fully capable of deterring an attack through the introduction 
and use of security measures that counter specific types of attacks. It is of paramount 
importance that departments consider security measures to mitigate these types of 
attack in their planning procedures. It should also be noted that the department’s 
planning must be sensitive to the potential that improperly selected and/or applied 
security measures may only serve to “deflect” rather than deter an attack.  For example, 
if a department so hardens its administrative building that the terrorists attack a less 
defended operational building within the same department, then the department has 
succeeded only in “deflecting” rather than “deterring” attack. In this case it cannot be 
said that the attack was “prevented”. 
Response Capabilities 
There are specific measures available for preparation for, defense against, and/or 
response to types of terrorist attack. The department’s internal capabilities across a wide 
range of areas of expertise and resources will be required in the wake of such an attack 
to continue performing the department mandate. Organizational structure and 
leadership, the existence of operational plans and procedures, the level of training and 
expertise, the availability and use of equipment and or systems, and the number and 
type of personnel and their availability are all primary issues for appropriate response 
and recovery. The gap between the current readiness condition within the department 
and a desirable level of readiness in order to continue departmental functionality 
equates to a department’s response needs. For example, if a department needs twenty 
SWAT trained officers when it currently has eight, or the department has one rescue 
company but also needs a Haz-Mat capability, such conditions reveal the gap between 
existing departmental resources and what the current threat environment requires them 
to have. 
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Some of the administrative and infrastructure elements of the department also 
contribute to its response readiness. These includes such things as the presence of 
administrative plans and procedures, the existence of alternate facilities, 
communication capabilities, the existence and continuity of vital information in 
databases, and a periodic use of training exercises. The combination of these operational 
and administrative elements can reveal the difference between current capabilities and 
terrorist incident response needs. 
Impact 
Impact (or consequence) can be described as the portion or fraction of an asset’s 
criticality that would be lost to the department in each of the attack types previously 
described. This impact is balanced to a degree by determining what fraction of that 
impact could be reduced or mitigated due to the identified response and recovery 
capabilities of the department. The combination of these various elements (the 
percentage of criticality of the assets destroyed, the percentage mitigated by recovery 
capabilities, and the amount of impact mitigated by response capabilities) has a direct 
relationship to the overall consequence to the department from these attacks and, by 
extrapolation, to the surrounding community. 
Relative Risk 
Relative risk means that assets of different types, with different purposes and functions, 
being similarly threatened by multiple types of weapons and attacks, can still be 
measured in direct comparison to each other’s level of risk exposure. This also means 
that all of a department’s critical assets can be evaluated as a group. 
These risk calculations can be plotted on a graph, where the vertical axis represents 
vulnerability (likelihood) and the horizontal axis represents consequence (impact), by 
placing a point on the graph for each type of attack at each critical asset. Those points 
close to the axis junction (lower left) have less vulnerability and/or consequence than 
those at a distance from it (upper right). In practice, the assets and attack type 
combinations proceeding diagonally on the graph up and to the right from the axis point 
represent the highest level of risk and require the most immediate attention to secure. 
Since all the assets and attack types are measured against the same set of threats, and 
each asset has a point on the graph for each type of risk it faces, the plot points display 
the relative risk between all the assets.  
Using this method, it is possible for a department to know that, given its 
circumstances, the greatest risk may be to their communications center from a vehicle 
borne explosive, or to their EMS center from a biological weapon, or their headquarters 
from a chemical attack, or to their rescue company quarters from a man-carried 
explosive, etc. Each attack type and location will have a position (node) on the graph in 
direct risk-relationship to every other type of attack at each of the other assets. The 
below graph displays a notional example of a typical relative risk assessment diagram;  
an asset can have multiple points on the graph representing each type of attack it could 
face, while some types of attack appear multiple times against different assets. 
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Through extrapolation, Diagram 3 also informs department management and personnel 
of what corrective measures need to be taken in order to lower risk. Determining the 
reasons for a vulnerability rating suggests the lack of a defensive security measure (or a 
combination of security measures). Instituting such a security measure (or measures) 
would serve to lower an asset’s vulnerability to a particular type of attack. For example, 
where a vehicle bomb attack is indicated, the installation of vehicle barriers might serve 
as a deterrent and installing a type of public access control system could reduce the 
possibility of a man-carried explosive being used against another asset. Installation of 
such security measures would lower the risk profile of the involved asset. 
Reduction in vulnerability (the vertical axis) is frequently thought of as being 
achieved through installation of “site-hardening” physical security measures. While this 
is a logical way to reach the risk reduction goal, other means are also available and must 
be considered. For example, one of the elements of ‘likelihood’ is the target’s 
attractiveness to the terrorist; changing that attractiveness is a means of reducing risk. 
Making a target too difficult to attack, or beyond the terrorist’s weapon and resource 
capability, reduces the target’s attractiveness and, therefore, “likelihood”. Changes in 
established operational procedures can also serve to lower risk by making various 
aspects of the asset less vulnerable. 
Risk can also be reduced by making changes in consequence (the horizontal axis). 
This is frequently done through duplication and/or dispersal of the asset. If destruction 
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of a particular asset represents a single potential point of failure in accomplishing the 
department mandate, then consideration can be given to duplicating that capacity 
and/or dispersing its functional purpose throughout multiple other elements or 
locations, in order to reduce that failure consequence. Measures that create duplication 
and dispersal of ability can extend the time during which an emergency service can 
continue to provide services in a crisis by ensuring a replacement or substitute capacity 
when a similar function is lost at another location. Note, however, that security 
measures which reduce consequence without changing the level of vulnerability of assets 
rely, in part, on the presumption that the terrorist element does not have the capacity to 
eliminate all of the vulnerable assets simultaneously or each in sequence. Thus, 
choosing mitigations that focus independently on reducing “likelihood/vulnerability” or 
“consequence/impact” alone can have the desired effect of reducing risk to the asset 
where they are applied; but a program that develops need-driven mitigations that 
reduce both these elements of risk (vulnerability and consequence), simultaneously and 
in coordination with each other, directly enhances overall security and supports the 
sustainability of the departmental services the asset provides. 
Applied risk reduction measures that lower vulnerability can sometimes be 
dependent on various forms of technology. Departments must be sensitive to the degree 
of technological dependence created in addressing their risk reduction methods, 
particularly if the technology represents a single point of failure. If the technology fails 
or is overcome, the total consequence of the original vulnerability can occur 
immediately. The level of accrued technological dependency may not permit any time 
for initiating other measures to limit the full consequence.  
In situations where technological dependency is acute, a program that trains 
personnel not to extend their operations to the extreme limits of the technology and/or 
provides alternate methods to achieve the objective, can serve to increase actual safety 
and available time to avoid the full consequences of any technological failure. 
Whether the choice to reduce risk applies to vulnerability or consequence, or ideally 
both, it is important to remember that the mitigations and changes driven by the needs 
assessment should not be limited to physical and structural changes alone. Operational 
changes in routine functioning are often highly effective in reducing risk, usually involve 
less capital costs than physical changes, and can be applied more easily and often on a 
scale that varies according to the current local level of threat. It is often most effective to 
implement both physical and operational risk reduction efforts in a coordinated 
manner. It is in this area that changing response patterns as a result of specific terrorist 
conditions can be highly effective. 
Return on Investment 
Investments in counter-terrorism mitigations can be significant and as with all 
investments, must present a gain or positive return for the investor. The gain being 
sought in a risk assessment is the reduction of risk. It is that reduction which represents 
the return on this investment, and each mitigation must have a value in risk reduction 
with a direct relationship to the recognized threats. The cost of each mitigation method 
and/or a combination of mitigations, and their effectiveness and efficiency in gaining 
risk reduction per actual unit of cost, is a major issue for a department. By using pre- 
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and post-mitigation installation assessments, a department will be able to evaluate its 
overall security profile at any given time and the return on investment of its mitigations. 
It should be understood that the assessment profile and all aspects of risk respond to the 
nature of the threats, which can change over time. It is therefore beneficial for a 
department to periodically reassess its threat and risk condition. 
Additionally, department management must consider the concept of “acceptable risk” 
in selecting which asset(s) are chosen, and in what sequence for mitigation 
improvement. Presuming that available funding in any given year will be insufficient to 
address the totality of mitigation needs, a department must choose how and where those 
funds will be expended. Logic would seem to dictate that the asset determined to be 
most at risk (see Diagram 3, Rescue Co./Small Explosive) would be the first asset to 
receive corrective measures, and each subsequent asset in the hierarchy would be 
addressed in turn according to available funding. Another method could be to 
collectively fund partial mitigation for a selected group of assets, or all assets 
simultaneously, thereby giving some protection to a wider group of assets rather than 
in-depth security to one. Regardless of which process is chosen, the gap between the 
optimum obtainable security condition desired, and that which current funding, 
technology or expertise permits, is the amount of ‘acceptable risk’ a department will 
have until conditions allow further mitigations to be applied or the threat itself 
diminishes. 
Similarly, a department must guard against selecting a method of mitigation simply 
because it has the highest return on investment. Expending funds for that reason only, 
on an asset that holds a lower position on the risk assessment graph, leaves those higher 
ranked assets wanting for attention.  
TRANSITION 2: Risk Assessment Informs Security Mitigations 
Security Mitigations 
The vast majority of calls that fire departments and emergency medical services respond 
to are accidental. That is to say, they are not intentionally caused. The exceptions of 
arson and other intentional criminal matters account for a select percentage of the total 
responses, but most departments consider such operational responses within their 
routine patterns. The idea that these emergency services may themselves be 
intentionally targeted is rarely considered or planned for. This is not to be confused with 
any existing plans for operating under dangerous conditions or in a contaminated zone; 
these plans envision arriving at an ongoing, unusual, or terrorist event wherein 
something else is the primary target. The concept being considered here is that of 
emergency services being directly targeted and attacked as part of a wider terrorist 
event. Departments have an awareness of time-delayed “secondary” explosive devices 
being planted for the specific purpose of  impacting emergency responders upon arrival, 
but the intentional attacking of the services prior to or concurrent with a wider attack is 
not an event generally included in emergency planning. 
There are numerous examples of terrorist attacks targeting security forces whose 
expertise could impede or deny the terrorists’ attack objectives. Such actions as 
attacking command and control hubs, communications centers, hospitals, etc. that can 
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reduce the impact of the terrorist attack by rapid and effective use of a department’s 
responding capabilities are such examples.18 By neutralizing or minimizing that 
response capability the asymmetry of the attack shifts in favor of the terrorists.  
Both captured intelligence evidence and past terrorist actions require that this 
intentional targeting potential be examined.19 Causing death, injury, and destruction are 
some of the primary intentions of transnational terrorists. Terrorists have demonstrated 
that they can improve their effectiveness in those areas through the elimination or 
lowering of the response capabilities of local authorities.20 Recent evolutions of such 
attacks, particularly in Mumbai, India, have clearly demonstrated that the terrorists 
were able to enhance the effects of their attacks through such means. Whether 
conducting pre-attack surveillance on emergency services, rehearsing attacks on 
responding vehicles, attacking police stations, commandeering emergency vehicles, or 
executing response commanders, there is ample evidence to indicate that such tactics 
are part of their overall planning.21 
Emergency services must realize that they represent some of the most valuable and 
finite counter-terrorism resources in the country. This means that departments should 
highlight the need to secure their resources from attack and take the possibility of any 
diminished capability or capacity due to such situations into account in their policy 
development and response planning and budgeting. 
Even if departmental resources are not targeted directly, multiple types of WMD 
terrorist attacks are capable of wide-spread injury, death, and destruction. Emergency 
services are not immune from such consequences. These types of attacks can seriously 
impact both on-duty and off-duty personnel, and equipment serviceability, 
simultaneously. Crisis planning considerations should examine the departmental 
response profile through a range of diminishing levels of personnel and equipment 
availability due to the direct impact of a particular type of attack on the resources of the 
department itself, or by its being effected by these WMD. There is a direct relationship 
between the number, and capabilities, of the remaining department resources following 
an attack, and the selection of which emergency operational functions are to be 
continued at which critical community locations. There is a “tipping-point” at which 
operations are unavoidably or intentionally diminished.22 This point will vary from 
department to department. Note that a departmental capability should never be 
confused with its capacity. A department may have excellent training, equipment, 
leadership, and experience to address an event – even a terrorist event – but its ability 
to rapidly respond and sustain those operations over time or in simultaneous multiple 
attack scenarios is a measure of its capacity,23 which can be dramatically reduced by 
WMD. 
The above risk assessment process can identify which assets are most at risk from 
terrorist-type attacks and their current vulnerability profiles. In planning terrorist 
response operations, senior emergency management needs to consider actions and 
expenditures that will help ensure that their most valuable resources (frequently the 
ones most at risk) remain viable and available for use by the wider community during 
and after these emergencies.24 Even a cursory review by senior management will often 
reveal that the entirety of a department’s policies, practices, and particularly Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP), have been created to function in a routine environment 
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and will therefore need to be completely reconsidered to ensure survivability in a 
terrorist attack. Physical site hardening of critical assets and the installation of access-
limiting measures that create a secure zone in depth, as well as operational changes, are 
some of the basic steps that can be taken to help protect these resources. Such 
hardening is not limited to physical sites; it should include mobile resources as 
necessary. In every instance it is the selection of the correct mitigation or (more 
frequently) a combination of mitigations, chosen because they are directly mapped to a 
risk reduction need identified through the above risk assessment process, that will be 
the most effective in addressing security concerns. 
TRANSITION 3: Security Ensures Resource Allocation for Terrorist Events 
The above risk assessment process results in a department understanding the ways in 
which it is threatened by terrorism and which of its assets are most vulnerable to that 
threat. The process also identifies those assets that will need to be secured from those 
threats since they are the most necessary and critical for the department to carry out its 
mandate in the event of a terrorist attack. That understanding of all aspects of risk is 
necessary in order to examine and address a department’s preparedness profile for 
responding to terrorism. One of the principle ways of determining preparedness is to 
understand the way a department allocates resources. 
Resource Allocation  
“What is our capacity to do what we do”?  
For an emergency services department, the answer to this question is related to all 
the resources that attach to each of the department’s critical assets, and all other assets, 
in order to accomplish the department mission. For example, a fire department may 
have twenty apparatus including pumpers, ladder trucks, ambulances, rescue vehicles, 
mobile command vehicles, etc. The number of them and the total number of personnel 
assigned to those operational functions, in addition to those in administrative functions, 
can give an indication of the department’s response capacity. That distribution will 
reflect what local experience and practice has shown to be the appropriate number of 
resources necessary to meet the daily routine requirements of the department. Diagram 
4 (below) demonstrates the possible assets and the number of emergency personnel 
distributed within a department. 
 !
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“How do we accomplish our mission?” 
 The answers to this question generally involve training, command and control, 
response patterns, communication systems and data bases, liaison and mutual aid, etc. 
Knowing the answers to these questions permits a department to have an overarching 
view of its functional means and processes necessary to operate. Specifically, it will have 
an analysis of its daily, routine operations and how the department mandate is met. 
  
“What resources, and in what numbers, will be needed to respond to each type of 
terrorist event?”  
Diagram 5 (below) hypothetically lists an asset, the number of personnel assigned to 
that type of asset, and the types of WMD that asset will be called on to mitigate. 
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Risk assessments (particularly in the response capabilities section) provide an 
analysis of critical issues and critical needs when operating in a WMD environment. The 
distribution of resources shown in Diagram 4 describes resource allocation for routine 
operations and functions. 
As displayed in Diagram 5, the WMD response resource allocation needs are clear. 
The two diagrams (4 and 5) are dramatically different. In fact, the distribution of routine 
function resources (for example, personnel) may be nearly inversely proportional to the 
department needs in addressing the WMD terrorist threat. In Diagram 5, note that there 
are 150 personnel assigned to engine companies who can operate in response to three 
types of WMD attack, but only twenty rescue personnel available for addressing six 
types of WMD attack. Multiple, simultaneous attacks of this type would only serve to 
exacerbate this issue. 
The reason for this disparity is that response to a routine matter and response to a 
terrorist/crisis event are two entirely different circumstances, requiring very different 
operational processes, abilities, and resources.  
The expertise, equipment, and resources used most infrequently in daily operations 
will become some of the very elements in greatest demand during response to a terrorist 
event. Attempting to use the larger routine resources as a substitute for them during a 
crisis can/will result in great peril to those resources and an inadequate outcome for the 
conditions being addressed. This situation would be a crisis for the department. 
TRANSITION 4: Terrorist Events Require Crisis Leadership Skills 
The above description of a department’s resources provides an indication of how it is 
prepared to respond to the full range of its mandated duties. But, as can be seen, those 
duties do not always consider the potential for terrorism within a department’s response 
protocols. Similarly, the on-scene command and control of those resources may also not 
calculate the leadership issues – particularly the relationship between resource 
allocation, response patterns, and leadership present at a terrorism event.   
Routine versus Crisis Response  
Due to an emergency department’s experience, training methods, management practice, 
and organizational structure and culture, the ability to recognize a crisis and to respond 
accordingly with methods specifically designed for a crisis (if such methods even exist) 
often develops too late in the course of the crisis to mitigate the issue. Unfortunately, for 
some the recognition does not come at all. 
A crisis is often viewed is as a calculation of the size or scale of the event, but this is 
not always justified. For example, transmitting a fifth alarm for a fire, or calling up the 
police reserve, clearly signifies the occasion of a large-scale event. But this is not 
necessarily a crisis, inasmuch as the department has these existing methodologies and 
resources available to address the problem. In short, the department has a means in 
place to address large, but routine, matters. Conversely, a single police officer, suddenly 
engaged in a shootout with multiple armed subjects, is very much in a crisis status. 
Thus, size or scale alone is not always a legitimate measure for determining the presence 
of a crisis; there is a difference between routine – meaning something prepared for and 
MAHONEY, THREAT-BASED RESPONSE PATTERNS 
!
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
*(!
regularly addressed regardless of size – and a crisis, which is neither routine nor 
prepared for and can either evolve or be sudden and unanticipated.25  
This ability to recognize the difference between routine and crisis conditions is a 
pivotal issue for emergency service leaders in a terrorist war environment. 
Crisis Leadership 
In studies of failure to manage crises, including those involving homeland security-type 
issues, Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government has examined the crucial elements in 
decision making during situations that move from “ordinary” or routine, to “high 
consequence” or crisis conditions.26 The point at which the routine (Status R), moves to 
crisis (Status C) is largely dependent on the amount of “novelty” in the situation and 
how quickly those in charge are able to recognize, and respond to, the novelty or 
newness of the situation. Status R is identifiable by its “familiar” elements and Status C 
by its “unfamiliar” ones. Individuals, institutions, and societies succeed or fail based on 
which set of elements is permitted to dominate the response in times of novelty or crisis.  
Routine vs. Crisis Elements 
Status R contains the following elements: a need for minor customizing; has standard 
operating procedures and clear objectives; has sufficient resources, policies, and laws; 
has sufficient training; has clear authority and organizational structure; is expert driven; 
has some unknowns; and plans are based on known threats.  
Status C contains the following elements: it invalidates some standard responses; 
there is a mismatch between the problem and resources, policies, laws, and experience; 
it requires capability based planning; and it has “unknown unknowns.”  
Routine vs. Crisis Leadership 
Status R leadership elements display: a familiarity with the condition; a substantive 
expertise with the issue; a consultative/directive style of leadership; demonstrated 
interpersonal skills ability; and a reliance on recognition-primed (“I’ve seen this before”) 
decision making.  
Status C leadership elements display: an expertise in multiple operations; a flexible 
“first responder” mindset; a strong personality; risk taking ability; a willingness to 
create a wide organization (a “sudden network”); rapid assessment of network abilities 
(evaluates resources); focuses the network (identifies what is important); decisiveness 
(takes command). 
Recognizing Routine vs. Crisis Situations 
A true crisis is characterized as an event which: has high stakes and high costs; is 
beyond existing resources; consumes available resources; has serious negative 
outcomes; entails a realization that a standard response is inadequate; and requires 
action that is urgent and imperative. There is a loss of control, the size and complexity of 
the situation is expanding, there is command and/or operational confusion, there is a 
lack of authority to act or too many authorities involved, it has high political and media 
attention, it is a unique occurrence or scale, it is beyond what has been prepared for, and 
there is a high level of uncertainty.  
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A “novelty” or crisis can also be characterized as a situation that changes from 
categorized to decentralized, bureaucratic to improvisational, big picture control to a 
possibility of risk, and from familiar reliance to a need for trust.  
As the situation moves from Status R to Status C, the challenge is to not let the “R” 
people and/or methods maintain control according to routine practices, because the 
situation can no longer be overcome by using familiar methods. The main objective in 
overcoming a crisis is to apply creativity, improvisation, and rapid innovation – or 
prepared response patterns whose elements have that built-in crisis capacity as 
compared to routine responses. 
The most common and systemic mistakes made by otherwise bright people in 
addressing crisis constitute cognitive failures which are most likely to occur under 
pressure. These mistakes are created by: over valuing one’s own experience; believing in 
an illusion of experience (discounting what we haven’t seen ourselves); and multiple 
forms of overconfidence, such as believing there is an understanding of the entire 
situation, all the facts are known, being able to make predictions, having a capacity to 
influence outcomes, and being able to control events.  
Actions based on those types of cognitive failure are characterized by: continuing a 
commitment to an irrational action through escalation of that commitment; bounded 
awareness or focusing on the wrong things; over reliance on readily-available data; 
overconfidence; searching for data that confirms pre-conceived beliefs (a valid 
information bias); and an action orientation that has a preference to avoid risk (which in 
crisis only increases risk).  
 
Routine vs. Crisis Indicators 
Routine (STATUS R) Crisis (STATUS C) 
The situation is familiar  The situation is a unique occurrence or scale 
Uses standard operating procedures Is beyond what has been prepared for 
Has clear objectives There is a high level of uncertainty 
There are sufficient resources The problem is beyond the existing resources 
and/or all resources are consumed 
The resources are the correct ones Resources do not match the problem 
The outcomes are expected and normal Has serious negative outcomes 
Authority and organizational structure is clear There is a lack of authority to act or too many 
authorities overlapping 
Is expert driven Experience is not equal to the task   
Plans are based on known threats Requires capability based planning 
Has some unknown conditions Has unknown unknowns 
Response needs minor customizing Invalidates some standard responses 
The threat level is normal There are “high-stakes” involved 
The cost is acceptable  The cost is high 
Action time is normal Action is urgent and imperative 
Command is direct and obeyed There is command and/or operational 
confusion and a loss of control 
It attracts no or normal attention Has high political and media attention 
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What the generals were facing in the earlier warfare examples was a Status C 
situation which they were addressing with Status R process. Their actions represented a 
“cognitive failure” (as evidenced among other of the above indicators) by the fact that 
they were “continuing a commitment to an irrational action through escalation of that 
commitment.” Reviewing the accounts of both battles and the nature of the wars in 
which they occurred, the descriptions of “crisis” and the failures to recognize the 
“novelty” of the situation that existed in the Harvard criteria are plainly evident, along 
with the failure of leadership to respond in an effective way partly due to their inability 
to recognize crisis.  
Clearly, the British admiralty example is the opposite circumstance. 
 
!
Routine vs. Crisis Leadership Skills 
Routine (Status R) Crisis (Status C) 
Familiarity with the condition A flexible mind-set 
Has substantive expertise with the issue Expert in multiple types of operations and can 
rapidly assess network capabilities (evaluates 
resources) 
Has strong interpersonal skills and 
consultation/direction style 
Has a strong individual “take command” 
personality 
Reliance on “recognition primed” decisions Quickly recognizes the “novelty” of the 
situation. Is a risk taker and can focus the 
network (identifies what is important) and a 
willingness to create a wide organization (a 
“sudden network”) 
Diagram 7 
The principle hazard for emergency services in terrorist events (or other forms of crisis), 
in addition to the direct hazard of being targeted themselves by terrorists, is the failure 
to recognize the crisis condition for what it is, as rapidly as possible. Any command 
delay in switching from ‘routine’ to ‘crisis’ operations status can result in disastrous 
outcomes. Yet the very nature of emergency service response patterns and culture can 
aggravate this problem; i.e. departments do not traditionally have separate, prepared, 
and practiced “crisis” response protocols that the commander and operational personnel 
can switch to when the situation requires it.  
Emergency services have well-established methods for managing large or expanding 
emergencies. This is most frequently done through sounding additional alarms, calling 
in mutual aid, applying the Incident Command System (ICS), etc.,27 which is a 
universally accepted and practiced process. But a WMD crisis is not just another large 
emergency; it is a “novel” situation that must be immediately recognized and managed 
according to plans and response procedures designed specifically for these events. In 
fact, a routine plan (such as Mutual Aid or ICS) that facilitates an ever-expanding 
response and use of additional resources, might create the illusion of control and can 
serve to delay the critical command recognition that a crisis is occurring which requires 
a different type of response.28 It is of primary concern that all departments develop such 
crisis awareness and terrorist/crisis-specific operational plans. This will serve to make 
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them more effective in a crisis in their own jurisdictions or when responding under 
mutual aid or ICS.   
The discussion thus far has examined the nature of the threat, the consequences of an 
attack, and the need for changed response patterns to address those threats. However, 
the information developed also indicates that a department can do more than just 
“respond”. It can also take measures to protect itself from being victimized by the 
terrorist attacks. 
TRANSITION 5: These Issues are Addressed through Training and Plans 
As can be seen from the above, for an emergency service operating in a terrorist 
environment, the relationship between threat, resources, leadership, and response 
patterns is an all important equation. The balance between these elements can be 
critical to the department successfully achieving its mandated objectives. That balance is 
gained by making the necessary changes to each of these elements in relation to the 
others, and it is within the department planning and training programs that the most 
significant and effective changes can occur and must begin. 
Training Systems 
Emergency services train their personnel to operate within a practiced and coordinated 
system and process designed to be highly effective and efficient. Significant amounts of 
time and money are allocated to ensuring that every member of the department is fully 
aware of his or her duty, and has the knowledge and means to execute those duties 
properly. The nature of emergency work is such that repetitive conditioning through 
training and exercises ensures that each member will respond to a situation in a manner 
that has been tested and shown to be effective in gaining the desired outcome. The 
training is often conditioned to the point of individual operators responding 
instinctively. This methodology is designed to create teamwork and organization that 
focuses all resources on achieving the desired outcome in the most effective and efficient 
manner. This orchestrated response pattern is nearly universal and contains within its 
normal parameters the capability to meet and address expanding emergencies. In short, 
training methods condition personnel to address situations that have known best 
practices available, regardless of the scale of the event. 
These training programs are experiential at their core. Many years of analysis of what 
happened, what worked, and what proved to be the best solution has evolved into 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). It is absolutely mandatory that such methods be 
developed and applied in daily operations because they represent the collected 
knowledge of years of experience that result in the most effective and efficient means of 
responding to an event. These events that training addresses vary by location, frequency 
and scale, but the thing that remains constant is that, regardless of these dynamics, all 
are familiar events. The very fact that training protocols exist for these conditions is 
prima facie evidence that the condition is a known occurrence for which best practices 
have been derived through experience. The vast majority of all emergency services rely 
on the effective use of these inculcated response patterns by their personnel to carry out 
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the mandate of the department. Such training is at the core of effective emergency 
management practices for routine events. 
Unfortunately, the SOP can also lead to response patterns in individuals and 
organizations that become more automatic and habitual rather than considered. It is 
this reliance on routine actions that can be a primary issue in growing a crisis into a 
disaster. Reliance on known event parameters, and a matching response pattern by a 
department and every individual in it, reflects the core strength of the organization and 
can also become its greatest weakness.  
The longer the delay in recognizing that a crisis is occurring, and then changing 
response patterns accordingly, the worse the outcome can be.29 It must also be 
understood that even if a leader recognizes the existence of a crisis, but has only routine 
resources and response processes available to use, that leader will be overmatched and 
forced to rely heavily on improvisation, which will meet with limited success and 
duration.  
Therefore, the pivotal factors in addressing crisis are situational awareness (having 
knowledge of the totality of an event), the amount of time that has elapsed before crisis 
recognition is made, and having specific crisis response plans available. All these issues 
can be managed by training programs.30 
Training Sources 
Just as SOP are created by experience, the fact that only a select few domestic 
emergency services have first-hand terrorist operations experience precludes the ability 
of others to develop new response patterns from their own knowledge. Those 
departments that do have such experience most likely dealt with a singular event, which 
is certainly not sufficient to draw upon for response plan development for the full range 
of terrorist-type attacks. Limited experience can tend to isolate and focus departmental 
thinking to anticipate a repetition of what has happened to them previously, causing 
them to develop too narrow a plan.31 It is therefore mandatory that terrorist-based 
response patterns be developed by accessing the wealth of information that has been 
gained as a result of decades of worldwide responses to these events. 
While the attempted New York Times Square car bombing, in May 2010, initially 
appeared routine, several issues created a note of caution for responding units: Times 
Square is clearly a high value, iconic target location; the vehicle was hastily left in a 
marked pedestrian cross-walk rather than in a parking space; there were unusual 
“popping noises” coming from the vehicle; there was white smoke without heat; and the 
vehicle was immediately abandoned by the driver.32 None of these factors individually 
might be sufficient to trigger a heightened awareness on the part of the responding 
units, but in the aggregate, where crisis training protocols are comprehensive, they serve 
to give warning that a possible terrorist event is underway. It is understood that initial 
responding units rarely have full information about the conditions they will encounter 
and can therefore be drawn into an environment they would otherwise avoid. That lack 
of information is one of the cautionary indicators of crisis that enhanced training can 
include. 
As previously noted, one of the keys to successful crisis management is the ability on 
the part of the personnel involved to recognize that the environment they find 
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themselves in is in fact, a crisis.33 It may seem odd to suggest that experienced 
individuals might not recognize the novelty of their situation, or that it is actually a 
crisis, but the historic military examples given previously are only representative of 
numerous such examples across the full range of human experience, including the 
emergency services. Inasmuch as modern terrorist objectives bring a form of warfare 
into the realm of the emergency services, it is imperative that those services be prepared 
to address and counter these events with training and preparations at a level, and on a 
scale, that have previously been thought of as matters confined to war and military 
leaders and decision makers. 
Training Curriculum 
Training for Crisis Leadership 
Any crisis can also contain “routine” elements that will be familiar to an experienced 
leader. The presence of such elements can cause a cognitive failure, where the leader 
focuses on the wrong things (a bounded awareness) and develops a myopic view of the 
entire situation. The leader is in danger of making overly focused decisions that rely on 
“recognition primed” thinking, when in fact the entirety of the environment calls for 
decisions that cannot be judged by experience alone.34 
Operational leadership training programs that rely on stress-inducing scenarios to 
test a commander’s ability to acquire, distribute, and utilize ever-expanding resources, 
serve to accustom that individual to managing a wide range of disparate facts and details 
simultaneously.35 It is essentially a test of the individual’s ability to manage the growing 
minutiae of an incident. Such repetitive attention to the management of details can 
occur at the expense of overall situational awareness and unacceptably extend the time 
it takes to recognize that a crisis condition exists. 
Inducing stress can be an effective teaching method, but it must be counter-balanced 
with a process that teaches the leader to regularly detach from issues of detail in order to 
rethink and re-evaluate the totality of the operation in order to recognize crisis 
situations sooner and to take appropriate action. 
Alternatively, resources permitting, a secondary leader can be assigned the duty of 
continuously monitoring and evaluating the entirety of the situation rather than its 
minutiae, and serve as an assistant/advisor to the commander. Such a position would 
provide the commander with a second source of warnings, cautions, and critical advice 
in determining the existence, and managing, of the crisis.36 
Providing Crisis Response Tools 
At the heart of the matter is the fact that due to the lack of specific crisis response status 
training, let alone counter-terrorist training, even if emergency personnel do recognize 
that they are in a crisis, they are left with no other methodologies for response available 
to them other than those designed to address routine conditions.  
Clearly, because of the culture of these organizations, their personnel are highly 
innovative and will quickly regroup and reorganize in a way that eventually develops a 
successful, if limited, path for them to follow. However, in the face of an enemy that has 
factored emergency service methods and capabilities into its attack plans, the terrorist 
overmatching of the department response capabilities may cause that innovative 
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response pattern to be ineffective or to come long after the terrorist’s objectives have 
been met. In short, departmental innovations may come at a time when they can be 
applied to the “recovery” phase, rather than during the crisis management part of the 
event. Thus it is manifest that the amount of time expended to first become aware of the 
crisis situation, and second to apply alternative procedures to counter the crisis, are two 
critical issues in regaining control of the operating environment. 
It is insufficient to train personnel to recognize the presence of a crisis, but not have 
crisis protocols and/or response patterns for them to utilize during the crisis.  As noted 
above, such a situation will leave the leaders and other personnel relying on innovation 
and improvisation alone to address the situation. While emergency service personnel 
are often innovative by nature, the ability to innovate (which is different from 
improvisation) is a highly personal and singular matter. Given similar circumstances, or 
even separate parts of the same incident, an innovative response that is dependent on 
the variables of personal ability and preference can result in drastically different 
outcomes for the same conditions. In the absence of crisis protocols, opportunities for 
innovative and/or improvisational response will soon be overmatched by the growing 
crisis condition. Additionally, recognizing that improvisation requires spontaneous and 
rapid reorganization and instruction, significant modification of protocols, and the use 
of tools, equipment, and technology for purposes for which they were not intended, 
means small chance for success of continued and repetitive improvisation during a 
crisis. 
Routine Training and Crisis Training 
A training program that establishes an additional crisis response training course parallel 
to the routine matters course can start to address the modern form of terrorist warfare 
in its operational area. In essence it means providing instruction in two different forms 
of thinking and operating, based on threat recognition. Traditionally, emergency 
services do not teach multiple, alternative forms of operations and the departments’ 
themselves are not organized, managed, or equipped to function along parallel tracks. 
This, however, is the very functional condition that effectively combating transnational 
terrorism has imposed upon emergency services. 
The first step in establishing a crisis training regimen is to instruct all personnel to 
recognize the signs that differentiate crisis (Status C) from routine (Status R). It is then 
necessary to have a command and operations structure that is authorized and capable of 
immediately changing the department from routine to crisis operations and 
administration as soon as the crisis is recognized. Most importantly, it is necessary for 
the training and command entities to have established crisis policies, plans, procedures, 
and resources in place that can be substituted during crisis for the now inadequate 
routine methods. 
This is not to say that routine procedures become discarded or obsolete; it is within 
the scope of the department mandate that an emergency service will continue to 
respond to other routine matters concurrent with the crisis occurring. However, the 
crisis use of available resources will severely impact the scale and ability of the 
department to respond to the routine matters, requiring significant modification to 
existing routine response patterns as well.37 It is this requirement to maintain both 
forms of response in parallel that will have a significant impact on policy changes. The 
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intensity and level of threat will determine if a department uses dual, parallel response 
patterns for routine and crisis matters simultaneously, or chooses to use crisis response 
mode for all activities to counter the potential consequences of sudden terrorist events 
leading to injury and loss of department personnel in such an environment. 
RESPONSE PLANNING 
The modification of all of the elements of an emergency services department discussed 
thus far is driven by understanding the nature of the threat and the relationship of each 
of the departmental elements to the other. Changing all of those relationships in a 
balanced and cohesive manner, utilizing the sequence of transitions described above, 
will require a department to develop detailed plans based on the consideration of 
thoughts and issues about terrorism that may not currently be included in the overall 
management vision. Department leaders must consider a wide range of new and 
changed issues. 
Planning Considerations 
Simultaneously considering altered and/or random, non-traditional response patterns, 
set to specific types of events, can enhance the potential security of a department’s and a 
community’s valuable resources. A response pattern structured to meet current, factual 
conditions rather than future, presumptive environments, can result in both successful 
and acceptable outcomes within the dynamic created by these terrorist environments. 
Similarly, a review of policies based on administrative and legal matters may reveal 
the need for additional authority or relief from certain other requirements, in order to 
fully function in this changed environment. Virtually every area of a department’s 
functioning – from contracting to recruiting, equipment purchasing, supply 
management, communicating, housing, and promotions, etc. – can be modified to 
update and enhance a department’s security and operational capabilities profile both 
during, and in the aftermath of, one of these incidents. 
As the threat of terrorist activity increases, through various notification means we 
have come to recognize (such as the yellow to orange, orange to red, etc.) a department 
can order different types of operations. For example, "Secure Response Conditions" 
under “orange” conditions can mean changing response routes, responding only with 
police escort,38 blocking private vehicles from transiting roads used by critical 
departmental assets, etc. 
A further heightened threat level may result in a "Limited Service Response 
Condition" wherein departmental resources are retained away from critically hazardous 
or ongoing situations until such time as the immediate danger passes. This response can 
also serve to ensure the survival of those resources for use in protecting the wider 
community.39 
Such overarching departmental policy and training alterations do not come easily. 
The realization that every aspect of a department culture will undergo some change is a 
significant concept to grasp and adjust to. It is also probable that those very individuals 
on whom this change-management task will fall are the same individuals who have the 
longest association with the reliability of the established routines. Conversely, they are 
also the individuals who have the greatest knowledge of the department and all its 
MAHONEY, THREAT-BASED RESPONSE PATTERNS 
!
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
"&!
networked aspects. They should therefore be the most capable of identifying and 
coordinating all the cause-and-effect relationships that a modification of one element 
will require in all the other elements. 
The sequence of the risk assessment, threat-based resource allocation process, crisis 
leadership issue, and training needs alluded to earlier can serve as the pivotal guide in 
managing these terrorism-motivated departmental changes. As a department enters 
into this process it is worth noting the following items: 
• A conceptual model for dual routine and crisis thinking and management can be 
found in the military practice of designating a “General Quarters” condition. All 
routine matters cease, all personnel change immediately from a routine to a crisis 
mind-set, and all operations, equipment, resources, and response patterns 
become crisis condition-based for the duration of the situation. 
• Ensuring the security of critical assets before an incident will positively 
contribute to the availability and sustainability of those resources during and 
after a terrorist event and crisis. 
• Planning for crisis by starting with current departmental conditions and 
resources and working to evolve into a crisis-ready format may not be efficient. 
Consider deciding on the desired departmental outcome or ‘end-game’ for 
operating in a terrorist-induced condition, and work backwards to determine 
what training, procedures, and equipment need to be developed in order to 
ensure the department’s desired outcome. Also calculating potential 
departmental losses created by the terrorist event will help determine the priority 
and scope of subsequent operations and departmental capabilities.40 
• Do not project personal or departmental standards of behavior onto the 
terrorists’ planning and practices. Instead, rely on the stated objectives of the 
terrorists themselves to anticipate the issues that need to be addressed. Rather 
than trying to predict specifics, use the change in preparedness and the improved 
ability of the department to meet and counter the terrorist objectives as the 
measurement of reorganizational success.41 
• It is of primary importance that each department member not only knows his or 
her individual responsibility in the crisis procedure, but also what is the intended 
purpose and outcome of the operations plan in total. This is done so that every 
member can continue to work to achieve that outcome despite any mishaps or 
plan failures caused by the terrorists. This allows leadership initiative to surface 
during crisis. 
• Do not plan to counter what the terrorists are going to do – this is a presumption 
based on knowledge of their past actions. Absent any specific knowledge of actual 
plans, departmental thinking and planning from this basis seriously limits the 
potential to create operations and security measures that can be highly effective 
against terrorist attacks. In essence, this is “planning for the last war” and is an 
example of a hindsight bias. Instead, plan for what the terrorists are capable of 
doing, which is based both on their past actions and current capabilities, using 
knowledge provided by the department’s intelligence agency partners.  Such 
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thinking will keep the department current with the latest threat, and ensure that 
mitigations and plans serve to match or overmatch the terrorist abilities, thereby 
reducing departmental assets’ target attractiveness.   
CONCLUSIONS 
Traditional emergency services are operating in the front lines of combating and 
responding to terrorism. The response protocols used by these departments are based 
on routine emergencies and are insufficient to meet the direct threat of terrorist 
incidents. In order to understand and meet the current level of threat, these 
departments must re-examine conditions, security, and response capabilities through a 
series of steps beginning with a comprehensive risk assessment. Emergency services 
departments must ensure the security of their personnel and critical assets, re-define 
the allocation of resources, prepare for crisis leadership, and develop training methods 
and response patterns that reflect the nature of the current threat environment. These 
elements must be viewed as a continuum of inter-related parts of the same problem, 
rather than individual, independent issues. Creating threat-based response patterns will 
challenge all the assumptions on which current routine-based response patterns exist.  
Command personnel charged with developing these protocols must resist the 
temptation to fall back on what has been done previously under routine response 
conditions.  In fact, many of the protocols developed to respond to a terrorist threat will 
seem to be the antithesis of the very culture of the department itself and may be met 
with significant resistance both internally and externally.  All the parties involved must 
understand, be trained, and be prepared to operate in both routine- and crisis-status 
situations that are different, because a terrorist crisis condition is different from the 
daily, routine condition. The current reality of the terrorist threat and departmental risk 
exposure requires that a prepared emergency services department make these changes.  
By starting with an understanding of the current terrorist threat, and using the 
knowledge gained in each step of the above processes to inform the successive steps, a 
department will overcome the parochial approach to developing its response patterns. A 
department can become informed and transformed to counter the terrorist threat, 
protect its personnel, fulfill its mandate, and continue to serve the community it 
protects in this new terrorist environment. !
Robert T. Mahoney is a retired FBI agent who served as the national manager for all FBI 
Special Operations Groups, assistant legal attaché for terrorism in London, and acting 
assistant special agent in charge in New York. He was in the World Trade Center on 
September 11th and a supervisor in the FBI Crisis Command and Recovery Center thereafter. 
After retiring from the FBI, Mahoney was a team leader in the development of the WMD 
Terrorism Threat and Vulnerability Assessment process for Critical Infrastructures, and 
general manager of security programs for the Port Authority of New York. He holds a master’s 
degree in education and another from the Naval Postgraduate School in national security 
studies. Mr. Mahoney may be reached at r.mahoney@manageemergencies.com.  
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Homeland Insecurity: Thinking About CBRN Terrorism 
Albert J. Mauroni 
As the U.S. government has seen a change of administrations, there is an opportunity 
for a constructive review of how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
addressed the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism 
in terms of policy development and execution to date. Our current homeland security 
approach to CBRN terrorism seems to have its basis in the incidents of 9/11 and the U.S. 
anthrax attacks in October-November 2001. However, our history of homeland defense 
goes back to 1941 (at least); to understand from a policy perspective how the 
government ought to address domestic CBRN terrorism, we need to put it all in context. 
This essay examines the issues of how DHS has prepared for chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear terrorism incidents. DHS should address these threats in a 
consistent and holistic manner, but instead the federal government has developed 
singular hazard-based approaches to each threat. DHS has not assessed its efforts to 
address CBRN terrorism or identified where DHS could improve, and as a result we see 
merely the continuation of previous initiatives. The essay concludes with some 
recommendations on how DHS could improve this area with better policy practices.  
Words Are Important 
The term “WMD” was the word of the year in 2002, but quickly fell into abuse as a term 
of political rhetoric and comedic punch lines. It was originally developed in 1948 by the 
United Nations as an accepted arms control term to describe the nation-state use of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. But today, the term means different things to 
different people and agencies. For that purpose, I’m going to take some time to define 
my terminology.  
The military defines WMD as nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons that can cause 
a “high order of destruction.” I would add to this definition that the intentional use of 
these weapons needs to cause mass casualties, defined as more than one thousand 
injured or dead, during a single incident. I disagree with the FBI’s use of the Title 18 
U.S. Code definition of WMD because of its deliberate lack of reference to the scale of 
the incident. To the Department of Justice (DoJ) lawyers, any amount of CBRN or 
explosives, no matter how small, constitutes a WMD. Even innate devices or hoaxes can 
have WMD aspects. 
The presence of mass casualties is a key aspect of the WMD incident, but “mass 
casualties” is an undefined and nebulous phrase. In general, people use the term to 
describe a situation in which there is one more casualty than the number of available 
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hospital beds in the local area. Because we want to focus on the federal response, we 
need to quantify that number to understand what federal actions are adequate. The 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) chose the number of 1,000 injured 
or dead people for the trigger for its Metropolitan Medical Response Forces. 
In my mind, the term “WMD” is only useful as an arms control term. It is often used 
by international agencies and government officials to discuss a particular class of 
unconventional weapons. However, the United Nations wanted to keep the term open to 
other forms of technology that might equal nuclear weapons in the scope of their 
destructive force, so I’m not against consideration of high-yield explosives, directed 
energy lasers, or other weapons that could realistically cause mass casualties. Ricin and 
botolinum toxin, often used in small amounts for assassinations, are not WMD. 
Airplanes used to cause mass casualty events are not WMD. Pipebombs and grenades 
are not WMD. 
There is a distinction between nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and 
CBRN hazards. This is probably more of an issue for specialists than for laypersons, but 
again, words are important. The term “NBC weapons” should cause one to take into 
consideration that a nation funded its top scientists and engineers with millions of 
dollars and built numerous facilities to develop and test special weapons that had 
definable characteristics and expected outcomes. The military developed operational 
specialists who could use these weapons on the battlefield for the purpose of causing 
measurable operational effects. This is where we got our nerve agents, our anthrax and 
smallpox weapons, and nuclear missiles and bombs. 
These weapons were not developed casually, nor are they “immoral.” They were 
developed because they could, in fact, kill large amounts of people or disrupt operations, 
causing an advantage for the side using them. That’s what military forces do. The 
immorality comes in when the weapons are causally used and noncombatants suffer as a 
result, just as with any weapon system. Nonetheless, the world community has 
developed arms control treaties to regulate the use of these unconventional weapons, 
and the U.S. government has agreed to comply with these treaties. 
One needs to be careful about how we use the term “chemical weapons.” The military 
has always been careful to note the difference between munitions with chemical 
components, such as riot control agents, herbicides, and incendiaries like napalm, and 
toxic chemical munitions, like sarin nerve agent and mustard agent. Again, this is 
because of arms control agreements intended to guide nation-states during wartime. It 
is not against international law to use tear gas, herbicides, or flame munitions. 
CBRN hazards, on the other hand, reflect a more general threat in which certain 
physical compounds could harm individuals through direct exposure, whether 
inadvertent or deliberate.  The key here is that CBRN hazards do not have to be used in 
great quantity or to result in mass casualty events to be a concern to the public. It 
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benefits us, however, to narrow down the definition of what CBRN hazards are. There 
are literally tens of thousands of potential chemicals that could harm an individual 
through direct exposure. Even water has a material safety data sheet. The serious threats 
include toxic inhalation hazards like chlorine and phosgene, not chemicals like mercury 
or sulfuric acid. Anti-plant or anti-animal diseases are not so much a concern as are a 
limited number of pathogens and toxins that are particularly contagious or lethal to 
people. There is a short list of radioactive material, such as highly-enriched uranium, 
plutonium, and cobalt that cause people significant concern. 
I don’t like the term “CBRNE” because that’s an antiterrorism term, not a WMD term. 
The military police and emergency responders within the DOD antiterrorism 
community started using “CBRNE” in the late 1990s because of numerous terrorist 
incidents such as the bombing at Khobar Towers, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the 
Aum Shinrikyo’s Tokyo subway incident. But the antiterrorism community really 
doesn’t worry about the “CBRN” as much as they do the “E.” When it comes to assigning 
resources and time to the most credible threats, the more probable threat of explosives 
wins over CBRN hazards every time.  
THE EVOLUTION OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
There’s a good publication within DHS that describes the history of civil defense and its 
morphing into what we now know as homeland security.1 I don’t intend to go through 
the long linage of that effort, except to note two things. First of all, it’s not a static 
history. Different administrations viewed civil defense/homeland defense in different 
ways, and they moved around the responsibilities from office to office. This is a natural 
part of policy development and maturation, where people can assess how the programs 
are going and where they need to be. That’s something that I’ve hoped would happen 
more within DHS since its inception in 2003, and I’m not sure that this assessment has 
really taken place. 
Second, there has been a change in the focus as to what the federal government’s 
responsibilities are with respect to addressing civil defense/homeland defense roles. 
Initially, the federal government saw its role strictly as providing a response to the 
intentional use of military weapons against U.S. cities and noncombatants. First it was 
the fear of German and Japanese bombers and missiles hitting U.S. cities on the coast. 
Then it was the threat of Soviet bombers and missiles. But the congressional response 
was not to spend great deals of money on this threat. Over time, the state and local 
officials were not as concerned about the possibility of external attack as they were the 
power of Mother Nature. Congress, influenced by those state and local officials, decided 
it was more important for the federal government to respond to states and locals 
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affected by natural disasters and accidents rather than external threats. That balance 
was rudely jarred after 9/11, and we have yet to re-establish a more balanced view.  
Using Public Policy Methodologies 
There are policy analysts, such as Charles O. Jones, who have developed methodologies 
to examine how the federal government addresses specific issues, whether these 
functions are appropriate, whether they are being adequately executed, and whether the 
people in charge are addressing the challenges that are presented. Homeland security 
and national defense are two important public policy issues, and yet it seems rare to see 
any honest, intellectual assessment of the particular projects the government is 
executing. 
Using the Jones model outlined in “An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy,”2 
there are four specific players involved in any public policy issue. There are the decision-
makers at the top ranks of executive agencies who are responsible for developing 
rational policy for areas under their mandate, such as the DHS under secretaries and 
assistant secretaries. There are the technical agencies that have to implement an aspect 
of these public policies, such as FEMA or the Coast Guard or Fire Services. The state and 
federal politicians are never quite comfortable with wide, sweeping actions, so they 
implement policies in small increments rather than addressing reforms in bold strokes. 
Finally, there are the reformists who demand immediate actions despite legal or 
financial challenges. The activists for homeland security exist on both the right and the 
left, especially on issues such as missile defense and border control.  
This model can assist in identifying the challenges in how DHS is executing its 
responsibilities for addressing CBRN terrorism. For instance, on occasion, one might 
find the policy-makers (rationalists) directing agencies (technicians) on how to do their 
jobs in great detail rather than developing policy issues (which is hard). And because 
those policy issues need to be laid out before the challenges are addressed, the 
subordinate agencies end up making policy directives that are ineffective because the 
technicians don’t have a view of the entire policy issue from a higher level. Congress 
ends up being influenced by activists and create grand initiatives, but only incrementally 
fund them. And the challenges pile up. 
Seeking National Guidance 
The recently released National Security Strategy defines its homeland security 
approach as addressing a number of significant challenges.3 There are the generic 
“threats” to American interests, the emphasis over maintaining our borders and to 
stopping the transit of “hostile actors” who are either bringing illegal trade into our 
country or who are intent on causing harm. The ever-present focus on terrorism is plain, 
but less so the emphasis on natural disasters and whatever “other hazards” entails. The 
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National Security Strategy provides the basis for developing public policy for homeland 
security. 
We can argue about what homeland security is and isn’t, but it should be clear that it 
is a broad area covering multiple issues and overlapping concerns where the public 
might expect the federal government to play a role. In responding to natural disasters 
and catastrophic incidents, there was the Federal Response Plan to explain how the 
federal response will address state and local emergencies. This was followed by the 
National Response Plan, and now we have the National Response Framework and 
National Incident Management System. Deliberate CBRN hazards and WMD incidents 
are one subset of the overall national response framework, but we do spend an awful lot 
of energy discussing these very low-probability, high-consequence events.  
There are a number of national strategy documents that address CBRN terrorism 
concerns. I don’t intend to go into each one, but these documents have been the basis 
for explaining how our nation will execute its plans and develop capabilities for 
particular aspects of CBRN terrorism response. The federal government does not often 
distinguish between the approaches of how the military addresses adversarial use of 
NBC weapons on the battlefield from how terrorists use CBRN hazards against 
noncombatants. This is a serious flaw. We don’t lack for top-level guidance, but 
determining what one can do given unclear guidance, budgetary limits, and limited 
areas of responsibility, can be challenging.  
As an example, Presidential Policy Directive 2, a national strategy to “counter 
biological threats” just came out in January 2010. It purports to address all biological 
threats, whether natural or deliberate, under a sweeping architecture of efforts. At a 
recent meeting, one person stated that the only difference between naturally-occurring 
infectious diseases and biological warfare agents was “intent.” Such a statement could 
quickly lead to miscommunications as to who’s in charge of what and whose funds ought 
to be used to address the problem. This casual approach doesn’t help to identify the 
roles and responsibilities for responding to bioterrorism within the federal government.  
U.S. GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS CBRN TERRORISM 
When we examine federal responses to CBRN terrorism, there is a tendency to confuse 
what the DOD does to protect its forces from NBC weapons and what DHS does to 
support state and local responses to CBRN incidents. This hasn’t been helped by the 
confusing, high-level guidance in the National Strategy to Combat WMD, which was 
released in 2002.4  
We’ve seen a deliberate change of philosophy in how the federal government 
addresses CBRN terrorism before and after 9/11. Before 9/11, it was a law enforcement 
exercise that DOD supported as requested. After 9/11, it became a military responsibility 
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to pre-empt the terrorists, with less attention as to the adequacy of civilian response. 
But due to a lack of clarity over roles, missions, and responsibilities, we see a continued 
debate over who’s supposed to do what to whom in both areas. We talk about using a 
“whole of government” approach to CBRN terrorism, often focusing on the efforts of 
DOD, DHS, and DHHS (and other federal agencies). But this also commits the sin of 
blurring the difference between military operations and homeland security. 
Overall, there are many responsibilities across the government when it comes to 
addressing domestic CBRN terrorism. No one should be surprised by the long list of 
involved federal agencies. The broad responsibilities are pretty well known – it’s the 
inter-agency coordination and actual implementation that’s the challenging part. There 
are a lot of people doing different things, and it’s sometimes hard to put the pieces all 
together. This article will focus on the DHS responsibilities and programs, but certainly, 
the discussion could continue as to other federal agencies that are involved in CBRN 
terrorism response.  
Counterproliferation versus Counterterrorism 
There is a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and a National 
Counterproliferation Center (NCPC). Both address WMD issues, but from differing 
perspectives. The counterproliferation community largely focuses on nation-states and 
the means of producing WMD materials and technology, and works long-term policy 
initiatives. The counterterrorism community focuses on tracking violent extremist 
groups who may be seeking WMD materials and technology and their activities 
operating outside of nation-states. Both communities are looking for similar hazards, 
but from different perspectives, using different agencies and different funding. They 
don’t work as well together as they probably should, but that’s because they have 
different agendas. There is a gap. 
There are those people who believe we should force the two communities to work 
more closely together – that we ought to eliminate the gap between the agencies. I don’t 
agree. While the two communities use similar intelligence sources and may be looking at 
similar regions in the world, they are fundamentally different. I don’t believe in the 
popular assumption that terrorists are actively working with “rogue nations” to exploit 
WMD materials and technology. The evidence isn’t there. Nation states invest heavy 
amounts of people and funds to develop specific unconventional weapons, and if they 
were to give or sell them to terrorists, one of two things could happen – either the 
weapons would be traced back to them, or the weapons might get used someplace where 
the nation state regrets. 
Terrorists get their material and technology where they can, from the local economy. 
They don’t have the time, funds, or interests to get exotic. That’s what we see, over and 
over again. The NCTC noted that, in 2008, there were approximately 11,800 terrorist 
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attacks resulting in more than 54,000 deaths, injuries, and kidnappings. Nearly all were 
caused by armed assaults, bombings, suicide attacks, kidnappings, and other 
conventional forms of assault.5   
Early Efforts to Address CBRN Terrorism  
In 2003, DHS began developing its CBRN terrorism response efforts by basically 
copying the DOD’s CBRN defense concept. This included recommending the use of 
plastic sheets and duct tape for homes and businesses to provide “shelter in place” 
collective protection and the use of point detectors to identify lethal levels of chemical, 
biological, and radiological hazards. There were two major problems with this approach. 
First, the threat of CBRN hazard exposure to people at home (or even businesses) was 
about near zero, and second, the low probability of a CBRN hazard being used on any 
one day during the year at any one particular site within the United States was 
practically zero. It was not a sustainable strategy if one demanded eternal vigilance at all 
locations with the goal of eliminating all threats. And of course, the U.S. government 
wasn’t protecting all potential terrorist targets. 
The Homeland Security Planning Scenarios are ridiculously unrealistic in portraying 
the expected threats to the homeland. Of the fifteen scenarios, eleven are CBRN-
focused, and not just typical CBRN hazards but significant quantities of military warfare 
agents such as anthrax, smallpox, sarin nerve agent, and mustard agent. They are 
“worst-case” scenarios, which are good for leadership exercises where you want to 
encourage interagency communications or to identify whether policies or resources are 
a limiting factor, but they are lousy for making resourcing decisions. Worst-case 
scenarios rely on movie-theater plots that maximize the threat only because that’s the 
best way to get a maximum number of senior leaders within multiple agencies at the 
federal level involved to play in a short, annual national exercise. The 10-kiloton nuclear 
scenario is particularly ridiculous, but let’s wait on that discussion. 
As a result of these plans, we’ve inflated the stature of foreign terrorists into twelve-
foot ubermensch. The term “non-state actor,” a phrase that is routinely used around 
Washington, DC, applies to a larger cast of villains, including private militias, 
insurgents, criminals and drug smugglers, anyone who is basically working outside the 
government and conducting illegal activities. The concern focuses on those foreign 
(transnational) violent extremist organizations who generally receive some kind of basic 
military training so that they can use automatic rifles and grenades.  
The basic approach used by terrorists and insurgents is to seek out and use low-risk, 
easily-acquired weapon systems. Any weapon that can be improvised using available 
and accessible materials is good; any weapon that can be bought on the open market 
and easily used is good. CBRN materials don’t fit that niche. The reason why terrorists 
are interested in CBRN hazards is because so many senior leaders keep vocalizing how 
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afraid they are of this particular threat. Before 9/11, the interest was not as strong (and 
the senior leader rhetoric about “WMD threats” wasn’t, either). 
While terrorists are interested in CBRN hazards, they can’t get the dangerous 
precursor materials, they don’t have any training in handling or dispersing these 
hazards, and they don’t understand the particular effects on their targets. So we see 
some scattered use of industrial chemicals, some production of ricin toxin from castor 
beans, a few grams of radioactive material stolen from a facility – not exactly mass 
casualty threats. As terrorists attempt to develop more sophisticated weapons in an 
effort to create mass casualties, their machinations become more public and it actually 
becomes easier to catch them. 
Chemical Terrorism 
Chemical terrorism has been downplayed recently, ironically because it doesn’t cause 
enough casualties for high-consequence scenarios. Chemical terrorism remains the most 
likely form of CBRN terrorism, if one looks at the relative ease of obtaining industrial 
chemicals from the economy and low threshold of training and equipment required. 
Still, people focus on the nerve agents as the “likely” threat, not because they’re 
available, but because they’re the most lethal. Actual cases show terrorists seeking 
available industrial chemicals rather than making nerve agents, with one exception. 
Aum Shinrikyo had millions of dollars, facilities, trained chemists, and years of practice 
to make its sarin nerve agent. Most terrorist groups lack those resources. 
I’m not a proponent of the DHS Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Standards, where the 
department looks to identify all chemical storage facilities and to make their owners 
assess the security of their chemicals. All this does is cause incentives to industry to 
move the chemicals somewhere else. Instead of focusing on the major producers, DHS 
diminishes its efforts by trying to cover tens of thousands of small facilities and anyone 
using a chemistry kit. It becomes a paperwork drill where no one addresses the really 
tough problems. 
The toxic inhalation hazards, such as chlorine and phosgene, represent the most 
challenging terrorist threat, but that doesn’t stop DHS from listing sixteen pages of 
“chemicals of interest.”6 Even then, getting cylinders of chlorine gas in the United States 
is not as easy as it used to be. Many water treatment plants have converted to 
alternatives to chlorine gas. Most toxic chemicals have colors or smells that cause people 
to take preventive measures prior to succumbing to their effects. But in the end, we 
know how to address hazardous material incidents, right? So why is this so difficult to 
address? 
The railcar discussions are particularly amusing, in that there is so much concern 
about a hazmat derailment within a major city. So the answer is to divert hazardous 
materials around a city, right? There are two things wrong with that – the secondary 
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rails are less well maintained, and so represent a greater safety risk. And legal issues 
with regulation of interstate rail transport get in the way.  
We’re driven in the chemical industry to use this mentality of limiting exposure to the 
general public to “as low as reasonably achievable” or ALARA. This approach results in 
promoting “worst-case” EPA plume analyses that use minimum levels of incapacitating 
exposure as guidance for area effects, overestimating the actual impact of such 
incidents. We need to be serious about the probability of “high-consequence” events and 
what can be done to address them. DHS should focus on providing installation security 
assessments and identify ways to assist industry rather than being watchdogs. 
Biological Terrorism 
Bioterrorism is the flavor of the year, thanks to a recently-released government report 
titled “World At Risk” by former senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent.7 Hollywood and 
fiction novels have done their best to ensure we all believe that a contagious virus 
without any cure is being secretly developed in a government lab and will wipe out 
civilization as we know it. We have a very long history on the treatment of natural 
diseases, and with the rise of biological warfare the difference between addressing 
deliberate and natural disease outbreaks gets very blurry. Some people say that, merely 
because there is greater access to information and technology related to natural 
biological diseases, there is a corresponding increasing chance of a bioterrorist incident. 
This isn’t necessarily so. 
One requires a large amount of biological warfare (BW) agent to successfully cause 
mass casualties, and these agents can’t be made in a bathtub. You can’t go to Wal-Mart 
stores to obtain dangerous biological assays or to Home Depot for equipment to grow 
biological material. Bruce Ivins was successful because he had a full laboratory suite and 
starter material available to him, plus decades of experience in handling anthrax.8 But 
while the dangerous agents are hard to make, the diversity of the biological threat 
complicates the development of particular solutions. That isn’t to say that we haven’t 
made a good faith effort. 
There are at least a dozen top BW threats, but under Project Bioshield, we have 
vaccines for only two of them. Maybe in another ten years, we’ll have a few more 
vaccines, but certainly not twelve. For the 270 cities in the United States with a 
population of more than 100,000, only thirty-odd cities have Project Biowatch 
detectors. It’s a very expensive project to sustain against a wide variety of potential 
threats. But this isn’t just a medical issue, although the medics have assumed the 
spokesperson role.  
Let’s look at the “whole of government” approach to public health. DHS coordinates 
the Biowatch effort and the National Biosurveillance Integration Center effort. It’s not a 
lot of money. DHHS has more than $80 billion a year invested into public health (not 
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including nondiscretionary spending). This includes the work at CDC. The DOD has its 
Defense Health Program funded at $40 billion a year. This includes all the military 
hospitals and TRICARE program, in addition to medical surveillance and treatment on 
the battlefield. The Department of Veterans Affairs department handles the health care 
of former military and is slightly bigger than the active duty health affairs efforts at $41 
billion a year, but that’s not a big surprise. 
Then there’s the DoD combating WMD community. While two-thirds of its $15 
billion annual budget is spent on missile defense and special operations efforts, there 
are some funds spent on medical countermeasures and responses to biological warfare 
agent use. And finally, the international community plays a role through numerous non-
governmental agencies as well as international health organizations. There are lots of 
players addressing different aspects of this huge area we call “public health.”  
By the estimates of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh, there is 
roughly $5-6 billion a year spent on “biological defense,” depending on how one defines 
that project. The FY2011 budget calls for about $6.5 billion. The “whole of government” 
challenge is managing all these efforts without disrupting anyone’s rice bowl and still 
keeping cognizant of the bioterrorism threat, in addition to other public health concerns 
of infectious diseases, drug safety, and other health concerns. 
People like to quote the total federal investment of $58 billion in biodefense projects 
over the past ten years to discuss the efforts made in this one specific area of CBRN 
terrorism. It’s a misleading number, since many of the projects address multiple or 
tangential goals, not just domestic bioterrorism. However, the question should not be, is 
this too much money, but rather, how well is the money spent toward achievable goals? 
And we don’t really know, because no one has established the end state against which 
we ought to be planning.  
In January 2009, I presented a paper on behalf of the Project for National Security 
Reform, examining the progress we’ve made since the “Biodefense Strategy for the 21st 
Century” was released in April 2004.9  Overall, the framework of the strategy is good. It 
identifies all the aspects required to respond to domestic bioterrorism and assigns 
responsibilities to the right federal agencies. In fact, it is unique in that there is no 
equivalent chemical or rad/nuclear framework (and that ought to be a concern). The 
problem is that no one has assessed how well the agencies were performing, if they were 
going in the right direction or required rebalancing, or if the end state was achievable 
given the available resources and personnel.  
My research revealed that there are significant limitations on the progress made over 
the past five years. In particular, it was not apparent that there was any direct day-to-
day federal oversight of CBRN terrorism response measures. Both the National Security 
Council and Homeland Security Council were consumed with daily emergencies and 
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meetings, and there was little to no oversight of what executive agencies were doing and 
if more funds or guidance were needed.  
The generic terrorist threat is often referenced without any specific understanding of 
specific group motivations or activities. Al Qaeda has stated intentions to use CBRN 
hazards, but this has not led to the actual development of any specific capabilities. While 
the Proliferation Security Initiative has equipment for rad/nuke interdiction, there are 
no technologies to support biological interdiction. We’re blindly attacking the tools 
instead of the terrorists. 
The lack of any effort to harden critical infrastructure, notably with collective 
protection filters and CB agent detectors, surprised me. While integrating improved 
collective protection systems into existing buildings can be done, it’s not an area that 
you see implemented. It seems like a relatively easy solution, but it seems that people 
would rather spend the money on military intervention or medical response rather than 
general protection.  
I already mentioned the lack of vaccines and medical countermeasures for biological 
agents. The challenge was, and continues to be, that Big Pharma has no incentive to get 
involved in researching these specialized medical countermeasures. It’s too expensive, 
it’s not profitable, and it could lead to lawsuits if the drugs are incorrectly used. The 
government’s offer of indemnity isn’t winning any friends. 
Bioforensics remains a tough challenge, considering the number of different strains 
of biological organisms. I don’t know how many anthrax strains there are, for instance, 
but information on specific biological organism strains was helpful in narrowing down 
the Amerithrax suspect to a domestic source. The Biowatch effort should not be 
acceptable to any serious analyst. False positives aside, we’ll never get adequate 
coverage for the entire United States, or even a majority of the nation’s major cities, 
because it is too expensive to run 24/7 and to test all the samples in a lab. Even with the 
proposed Gen 3 biowatch detector, which doesn’t exist right now, DHS plans to roughly 
double its monitors to cover sixty cities. Using point detectors for national special 
security events makes sense. Biowatch doesn’t. 
DOD has an impressive amount of personnel standing by for responding to a CBRN 
incident. At last count, it was approaching fourteen to fifteen thousand people ready to 
respond to assist state and local emergency responders. Although they might be useful 
for addressing the consequences of a chemical or radiological terrorist incident, they’re 
not much help for biological terrorist incidents – especially a “no-notice” attack – other 
than offering a presumptive identification that the “white powder” threats isn’t anthrax.  
Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism 
Radiological terrorism gets people excited because, even though the nature of 
radiological hazards hasn’t changed in more than six decades, there’s something about 
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radiation that spooks us. The term “dirty bombs” has a sinister sound. But of all the 
terrorist CBRN hazards, radiological devices (RDD) are certainly not WMD. We have 
never had an RDD incident to date, and yet so many people like to worry about the loose 
or available radiological isotopes that could be grabbed up by terrorists. 
I’m very critical about the approach to addressing radiological terrorism. It’s no 
surprise that the easiest way to reduce our risk in this area is to secure all the 
radiological material that industry uses and to place it in one location that could be 
guarded. Instead, because of NIMBY politics, the decision was made to close down a $9 
billion nuclear material repository and to maintain the status quo of storing nuclear 
material in “temporary” storage near more than 120 nuclear facilities across the nation. 
The idea of placing radiological monitors at every airport, sea port, and border 
crossing is, again, a concept that DHS adopted from the DOD. There’s no question that 
the radiological dosimeters and monitors work when presented with an isotope. It’s just 
that using these detectors at the thousands of possible entry points, considering the 
huge and constant flow of personnel and cargo, is a really stressful and expensive 
operation. We do not have reliable, cheap detectors that can be integrated into the 
process of screening people and cargo without negatively impacting our economy.  
Getting past the actual implementation of such a vast network of detectors, let’s look 
at the real 800-pound gorilla in the room. Some people fear that al Qaeda is going to 
somehow obtain a nuke from Pakistan, disable the safety mechanisms, and transport it 
to a U.S. city. Some fear that al Qaeda will build a crude nuclear bomb, using technical 
expertise and material through the global economy. The scenario of a 10-kiloton nuclear 
blast is what causes people to “lose sleep,” allegedly. And yet, if you examine the facts, 
it’s not likely at all that this is a credible scenario. 
I strongly recommend Brian Jenkins’ book Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?10 and 
Michael Levi’s book On Nuclear Terrorism11 for anyone who’s interested in an objective 
discussion on this topic. In short, nations with nuclear technology or materials need to 
consider whether the bomb will be traced back to them, and where the bomb might be 
used. It might not be in the United States, it might be in a neighboring country. The 
number of people who would need to be engaged to get/build a bomb and move it to the 
United States, let alone engineer a successful detonation, would make this a complex 
operation that would be visible to law enforcement and the intelligence community. We 
have no compelling evidence that any nation has provided a terrorist group with 
chemical or biological weapons – why on earth would they provide a terrorist group 
with nuclear weapons? It doesn’t make sense.  
The “high-altitude EMP blast” scenario is particularly outlandish, suggesting that a 
terrorist organization would be able to move a ballistic missile to the coast of the United 
States and set off a megaton nuke 200 miles over the country just to collapse the 
electronic infrastructure and turn America into a pre-industrial society. There are better 
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odds that an asteroid the size of Texas might collide with a major city within the United 
States. Resiliency is the answer – it would be simple to harden critical infrastructure 
points and maintain spares to stop this scenario from occurring. The argument here 
actually masks a separate debate over the continued development of a comprehensive 
(and very expensive) national missile defense effort.   
Bottom line, we’re already petrified that al Qaeda is going to nuke America, even 
lacking any evidence that it has one or could get a nuclear weapon. So why does al 
Qaeda need a nuclear bomb? It already has accomplished its purpose of terrifying the 
country. And yet, we see the unfolding of this massive “Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture” that’s designed to ensure our politicians can sleep well at night. We could 
cite the statistics – the hundreds of ports, the thousands of miles of border, the “second 
line of defense” – and ask is this the most effective way to address the challenge of a 
terrorist rad/nuke incident? 
The scope of the global architecture keeps growing. In addition to the major air and 
sea ports and border crossings, the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has 
proposed going after all the smaller air and sea ports that cater to private vessels. And 
then there’s the idea of populating the major cities and interstate roads between cities 
with radiological monitors. Is this a sustainable plan? Is it really effective, considering 
the limits of radiological detection technology? I would argue, no. The false alarms and 
cost of maintaining such a nation-wide system are prohibitive, considering the very low 
probability of occurrence and other options available to the national security 
community.  
The GAO is actually very reserved in its criticism in this area.12 It focuses on the lack 
of a strategic plan with measurable actions rather than on the feasibility of the concept 
itself, because the GAO strongly believes in strategic planning in any area of 
government. But let’s be clear, this is a losing proposition. It is security theater, 
designed to make us feel good about doing something against a threat that people feel, 
in their gut, is an unacceptable challenge, despite the lack of any credible possibility of it 
occurring.  
This is the least probable threat, granted one with an extremely high-consequence 
event if it is successful. Increasing the effort to focus on the origins of the rad/nuke 
material, in addition to good old-fashioned law enforcement and intelligence work, 
would be a far more effective solution than developing a network of detectors that focus 
on a particular hazard that could be easily shielded. To truly be effective, we need to 
develop a strategy that is guided by resources and that can be sustained throughout the 
year. 
Let’s assume that, worst case, a nuclear bomb is smuggled into a major U.S. city. Let’s 
not pick New York City, that’s been debated enough. But say a nuke goes off in Atlanta 
or Chicago or Seattle. Let’s assume that the terrorists had a functional bomb that yielded 
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a 10-kiloton blast, not a crude device that resulted in a 1-2 kiloton fissile. Certainly 
thousands of Americans would die and a city would be irrevocably damaged. But would 
the United States stop, falter, collapse as a nation? No. A single nuclear terrorist event is 
not an existential threat to such a massive country. It can be managed, and given all the 
effort already in place to prevent such an incident, it’s not what ought to be keeping us 
up at night.13  
DOD Efforts to Respond to CBRN Terrorism 
The DOD became involved in the discussion of federal response to CBRN terrorism in 
the late 1990s because Secretary of Defense William Cohen wanted his technical 
specialists to be involved in any federal response to a CBRN terrorist incident. Since 
everyone believed the threat was NBC weapons, DOD was of course the subject-matter 
expert. We already had a limited capability with the Army’s Technical Escort Unit and 
the Marine Corp’s Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), the latter 
developed after the Aum Shinrikyo incident in 1995. So Cohen started with the concept 
of WMD Civil Support Teams to advise and assist state and local emergency responders. 
Congress really liked that idea, and now we have fifty-seven teams deployed across the 
U.S. states and territories. 
That wasn’t good enough, so DOD designed a Chemical-Biological Rapid Response 
Team, using various Army, Air Force, and Navy technical specialists, and later designed 
a “Guardian Brigade” in 2005. The National Guard decided to help with seventeen 
CBRNE Emergency Response Force Packages (CERF-P), which placed a CBIRF-type 
organization in every FEMA region (with some extra units for redundancy). The Bush 
administration pushed for a more robust capability using active duty forces, identifying 
the need for three large CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) 
to address multiple, simultaneous mass casualty events, but the strains of combat 
operations in the Middle East were significant, so that idea collapsed. As an alternative, 
the National Guard may provide additional response capability by creating ten 
Homeland Response Forces (HRF), one in each FEMA region.  
The development of DOD response forces assumes that the states and local 
emergency responders will become overwhelmed by a high-consequence WMD event 
within forty-eight to seventy-two hours, and that gradual waves of federal troops are 
required to reinforce the response to that incident until it is concluded. So DOD comes 
in if a state governor requests federal support, if DOD is seen as necessary to that 
support, and if the DOD secretary approves it. However, if a high-consequence event 
never occurs, is this really a necessary capability? It is more likely that state and local 
emergency responders will be able to address the majority of CBRN terrorist incidents 
(short of that 10-kiloton event), given adequate training and preparation. It’s an awful 
lot of manpower standing around, waiting for the firehouse alarm that may never ring.  
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As an example of DOD’s own inherent challenges in addressing “homeland defense” 
with military chemical-biological (CB) detectors, let me offer this case study. Shortly 
after 9/11, DOD leadership was concerned that terrorists were going to attack U.S. 
military installations with CB warfare agents. There was no clear intelligence to support 
this, but it was a gut feeling based on the belief that terrorists liked mass casualties and 
domestic military installations were the top targets. It wasn’t exactly a solid piece of 
analytical work.14  
In 2002, DOD had more than 650 military bases and installations across the globe, 
but because of financial implications, the Office of the Secretary of Defense decided that 
it would provide funds to develop CB defensive measures for 200 of these bases, the 
majority of which were within the continental United States, at a cost of $5 million each. 
In addition to the one billion dollars for the project, there was another half-billion 
dollars allocated for training installation responders. This would provide a number of 
chem-bio detectors (no radiation detectors) tied into the emergency ops center, some 
protective gear and medical countermeasures, hazard plume software and warning 
sirens, and training and concept development. This was supposed to provide a basic 
level of protection for the installation. 
The effort began in 2004, and within the first two years only one base received 
enough gear that might constitute an adequate antiterrorism capability. Most of the 
bases only received limited gear for the emergency responders, rather than receiving a 
full antiterrorism capability. In 2006, half of the billion dollars was funneled off for a 
new program aimed at developing “silver bullet” vaccine shots for “broad spectrum” 
biological threats. The main failure lay in the inability of the antiterrorism and CB 
defense communities to implement an integrated, all-hazard “CBRNE” operational 
concept for military installations and bases. The antiterrorism community didn’t view 
CBRN hazards as a significant threat, and didn’t appreciate having specialized 
equipment forced onto them.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Homeland security is not a new issue. It’s encouraging that we have advanced education 
now and interagency discussions on how we all can address the threat of domestic 
CBRN incidents, from the state and local level through the federal level. But we need 
serious reviews of the policies that are in place and to use that “risk-based” management 
approach to ensure that we are spending our funds wisely. We continue to view WMD or 
CBRN hazards as the threat – that’s a myopic focus. We need to look at the process by 
which terrorists develop their tools and understand that it is by defeating the terrorists 
that we can stop the CBRN threat. When you take a realistic look at the threat and what 
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terrorists can actually do – outside of a television show like 24 – it’s not a difficult thing. 
We can do this more smartly. 
There is a fundamentally better approach to developing a federal response to 
domestic CBRN incidents, but we need to start by stopping the loose use of the term 
“WMD.” It only confuses the discussion and presents an unachievable goal that 
obstructs serious discussion. We need to clearly separate the concepts of how militaries 
defend against NBC weapons and how emergency responders address terrorist CBRN 
hazards. These are very different concepts. We should not act as if a terrorist group has 
the capability to do as much damage as a nation with an active WMD program. Although 
the military threat is similar to the terrorist threat in terms of physical composition, the 
scope of the incident and required concepts and equipment are entirely unique. We have 
to develop a sustainable, effective solution that can be employed throughout the year to 
protect untrained noncombatants.  
We need to address the mass casualty definition to allow more informed discussions 
on possible approaches to realistic scenarios. My suggestion is to develop a three-part 
framework based on the expected number of casualties: 
• Type A: 100 – 1,000 casualties (Oklahoma City bombing) 
• Type B: 1,000 – 5,000 casualties (9/11 incident) 
• Type C: 5,000 – 50,000 casualties (nuclear weapon incident) 
By better defining the consequences of a terrorist incident, we can develop focused 
initiatives that can be measured against easily understood scenarios. Similarly, the 
Homeland Security Planning Scenarios have to be changed to reflect realistic and 
probable threats, not “worse-case” scenarios. By using the scenarios as the basis for 
national-level exercises, we risk the danger of overestimating the actual need for unique 
and specialized resources that may never be employed within our lifetimes. We should 
not lose sight of the fact that the majority of incidents requiring federal response to state 
and local emergency responders will be for natural disasters and industrial accidents 
rather than WMD.  
In developing policies that try to protect everything, we protect nothing. We need to 
develop strategies that are guided by resources, recognizing that there are multiple 
homeland security threats that all have to be addressed. It actually is a question of “if, 
not when” we ever see a CBRN terrorist incident that results in mass casualties. We need 
a sustainable, effective approach, which requires us to stop overhyping the threat. It’s 
not September 12, 2001, anymore. We need to realistically assess the challenge and all 
possible threats – natural and man-made – and calmly, rationally, develop a plan that 
doesn’t bankrupt the annual operating budget. None of us have enough money to 
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provide perfect protection for everyone throughout the year, and there are better things 
to spend money on – like retirement plans. 
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Fish don’t try to turn sharks into vegetarians. Living immersed in a world of constant 
risk forces the fish to develop multiple ways to live with risk, rather than trying to 
eliminate it. The fish can dash away from the shark in a burst of speed, live in places 
sharks can’t reach, use deceptive coloration to hide from the shark, form schools with 
other fish to confuse the shark, it can even form an alliance with the shark, and all of 
these things may help the fish solve the problem of how to avoid getting eaten by the 
shark. But none of these adaptations will help the fish solve the general problem of 
predation, and they don’t need to. The fish doesn’t have to be a perfect predator-
avoidance machine. Like every single one of the countless organisms it shares a planet 
with, the fish just has to be good enough to survive and reproduce itself.  
The world in which we spend our daily lives is also full of risk. Acts of terrorism that 
seem to come out of nowhere. Wars that have carried on too long and show little 
progress toward resolution. Catastrophic failures of supposedly fail-safe oil rigs. 
Intensifying natural disasters fueled by global changes in climate. A distribution of food 
that leaves billions undernourished and millions of others facing an obesity epidemic. A 
cyber infrastructure that we’ve become increasingly dependent upon that also has 
become increasingly vulnerable to catastrophic attack. New diseases and new mutations 
of old diseases that threaten to become global pandemics. The major threats society 
faces today are ominous and complex interplays of human behavior and environmental 
change, global politics, and local acts of cruelty or carelessness, historical accidents, and 
long-simmering tensions. Some of these threats have plagued us as long as we have been 
human and yet we’ve made little progress against them, others are becoming more 
dangerous in synergy with rapid climatic and political changes, and still others are just 
now emerging.  
Yet the responses we been offered or forced to accept by the experts we’ve entrusted 
to solve these problems often seem frustratingly ineffective, naïve, or just plain 
ridiculous. When increased body screening of airline passengers was implemented after 
9/11, Richard Reid attempted to destroy an airliner with a bomb in his shoe. When 
shoes began to be screened in response to Reid’s attack, al Qaeda plotted to use a liquid 
explosive attack. When liquids were banned, Umar Abdulmutallab used a powdered 
incendiary hidden in his underwear in an attempted attack. A wall constructed between 
parts of the U.S. and Mexico border at a cost of between $1 million and $10 million per 
mile, slows down illegal immigrants by an estimated twenty minutes, even in its most 
fortified areas.1 And on a tiny island in the tiny town of Beaufort, North Carolina there is 
a tiny outpost of the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) that 
studies fish populations and coastal ecology. There is little reason to suspect this outpost 
is on any terrorist’s list of desirable targets. Yet when the NOAA coastal scientists 
wanted to renovate and add some space a few years back, they were forced by the 
Department of Homeland Security to install enormous Wal-Mart style parking lot lights 
on their facility as a required security measure. This was ironic, since the scientists 
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working at the lab know full well that nighttime light pollution is a major threat to the 
ecology of the same coastal marine environments that they are paid by taxpayers to 
study.2   
The most famous line of the 9/11 Commission report was that 9/11 represented a 
“failure of imagination,”3 and this was certainly an apt description of the security 
situation up until 9/11. However, now that we imagine almost anything to be a threat to 
our security, a more pernicious problem faces all of our security systems: a failure of 
adaptation. Adaptation is the process of changing structures, behaviors, and interactions 
in response to changing conditions in the environment. Adaptability is the capacity to 
adapt to these changes – something that despite an unprecedented amount of attention, 
financial resources, and human lives sacrificed in the name of security since 9/11, has 
still largely eluded us. 
Fortunately, we have at our disposal a vast storehouse of largely untapped knowledge 
that could guide us in developing adaptable security systems. It is a massive set of 
proven solutions (and teachable failures) to the very same problem that unites all of the 
threats we face – that is, how to survive and thrive in a risky, variable, and uncertain 
world. Remarkably, this database is completely unclassified and accessible to anyone.  
The solutions I’m referring to are all contained in the staggering diversity of life on earth 
– millions of individual living and extinct species, and countless individuals within those 
species – which have been developing, testing, rejecting, and replicating methods to 
overcome the challenges of living on a continually changing planet. These organisms 
have been experiencing security challenges and developing solutions since long before 
any presidential administration or Congress has developed their security agenda, since 
long before 9/11 finally woke most of us to the new post-cold war reality, since long 
before industrialization pushed our biogeochemical cycles into chaos, and long before 
humans ever walked the earth. Indeed, the 3.5 billion-year history of life imbues 
biological systems with more experience dealing with security problems than any other 
body of knowledge we possess.  
And because we ourselves are biological creatures, our own species’ evolution (and 
the modern manifestations of that evolutionary process) is not only an integral part of 
this natural database, but perhaps the most important set of data to consider. This 
means that in addition to the ecologists, paleontologists, virologists, and evolutionary 
biologists who have something novel to contribute to our security debate, so too do 
anthropologists, psychologists, soldiers, and first responders who have extensive 
behavioral observations of people and societies under the stress of insecurity in an 
uncertain environment.  
I have been working with exactly these types of people for the last five years, 
primarily through my working group on “Darwinian Security” at the National Science 
Foundation-funded National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis (NCEAS) in 
Santa Barbara, CA, and through interactive discussions with participants in several 
programs at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS). The ideas 
developed in these lively discussions have been further honed in presentations to 
security think tanks and academic institutions, in corporate seminars and discussions 
with elected officials, and through response to our edited volume, Natural Security: A 
Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World (University of California Press, 2008).  
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We have found that there is an increased openness among biologists to apply 
ecological and evolutionary ideas beyond biology, and receptiveness among societal 
institutions to incorporate biological knowledge into practice in, for example, using 
ecosystem analysis to study the global financial collapse. While there have been 
attempts to copy designs from nature to apply to security concerns (for example, 
designing submarine hulls based on the hydrodynamic shape of a tuna), and 
applications of biological models to studies of conflict, our approach considers key 
questions across the broad spectrum of security concerns and seeks insight from natural 
patterns and dynamics (Fig. 1). It is from this rich store of human knowledge that I 
present the general rules, specific examples, and pertinent applications of naturally-
inspired security that can be implemented in the analysis, planning and practice of 
security in society. 
 
!
Figure 1: Naturally Inspired Security. Applying natural security is a reiterative process that begins with 
security questions in society and uses natural history-based inquiry to find analogies and models, which 
can then be applied to society. Applications can then be further refined with more detailed societal 
questions and biological observations. Examples given are illustrative, not exhaustive. 
BASIC PROPERTIES OF NATURAL SECURITY SYSTEMS 
Since we have incredibly limited communication with all but one species of the millions 
of natural security experts, how can we tap their knowledge? In some cases, we will have 
just the raw data to observe and work with – the remarkably diverse ecosystems, 
organisms, cells, and molecules that inhabit the earth. Still more knowledge can be 
gleaned from ancient observations of nature made since the earliest human societies, 
from painstaking natural history and evolutionary biology conducted over the 150 years 
since Darwin’s revolutionary On the Origin of Species, and from the most cutting-edge 
biological research on protein folding, genome mechanics, and network analysis that 
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have massaged these raw data into stories and models and theories about how biological 
organisms survive and thrive on a dangerous planet. What emerges from this vast and 
growing field of study are a few simple themes that are essential in understanding how 
to translate natural security to societal security. 
First, patterns in nature appear similar across different levels of biological 
organization. By levels of biological organization I mean the progression from molecules 
to DNA to cells to bodies of individual organisms to populations of those individuals to 
communities of those individuals interacting with individuals of other species to 
ecosystems which include the species, habitats, chemical and energetic interactions 
between them all in a given area. What is remarkable is that similar patterns – for 
example, using non-centralized organization to sense and respond to the environment – 
appear at each level of this organization. This nested quality of biological systems arises 
from their recursive character, meaning that the rules and patterns occurring at one 
level are not just similar to those at the next level, but essential in defining what 
happens at the next level. All of this is a good sign for applying biology to security in 
society because it suggests that biologically-guided solutions successfully implemented 
at one level (say, within a single office in FEMA) will be applicable at a completely 
different level (e.g., throughout the Department of Homeland Security). It also 
invalidates the excuse that we can’t change security policy unless our highest levels of 
government change. I argue that we can start at any level of society in instituting more 
adaptable security systems and, if we align our incentives correctly, these ideas can 
easily (in fact will almost inevitably) spread up and down different levels of organization 
in society.  
Second, complex natural patterns and processes arise from very simple building 
blocks. The four basic molecules of DNA code for a vast diversity of organisms that live 
in completely different ways and deal effectively with vastly different challenges. Moving 
up the levels of biological organization, natural selection, which has molded millions 
and millions of species into their forms today, is an incredibly simple process requiring 
just three simple building blocks: variation between individuals, environmental 
conditions that favor (or select) certain variants over others, and a means to reproduce 
those variants that are better suited to the environment. At yet a higher level, the simple 
process of individual organisms trying to survive and reproduce ends up producing 
networked ecosystems that are complex and resilient. Accordingly, natural security isn’t 
about rising to the complexity of the security threats we face by designing a hugely 
complex system with flow charts and acronyms and multi-variate statistical outputs. It’s 
about finding simple processes that impart our security systems with the adaptability to 
deal with a wide range of threats. 
Third, biological evolution doesn’t plan, design, or set goals of perfecting an 
organism. Evolution proceeds by solving survival problems as they arise, resulting in 
organisms that are not perfect, but “good enough” to survive and reproduce themselves. 
Likewise, in society we do not need to design perfect solutions to security problems – 
when we try to, they inevitably waste enormous amounts of resources while at best only 
marginally improve our security. We do need to define what is “good enough” and 
recognize that, as in natural systems, that definition will change continually through 
time.  
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Fourth, good ideas in evolution are often easy to spot because they appear nearly 
exactly the same across many different kinds of organisms. Although the DNA codes for 
millions of different organisms, the basic structure of the molecule and the process by 
which it replicates itself is the same across much of the living world. Heat shock 
proteins, which go around the body repairing damaged proteins, are both present and 
nearly identical in almost all organisms on earth. Thus, the biologically inspired ideas I 
propose here are not just stab-in-the-dark guesses that happened to work out well for a 
snail or a soybean plant somewhere, but time-tested billion-year-old solutions that have 
worked out in the coldest, highest, darkest, hottest, most predator-full and water-
starved places on earth.   
Fifth, good ideas in evolution are often the things that evolved independently 
multiple times. Eyes, for example, are a good solution for finding your way around in a 
complex world, but there isn’t one common type of eye that evolved billions of years ago 
and that we all share. This security solution arose independently several times in 
different types of organisms. Octopuses have incredible eyes that serve the same kinds 
of functions as our eyes, but they are unique to octopuses. This phenomenon, called 
convergent evolution, is evidence that evolution is not about taking one design and 
plopping it down all over, but about solving problems particular to a given organism in a 
given environment. Here I propose ideas for security that mimic natural solutions, but 
they may also have been explored by other people or organizations who didn’t make any 
reference to nature at all. I consider these coincident solutions to be examples of 
convergent evolution – different people trying to solve the problem of how to be ensure 
security in society and coming up with similar solutions. 
Sixth, under the lens of natural history, humans are special, but not that special. 
There are a number of adaptations we have – such as advanced cognition and language 
– that both set us apart from most other species and create a lot of the complex security 
threats we face, but we are, in the end, just another species that evolved through time to 
deal with security challenges in our environment. With over a billion people facing 
chronic nutrition shortages,4 and a host of old and emerging diseases that threaten to 
turn into human pandemics, we are undoubtedly still subject to the pressures of natural 
selection. Moreover, the way we have evolved has changed our environment enough to 
force us to adapt further. This cuts several ways for us – we are extremely adaptable, but 
we also may have changed our world and way of living faster than some parts of us can 
evolve. Some of our adaptations, which first arose in societies and on a planet 
completely unlike that in which we live today, can get us into trouble now.  
Finally, and most important, change and variation rule everything in nature. As 
Darwin mused during his long journey on the Beagle, “where on the face of the earth 
can we find a spot, on which close investigation will not discover signs of that endless 
cycle of change, to which this earth has been, is, and will be subjected?”5  
Darwin was referring to geology, the task he was primarily assigned during his fateful 
journey, but variation and change were very much at the heart of his subsequent 
biological studies. He felt it was essential to understand even the most minute variations 
– such as the microscopic differences between anatomies of the many species of 
barnacles that he cataloged in an enormous two-volume treatment6 – to understand that 
“mystery of mysteries” of where life comes from. The simple lesson from this is that no 
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effective security solution can be deployed and not modified or changed with time, 
because everything around it will be changing.  
These basic tenets of evolution provide the outside parameters for developing an 
adaptable approach to security, but careful study of nature reveals general trends and 
patterns that can be used to provide specific guidance for applying nature’s lessons to 
security in society.  
SPECIFIC PROPERTIES OF NATURAL SECURITY SYSTEMS 
Adaptable Organization 
The most adaptable and successful organisms, though wildly diverse in appearance and 
behavior, are all organized in a similar manner. Universally, they avoid the trap of 
centralized, top-down control by giving wide ranging power to multiple independent 
sensors to observe and respond to environmental change and threats.7 Organisms have 
done this by evolving specialized organs, developing highly sensitive sensory 
mechanisms, specializing functions into differentiated clones, and organizing nerve cells 
into networked clusters operating closest to the environmental interaction.  
By contrast, many of our security responses trend towards increased centralization. 
The most prominent security response after 9/11 was to create the massive Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), which quickly displayed its shortcomings during and after 
Hurricane Katrina, the response to which represented the worst post-9/11 security 
breach in the United States. A common question during and after Katrina was “Where 
was FEMA?” – referring to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which was 
ostensibly in charge of disaster relief efforts. Because it is a bureaucracy, the best way to 
find FEMA is by looking at the “Org” chart of its parent organization, DHS, at the time 
of Katrina (Fig. 2). FEMA is literally buried in a huge stack of blocks, all representing 
their own enormous bureaucracies – such as the Coast Guard and the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) – all required to run decisions up the chain of command 
to the secretary of Homeland Security and, consequently, all vying for the secretary’s 
attention.   
An organization like this might work fine in carrying out a planned set of tasks that 
continue routinely day after day. It’s like an early circuit board with a finite number of 
pathways through which the energy of decision-making can pass. But security problems 
are such precisely because they are not routine; they are highly variable and 
unpredictable. If one of the organizations inside one of those boxes needs to do 
something completely different than normal – as FEMA needed too after Katrina – it 
has little recourse to do so. 
That’s not to say that some organizations didn’t demonstrate some amazing 
responses to Katrina. The United States Maritime Administration, a branch of the 
Department of Transportation that maintains and contracts a fleet of ships to make 
vessels available during wars and national emergencies, quickly set up shipboard spaces 
that the various security agencies used as command centers. And of course, many 
individuals within all of the agencies, as well as individual citizens, improvised all sorts 
of effective responses to the hurricane.   
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 Fig. 2. Organizational chart for the Department of Homeland Security. FEMA is circled in dark blue.  
Source: U.S. Senate Budget Committee Staff, Nov. 15, 2002.  
 
It is often assumed that the stack of boxes leading to one central controller is the natural 
and inevitable way an organization develops. And people working within such an 
organization often assume that there is no way to change that system of organization 
without destroying the entire organization itself.   
The first assumption is, in fact, completely false, as proven by most successful 
biological organizations on earth. And challenging the second assumption, which is 
beginning to happen in societal organizations throughout the world, is the key to 
turning non-adaptable organizations, like DHS, into adaptive organisms that truly do 
keep us safer. Indeed, independent of our biological perspective, a number of sources 
have recognized the adaptability of decentralized organization in the context of 
business,8 social activism,9 and international governance.10 
Even large entities have learned to develop adaptable, distributed organization 
structures. Google, Inc. uses a decentralized system for encouraging development of 
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many of its products, which are then tested by billions of independent internet users.11 
For example, Google Flu Trends analyzes search behavior by internet users, specifically 
focused on flu-related search terms such as, “flu symptoms” and “flu remedies” under 
the assumption that more people will search such terms when flu is becoming more 
prevalent. Google Flu Trends show remarkable similarity to official U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) flu trend reports (which are compiled and 
published by CDC from doctor and hospital surveys) with one major exception: Google 
Flu Trends are available one to two weeks prior to the release of centrally controlled 
CDC data.12  
Adopting an adaptable organizational system does not require a complete 
reorganization of our security bureaucracies. Almost any organization can inculcate 
adaptable systems by shifting from giving commands to issuing challenges – essentially 
open contests to solve a clearly stated security problem. Most security practice today is 
designed by a small number of experts and implemented through a central authority 
issuing orders to civilians (e.g., surrender your bottled water to TSA officials in airports) 
or contractors (e.g. design an aircraft that does X for Y amount of money). By contrast, 
challenges essentially create adaptable security organizations by encouraging multiple 
independent agents to find the best solution to a problem, then rewarding the most 
successful agents, and in the best cases, repeating the challenge to replicate and improve 
on the best designs from the previous iteration.   
Even complex challenges can be successful at low cost and in relatively short time 
frames. For example, in 2002 the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) presented an open challenge to a diffuse population of civilian groups to 
create autonomous vehicles that could navigate an obstacle course. The first iteration of 
this “Grand Challenge” in 2004 was fraught with failure. But groups learned from one 
another, and independently modified the wide variety of first-generation designs, 
selecting out poor performers and replicating successful components, resulting in high 
success in the second year which encouraged DARPA to issue yet more complex 
challenges in subsequent years. The most recent DARPA challenge (to find ten weather 
balloons scattered around the United States) was solved within a few hours by activating 
thousands of independent observers on the internet. 13  
Harnessing Uncertainty 
A decentralized organizational structure works because it allows organisms to deal with 
uncertainty. Uncertainty that is created by variation lies at the core of a wide range of 
security concerns. Organisms in nature actively exploit uncertainty and turn it to their 
advantage by creating uncertainty for their adversaries and reducing uncertainty for 
themselves. Predators create uncertainty by stalking from hidden vantage points, but 
when possible, prey reduce this uncertainty by vocally or behaviorally signaling the 
presence of predators – a strategy that both warns fellow prey about the threat and 
indicates to the predator that the element of uncertainty has been removed.14 To be 
effective the signaling must be directly tied to immediate threats. For example, ground 
squirrels will make vocal signals to bird and mammal predators (which can hear) but 
switch to “tail flagging” displays to deter snakes (which cannot hear), and will 
additionally heat their tails only when encountered by particular snakes (pit vipers) that 
can sense infrared signals.15 By contrast, when organisms in a community make 
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constant alarm calls regardless of the immediacy of the threat they only increase 
uncertainty for other members of the group, who must waste resources determining if 
the alarm is true or false.16 Analogously, the U.S. National Threat Advisory, which has 
remained at level “orange” for aviation since August 2006,17  is not aimed at deterring a 
particular threat and does little to reduce uncertainty among innocent travelers. We can 
vastly increase the uncertainty for our adversaries by just doing a small amount of 
random things every day in our security procedures. Currently we waste enormous 
resources to screen 100 percent of the people passing through security with little 
benefit. Laying aside the fact that this doesn’t even work to find the things we are 
looking for (knives, guns, explosive materials, and 6 oz. tubs of strawberry yogurt, all 
have which have been brought through security in recent years without detection),18 it 
also gives us almost no extra protection from real attackers.   
A low frequency of random screening (as opposed to a high level of screening equally 
applied to all) can deter someone who wants to evade detection.19 This is particularly 
true in the case of a terrorist attack because there is a very high cost of failure in such a 
plot, as there is for any predator. A lioness hunting an antelope must have very little 
uncertainty that her attack will be successful because if she fails, she has not only wasted 
energy and gotten hungrier, but she has also left her pride hungrier as well. A terrorist 
who gets caught not only fails to achieve the goal, but also puts his entire organization at 
grave risk of being discovered or counter-attacked. Indeed, this aversion to uncertainty 
drove several delays of the 9/11 attacks and may have led senior al Qaeda leaders to 
abort the attacks on 9/11 had they known one of the secondary operatives had been 
arrested.20  
What is attractive about randomizing security procedures is that it can actually 
drastically reduce the amount of time we waste in security lines (by screening much less 
than 100 percent of people for most things) while reducing the likelihood of an attack. 
These multiple benefits are not just serendipitous – natural security systems create 
positive feedback loops. For example, increasing uncertainty for a predator reduces the 
need for constant vigilance by the prey organism, which can then spend more resources 
on eating or mating or other needed security strategies. The Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) has been experimenting with randomization and uncertainty in 
its 2010 Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment, about which it testified 
that “random screening teams are among DHS’ most effective deterrence and detection 
tools for countering terrorist threats,”21 as well as through its Screening of Passengers 
through Observation Techniques (SPOT) behavioral detection program which deploys 
trained TSA agents to search for characteristic signs of stress and deception among 
passengers. Behavioral recognition has the advantage of returning control of uncertainty 
to the population it is trying to protect because it can be conducted from hidden vantage 
points or video. As a head behavioral screener at Dulles Airport (one of 161 airports 
where behavioral screening was initially deployed by TSA)22 remarked, “The observation 
of human behavior is probably the hardest thing to defeat. You just don’t know what I 
am going to see.”23 Nonetheless, the scientific basis for behavioral detection has not 
been well established,24 and the efficacy of layering discrete behavioral screening with 
other levels of verbal and non-verbal intent detection systems is currently being 
investigated.25 
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Learning Through Evolution  
A main reason that security walls and contraband screening don’t work against attackers 
is that they quickly learn what the barrier is and how to get around it. This problem has 
been recognized by cyber security experts who have recently acknowledged that forty 
years of attempts to make “perfect” systems protected by firewalls have only led to an 
increasingly vulnerable cyber infrastructure.26 One simple and effective cyber attack that 
has been successful in deliberate simulations and actual attacks involves physically 
scattering virus-infected USB drives in a parking lot and letting employees with security 
clearance inadvertently introduce the virus behind the firewall when they insert the 
drives into their workstations.27  
Even in relatively simple organisms, learning sets off a continual process of escalating 
threats and adaptive defenses. Birds learn that certain color patterns in spiders indicate 
the presence of poison and they avoid those patterns. Through time, other non-
poisonous spiders develop the color patterns of the poisonous types and thus avoid 
being eaten themselves; a selectively induced learning passed down through 
generations. Even the process of how animals learn is not immutable. That is, animals 
have some basic capacity for learning, but they can learn in accelerated ways depending 
on the environment they are put in. Monkeys, which are generally considered to have 
the learning capacity of a human two-year-old, can be trained in experimental settings 
to learn like a nine-year-old, including understanding a sense of their own self as a 
unique entity interacting with and affecting the world around them.28 The capacity for 
learning reminds us that no security adaptation should be assumed to be a safe and 
everlasting solution, because there is always the potential for an adaptable enemy to 
learn how to overcome it. 
A more formalized way to look at natural learning is through the framework of 
adaptation by natural selection. Examining the changing security environment in a 
Darwinian context that breaks down the three components of adaptive evolution – 
variation, selection, and replication – provides insight into how individuals and 
institutions learn from experiences with environmental threats. These factors may 
explain why the insurgents have been relatively successful against coalition forces in 
recent conflicts. Johnson argues that the nearly invariant ratio of insurgents killed or 
captured per U.S. soldier killed or captured throughout the Iraq war may be attributable 
to stronger selection pressure exerted by the more powerful side (the U.S.),29 which 
leads to faster adaptation among insurgent fighters, strategies, and technologies. This 
selection works on a more variable population of insurgents, who both come from more 
diverse origins than U.S. forces and utilize a wider range of tactics than U.S. forces, 
which are constrained by standard procedures, international conventions, and other 
norms.   
Ground observations support this analysis as the average time for insurgent fighters 
to adapt to new tactics, techniques, or procedures of U.S. troops is reported by 
counterinsurgency officers to be about fourteen days; insurgents apparently have 
learned to identify the signs of troop rotation and step-up attacks immediately following 
the arrival of new troops.30 This rapid adaptation is a well-appreciated problem. U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked at a congressional hearing in March 2007 
that “as soon as we …find one way of trying to thwart their efforts, [the insurgents] find 
a technology or a new way of going about their business”31. 
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Humans’ ability to learn is advanced relative to most other species and accelerated 
through a high degree of parental care, symbolic language, and communication 
networks that allow us to learn from environmental threats without actually 
experiencing them.32 In addition to creating a more threatening environment, learning 
can also greatly aid our security. For example, until 9/11 the normal response to a plane 
hijacking was to put up no resistance as hijackers made demands that were eventually 
negotiable and lethal threats were unlikely to be carried out. But on the same day that 
terrorists began using passenger planes as weapons of mass destruction, humans used 
networked technology to share information about the change in hijackers’ tactics and 
passengers on one hijacked plane immediately adapted a more active defense, risking 
their own security to protect a larger (and largely unrelated) group of humans. 
Subsequent airborne attack attempts by Reid and Abdulmutallab were similarly stopped 
by passengers. 
Using Symbiosis to Extend Adaptability 
All organisms are constrained in their adaptability at some point, but they can utilize 
symbiotic relationships to extend their inherent adaptive capacity to exploit new 
resources and environments. Symbiotic relationships are diverse and ubiquitous in 
nature, including relationships between species – such as predatory fish and much 
smaller fish – that would appear to have no reason to cooperate. Where these 
relationships appear cooperative in humans or other organisms, there is still debate over 
whether they: are codified through positive feedback, must be enforced by punishment, 
are conducted with the expectation of reciprocity, or arise in response to genetic 
relationships between kin.33 Regardless of the underlying mechanism, individual 
symbiotic relationships can confer multiple benefits to the larger environment. Studies 
on monkeys and apes show that when individuals are forced to begin a cooperative 
relationship (to help one another get food, for example), conflict overall between the 
animals is reduced.34 Small coral reef fish known as wrasses set up “cleaning stations” 
where large fish can have their parasites cleaned off, provided they don’t eat the smaller 
fish. The large fish in this symbiosis are not only less aggressive to their cleaning 
partners, but towards all other fish on the reef as well.35 
Cooperation among humans is far more complex than that among fish or monkeys, 
but the same surprising diversity of symbiotic relationship characterizes successful 
partnerships that diffuse security risks. New types of symbiotic partnerships between 
the most unlikely of collaborators are developing and ameliorating potential security 
crises around the globe. My colleague Terence Taylor, for example, has helped incubate 
symbiotic partnerships between Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians,36 as well as 
practitioners from five traditionally hostile countries on the Mekong River, all working 
together to identify and neutralize disease outbreaks on whatever side of borders they 
occur. Several features of these cooperative networks should be recognized. First, the 
networks have demonstrated success even beyond the feat of getting members of 
mutually hostile nations to work with one another. Network practitioners were quietly 
allowed into notoriously restricted Myanmar to do their work days, not weeks, after the 
catastrophic cyclone there. Second, these networks weren’t mandated by high levels of 
government or through international treaties, but have emerged from the ground up as 
local, adaptive responses to a real need to protect regional food supplies and human 
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health from pathogens that know no borders. Third, the networks were not designed to 
tackle the much larger and complex issues of creating peace between their member 
states, though they very well may be an opening to further peace agreements. Finally, 
the networks greatly expand the capacity of any individual member state, giving them a 
built-in impetus to continue; without the network, each individual state would not only 
be powerless over outbreaks in neighboring states, but would also be much less capable 
of tackling diseases within its own borders.   
HUMAN FACTORS 
Complex human behaviors also appear at the origins of many security problems. Taking 
a natural history approach to human behaviors, which involves looking at both their 
evolutionary roots and their commonalities across human groups, can provide valuable 
insight into their present manifestations. Seemingly irrational behaviors, such as radical 
fundamentalist belief systems, make more sense when viewed in the context of an 
evolutionary bias toward forming strong group identity in opposition to outsiders,37 a 
bias that has evolutionary origins long predating humans.38 Villarreal argues that 
human belief systems are simply the evolved manifestation of self recognition systems 
that have helped nearly all organisms maintain their autonomy since the earliest 
interactions between bacteria and viruses. Belief systems can spread through 
relationship networks. These human networks also share key characteristics with 
biological networks such as ecosystems, food webs, and social insect relationships.39 In 
particular, they show resilience which emanates from many individual components 
engaged in improving their own fitness. Many successful terrorist networks were found 
to originate through adolescent friendships developed in radical mosque-sponsored 
soccer leagues.40 Although human belief systems have diversified, they show common 
features across societies – for instance, adolescence as a nearly universal period when 
ideological, religious, and other beliefs are either abandoned or solidified.41 These three 
aspects of belief systems – their deep evolutionary roots, their network-reinforced 
resilience, and their universal features – suggest that they can’t be eliminated entirely, 
but that alternative pathways provided for adolescents (e.g., soccer clubs sponsored by 
secular or non-radical religious groups) may be effective in diffusing their most 
dangerous expressions. 
Nonetheless, applying Darwinian ideas to human society inevitably raises ethical 
issues. Biological evolution is often a tinkering process of trial and error and many 
individuals die under natural selection. Most societies don’t ethically accept the notion 
of sacrificing individuals to improve security, although engaging in armed conflict 
implicitly carries some aspects of this (and accordingly raises ethical deliberations). But 
biologically inspired security systems will not be perfect mimics of nature and they do 
not have to be beholden to the same forces of selection that operate on natural 
organisms.  We can deliberately select the aspects of natural security systems we would 
like to incorporate, devise artificial tests of their efficacy, and selectively reproduce only 
those systems that demonstrate improvements. Already, realistic amateur and 
professional probing has been used to test the efficacy of security systems, but the 
results have not necessarily been used to select for better systems. For example, the 
fallibility of systems that attempt to screen contraband carried by people entering secure 
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buildings and airport gates was revealed in tests well before Abdulmutallab smuggled 
incendiary material onto a plane,42 but the response to both the simulated and actual 
failure of contraband screening systems has been, in part, to appropriate more resources 
to them.  
This equation of human societies rewarding security failures stands in stark contrast 
to how the rest of the living world deals with failure. In the natural world, failed 
experiments are eliminated through the process of natural selection, while successful 
adaptations are rewarded and replicated through survival and relatively higher 
reproduction. We focus far less on success than on failures in society. For example, the 
U.S. Coast Guard was roundly criticized for its performance after the relatively small 
40,000-gallon Cosco Busan oil spill in San Francisco, but its admirable performance in 
containing and cleaning 9 million gallons of oil spilled after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
was almost completely ignored.43 In fact, the massive Townsend after action report on 
Katrina identified seventeen “Critical Challenges,” 125 recommendations, and 243 
action items, covering everything from search and rescue to transportation 
infrastructure to human services, but none of them addressed oil spill cleanup, the one 
unqualified success after Katrina.44 At the time, the oil spilled from Katrina was one of 
the largest oil spills on record, approximately two-thirds the size of the Exxon Valdez 
spill. Yet so forgotten were the oil spills caused by Katrina that by the time of the 2008 
presidential campaign, Republican candidate Mike Huckabee was able to argue publicly 
that “not one drop of oil was spilled” due to Katrina.45  
Both the engineering literature and the “organizational learning” literature place a 
strong emphasis on learning from failure. David Garvin, a leader in studies of 
organizational learning, argued that BP capitalizes on “constructive failure” which he 
defined as a failure that provides the critical learning components of “insight, 
understanding, and thus an addition to the commonly held wisdom of the 
organization.”46 The image of BP as an organization to emulate was shattered in April 
2010, when BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig exploded and led to an ecological and economic 
catastrophe. No doubt, the BP disaster will provide the company with all the 
components of “constructive failure” as Garvin defined them, but at a cost of greater 
than $1 billion to the company and with the uncertain economic and environmental 
impact on the Gulf of Mexico, it’s hard to see this kind of learning from failure as 
something to aspire to. 
In part, this discrepancy lies in the selective forces at work or not. In nature, selection 
is cleanly parsed out in life and death. In society, the selective agents are not so sharp.  
In both statute and practice, BP was allowed to operate without the necessary backup 
systems and safeguards;47 there was no pressure to improve performance in this part of 
their operations. We would like to think that our congressional representatives could do 
a better job of rewarding better performance among security and safety agencies, but the 
complex politics of congressional appropriations (which are often more closely tied to 
seniority of representatives than the merits of the funded projects) have created an 
enormous disconnect between performance and reward that is not likely to be repaired 
soon.  
 It is often news media that plays the strongest selective agent. After the Cosco Busan 
spill, images of hundreds of frustrated San Francisco volunteers waiting to clean up 
oiled birds, but held back by Government bureaucrats, were rolled on national media. 
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These kinds of images result in calls to Congress and demands for investigations. By 
contrast, the Coast Guard’s work on the post-Katrina and Rita oil spills hardly made 
newsworthy footage relative to images of people stranded on the roofs of their flooded 
houses. Because so much of the selective force on government agencies, especially when 
it comes in the form of media attention, focuses on mistakes (cost overruns, terrapin-
like foot dragging, and botched responses), adapting based on success is not something 
that can be instilled from the top down. We cannot (and would not want to) order media 
outlets to only report good news.  
Accordingly, the onus is on operatives at much smaller levels of government – 
battalion commanders, local police chiefs, and bureau heads – to identify successes, 
even if they were just one part of an operation that mostly failed, and to reproduce them. 
Sometimes this will mean promoting the people responsible for the success. Sometimes 
it will mean allocating more of a budget to activities that demonstrated success. But 
even where these local agents lack the power or resources to dole out these material 
rewards, they do have a very powerful and very inexpensive resource at their disposal. 
They can reproduce successes by teaching others in their field how to adopt their 
successful activities. This kind of teaching and learning is best facilitated through small 
informal networks of practitioners. For example, the armed forces have used intranets, 
such as NCOcorps.net, to give soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan a forum to share 
information about successful practices as experienced by troops in the field.48 This peer-
to-peer training turns out to be an invaluable resource to new soldiers who come into 
combat with much less experience, and therefore much less adapted, than the 
insurgents that they will be fighting. Indeed, this method of replication brings us full 
circle back to the adaptability of decentralized organizations, as illustrated in the 
following case study of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. 
A CASE STUDY: IED Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan  
The case of IED deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates several points relevant to 
natural security. The issue of IED came to most civilian’s attention in a dramatic fashion 
on December 8, 2004, during a televised visit between Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and National Guard soldiers preparing for deployment in Kuwait. To the 
cheers of the soldiers assembled, Specialist Thomas Wilson, a thirty-one-year-old 
Tennessee National Guardsman, pointedly asked the secretary why he and his fellow 
soldiers were being forced to rummage through garbage dumps to find armor to strap 
on to their vehicles, which provided inadequate protection in the combat zone. 
Rumsfeld was initially taken aback, then tartly retorted “you go to war with the Army 
you have.”49  
The terse exchange belied a critical difference in adaptability between soldiers like 
Specialist Wilson and a large security organization like the Department of Defense. For 
the troops on the ground, the process of adapting began soon after the invasion of 
Bagdad. They “went to war with the Army they had” (to paraphrase Rumsfeld), and it 
worked brilliantly for a while. With superior firepower, training, and air superiority, 
even the most feared of Saddam Hussein’s forces virtually collapsed in front of the 
advancing coalition force. But as the old regime collapsed, the ground became rich for 
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any number of new threats to sprout up. The threat environment radically changed. 
Suddenly, thousands of soldiers, independently as individuals and linked through the 
units they fought with, were observing that hidden improvised explosive devices (IED) 
were becoming their biggest threat to security. Whereas the DoD had planned for a war 
against AK-47s, Scud Missiles, and weapons of mass destruction, soldiers on the ground 
began to see their enemies as random trash piles, sudden fender benders in downtown 
traffic, and cell phones; hiding, distracting from, and detonating IED. By the time 
Wilson was so incensed as to dare breach military protocol to give a superior officer a 





Figure 3. Deaths per month of U.S. troops in Iraq (red) and Afghanistan (green) and associated 
security related events. Data source: www.icasualties.org.   
The soldiers adapted the best that they could, welding metal plates to their vehicles, 
blocking up culverts to eliminate the most obvious niches for bombers to use, and 
learning to identify the signs of hidden bombs in otherwise unremarkable debris. But 
their ability to adapt was limited by forces beyond their control – by the equipment they 
were given, by the available scrap metal, by the rules of engagement that they were 
ethically and legally bound by – and the casualties mounted.  
By contrast, the Department of Defense had virtually unlimited resources, especially 
after 9/11 when no politically-minded congressperson or senator would ever turn down 
a military appropriation request. What the DoD lacked was adaptability. Even as 
Specialist Wilson and his comrades were frantically tracking the rapidly changing tactics 
of insurgents, the DoD was slowly churning away on weapons systems and fighting 
procedures that had been dreamed up long ago in places far away from the streets of 
Baghdad and Fallujah. Rumsfeld’s retort to Wilson revealed a centralized view where 
small numbers of intellectuals design a battle plan and the accompanying technology 
years in advance, and that’s what you go to war with. Moreover, even to bring the 
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idealized technological solutions to deal with the threats theorized by DoD experts, the 
Department was bound by a ponderous top-down procurement system in which a small 
number of large contractors submitted bids for development of weapons systems that 
inevitably ran over budget and beyond the estimated timeline. Even after congressional 
outrage from the exchange between Wilson and Rumsfeld fueled calls to speed up 
production and deployment of mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAP), they 
did not arrive in Iraq in until November 2007 – nearly three years later. By that time, an 
additional 1,589 of Wilson’s colleagues had been killed in IED attacks.  
The DoD solution certainly arrived too late to save their lives, but also too late to even 
deal with the original threat. A rapid downward trend in IED attacks and deaths was 
already well on its way by the time the MRAP arrived in Iraq. This downward trend can 
largely be linked to the successful fostering of two sets of symbiotic relationships in Iraq. 
First, General Petreaus authorized a shift in strategy towards engaging local populations 
to break up IED-producing networks, which resulted in increasing numbers of tips to 
soldiers about IED operations. Second, an inter-service partnership between ground 
soldiers and electronic warfare experts that devised methods to disarm wirelessly 
detonated IED greatly reduced the effectiveness of the remaining IED.51  
The lesson here is that adaptation is primarily forged out of behaviors and 
relationships that can respond to a changing environment, not out of material solutions. 
Indeed, the MRAP that arrived too late in Iraq were ready just in time for a renewed 
offensive in the long-simmering war in Afghanistan. They have undoubtedly saved the 
lives of soldiers who were hit by IED, but they certainly haven’t led to a decline in IED 
attacks or deaths, and may in fact have attracted more IED attacks. This is because the 
environment of Afghanistan is much more rugged than that of Iraq, making most of the 
country downright impassable to 14- to 24-ton vehicles like the MRAP.52 Taliban 
operatives in inexpensive second-hand Toyota pickup trucks (probably the most 
adaptable vehicle ever built) could operate at will without interference from the 
lumbering U.S. forces. The few roads in Afghanistan that were MRAP accessible quickly 
became targets for IED attacks (which had been only a minimal threat up until this 
point) so that travel became a cumbersome affair, sometimes taking all day to move 
twelve kilometers or so.53 In fact, after only two years of deployment, nearly half of the 
16,000 MRAP produced (at a cost of $500,000 each) are being put on “inactive status”. 
What does this tale of differential adaptation tell us? First, adaptation requires 
leaving or being forced from your comfort zone and into a place where you observe and 
experience new threats to your security. Second, adaptation takes resources, but 
resources don’t guarantee adaptation. Third, parts of an organization can be adaptable 
even if the organization is non-adaptable as a whole. Fourth, an adaptation developed 
for a given threat in a given environment may be useless, or even counterproductive, in 
a different environment.  
LESSONS FOR AN ADAPTABLE FUTURE 
It is important to recognize that the untapped secrets of natural security systems are not 
classified in any way. Rather, they are laid out in the structure of fossil and living 
organisms, in fragments of DNA, and in the observable behaviors of the organisms 
themselves. Translating ideas from nature into usable security solutions in society 
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requires sensitivity to both how humans and human societies are different from other 
evolutionary systems, but also their common roots and analogous dynamics. Overall, 
the goal of a natural security system is to help society live with risks, rather than waste 
resources trying to eliminate them, by developing and maintaining adaptive security 
systems. An analysis of biological security systems suggests that a cascading set of 
interrelated strategies can provide the best means for dealing with the variation and 
uncertainty in nature.  
In society, a cascade towards adaptive security can be initiated by giving more power 
to individual agents to sense and respond to threats. These agents could be individual 
people in a community, or individual offices, agencies, or states responsible for discrete 
aspects of a larger security mission. They do not operate completely independently, but 
rather are empowered through problem-solving challenges issued by an agency that has 
the resources or power to implement solutions. Multiple agents devising and testing a 
variety of security systems will provide greater likelihood of finding efficient solutions, 
redundancy to hedge against poor solutions, and potential for more rapid adaptation if 
selection pressures (such as budgets or media coverage) can be aligned to reward 
successful adaptations. Symbiotic partnerships between these agents can then extend 
their utility by bringing new skills and perspectives into emerging problem solving 
networks.  
Given the vast diversity of life, we have only scratched the surface of potential lessons 
from nature for security in society. For example, biologists understand that organisms in 
nature inherently accept that risk is inevitable in the environment and, through 
selection, manage to balance the costs and benefits of developing new adaptations. But 
we have little ability to predict why certain types of adaptations will arise in a given 
place or time, which could then reflect on how society could optimally manage a 
portfolio of emerging and existing risks. Getting closer to this understanding may 
involve a deeper appreciation (using appropriate biological models such as the immune 
system and host-parasite interactions) of how particular adaptations take place in a 
range of situations – are they the product of escalation through repeated direct 
interactions, a response to chronic stress, or a generalized response to cope with a 
potential range of natural variation? Additionally, focusing on rapid adaptation and 
rapid feedback cycles – such as occur with retroviruses which manage to hijack the 
adaptive machinery of the immune system and use it against the host body – could be 
enormously important as a model for understanding how radical ideas are now rapidly 
spread peer-to-peer using simple messaging between previously unlinked terror groups. 
This same model could be adapted to aid with the likely need to adapt rapidly to climate 
change. Finally, my group has largely focused on evolutionary successes, but the history 
of life is replete with apparently well-adapted organisms that went extinct. What are the 
conditions under which even organisms that sense the environment well and reduce 
their own uncertainty go extinct and what can this tell us about our own failures? This 
reminds us of a sobering basic tenet of natural security: those who embrace the process 
of adaptation survive and thrive, those who don’t, go extinct. 
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More is Better: The Analytic Case for a Robust 
Suspicious Activity Reports Program  
James E. Steiner 
 
In his March 2009 testimony, Gregory Nojeim warned Congress of the potential danger 
to civil liberties posed by the government’s suspicious activity report (SAR) program.  
But Nojeim, director of the Project on Freedom, Security, & Technology, raised another 
concern – that “the security ‘bang per byte’ of information gathered may be diminishing. 
While ‘stove piping’ was yesterday’s problem, tomorrow’s problem may be ‘pipe 
clogging,’ as huge amounts of information are being gathered without apparent focus.”1 
In concluding his testimony, Nojeim recommends: 
The Subcommittee should test whether SAR reporting is both effective and 
efficient in preventing terrorism…. SAR reporting may or may not be the best way 
to collect the ‘dots’ that need to be connected to head off terrorist attacks; 
whether it is or is not should be tested.  Because the SAR reporting system will 
result in the collection of so much information about innocent activities, it seems 
that it would be good to know at the front end that the results are likely to be 
worth the risks.2  
A subsequent CRS study, in November 2009, endorsed Nojeim’s suggestion questioning 
the need for a data-intensive program and made a similar recommendation: “Congress 
may be interested in how a future SAR Program Management Office intends to address 
this problem – specifically, which agency or agencies will be responsible for quality 
control of SARs [sic] to prevent system overload from irrelevant or redundant ones.”3 
This article acknowledges the progress made in protecting civil rights – an area of 
legitimate concern – but rejects categorically the call to reduce or limit the size of the 
SAR program. Two analytic requirements for the collection of more rather than less 
information through the SAR process are presented, to increase the probability of 
identifying pre-operational terrorist activity and to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of critical infrastructure protection regimes. In statistical analysis, more is 
better. 
The SAR Program and Process 
Since 2007, the U.S. homeland security, law enforcement, and intelligence communities 
have formally recognized the usefulness of SAR in counterterrorism. The U.S. 
government defines a SAR as “official documentation of observed behavior that may be 
indicative of intelligence gathering or pre-operational planning related to terrorism, 
criminal, or other illicit intention.”4 The primary impetus for the federal government’s 
National SAR Initiative (NSI) is intelligence support to law enforcement, although 
officials from the critical infrastructure (CI) protection world have recognized that SAR 
can help them improve their performance. 
Law enforcement has been collecting SAR (or something similar, such as field 
interviews of suspicious individuals) for decades. The NSI program endeavors to 
formalize a nationwide, uniform process for evaluating and recording this information 
and then making it available to appropriate personnel and organizations through the 
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Information Sharing Environment (ISE). The SAR concept and the NSI were both 
originally developed to provide direct support to law enforcement. Here is the typical 
process in brief: law enforcement intelligence analysts receive and evaluate all new SAR. 
In those relatively rare cases where a single SAR is both credible and actionable, the 
information is embedded in a short analytic report and provided directly to law 
enforcement for immediate counterterrorism action. These leads go to the local Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which has first right of refusal in terrorism cases. If the 
JTTF chooses not to follow-up, the lead is passed to state or local police for action. The 
figure below illustrates the Notional SAR Process in detail.5  
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This graphic has a familiar feel since it shows the traditional intelligence cycle as applied 
to suspicious activity reports. It begins with collection (information acquisition), 
moves to the (organizational) processing of that information, then on to analysis 
(integration/consolidation) and ends with final dissemination (and data retrieval) of 
the SAR and SAR-based analysis to the law enforcement customer (JTTF). Although not 
shown clearly, the cycle is completed through the “feedback to the collector” function 
in the last column of the graphic.   
SAR originate from a wide variety of sources, including law enforcement officers, 
public and private sector security, and the public through “phone in” calls to hotlines, 
and are reported to a large number of federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law 
enforcement organizations. From an intelligence perspective, the lack of direct control 
over some of these intelligence sources results in exceptional difficulty in assessing the 
quality of SAR. The NSI/ISE leadership is acutely aware of this problem as highlighted 
in the original “Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative Concept of 
Operations”: 
A standard reporting format is a key element of the effective implementation of a 
SAR program. A standardized report provides a mechanism for the efficient 
transition of the suspicious activity from the line-level officer to the agency 
management. This process will ensure that the suspicious activity is being 
collected and reported correctly and will regulate the reporting procedures across 
the agency.  
Additionally, in order to identify local, regional, and national trends in crime 
and terrorist precursor activity, a common national set of data collection codes 
needs to be adopted to ensure seamless sharing and analysis of suspicious 
activity. This national standard of codes will ensure that patterns of criminal 
behavior are identified and handled properly. The establishment of these codes 
needs to be the result of evaluation and determination that the activities to be 
collected are likely precursors of terrorist activity.”6  
If anything, this focus on SAR quality (a necessary condition for using SAR in the 
analytic process) has increased as seen in the extensive treatment dedicated in the 
“Final Report: Information Sharing Environment – Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Evaluation Environment.”7  
Legitimate Civil Rights Concerns 
Coming from a civil liberties perspective, Nojeim is most concerned about the range and 
number of collectors and the fact that despite a plethora of “quidelines” for collecting, 
handling, and storing SAR, the collection guidelines “fail to provide adequate guidance” 
(emphasis added).8 This legitimate issue raised by Nojeim was directly addressed by the 
NSI/SAR leadership in developing their January 2010 report on the NSI-SAR 
Evaluation Environment. In fact, no less an organization than the ACLU has provided 
kudos to the NSI SAR leadership, its efforts, and its results: 
The ACLU released a report criticizing these SAR programs in July 2008. In 
response, ISE program manager Thomas E. McNamara and his office worked 
with the ACLU and other privacy and civil liberties groups, as well as the LAPD 
and other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, to revise the ISE SAR 
functional standard to address privacy and civil liberties concerns.  
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The revised ISE guidelines for suspicious activity reporting, issued in May 
2009, establish that a reasonable connection to terrorism or other criminal 
activity is required before law enforcement officers may collect Americans’ 
personal information and share it within the ISE…. The revised ISE functional 
standards also make clear that behaviors such as photography and eliciting 
information are protected under the First Amendment, and require additional 
facts and circumstances giving reason to believe the behavior is related to crime 
or terrorism before reporting is appropriate. These changes to the standard, 
which include reiterating that race, ethnicity and religion cannot be used as 
factors that create suspicion, give law enforcement all the authority it needs while 
showing greater respect for individuals’ privacy and civil liberties. We applaud 
the willingness of the ISE Program Manager to engage constructively with the 
civil liberties community and to make significant modifications to the functional 
standard to address the concerns presented (emphasis added).9   
So far, so good. The civil liberties community and the SAR leadership agree that privacy 
issues are being addressed through guidance on how to handle such information. 
Criticism Beyond Civil Liberties 
Unfortunately the ACLU also picked up and repeated Nojeim’s concern over the sheer 
volume of SAR, implying that a smaller program would be better in terms of program 
efficiency and effectiveness. In other words, these civil rights advocates and 
organizations are now evaluating the analytic merits of intelligence officers having more 
or less data available to do their job, a subject well beyond their civil liberties expertise. 
Specifically, the ACLU continues: 
This overbroad reporting mandate is not just constitutionally questionable; it’s 
also counterproductive. These orders, if taken seriously by local law 
enforcement, can yield only one outcome: an ocean of data about innocent 
individuals that will overwhelm the investigative resources of the authorities 
(emphasis added).10 
In fact, this final conclusion is both naïve and incorrect. Intelligence analysts actually 
need an “ocean of data” concerning suspicious activity (but NOT the personal identities 
of those engaging in such activity) to successfully apply sophisticated statistical analysis 
techniques that have the potential to discern between benign activity and true terrorist 
precursor activity, thereby reducing the investigative load. Similarly, analysis of 
comprehensive data on suspicious but benign behavior near critical infrastructure is the 
first step in developing security programs to protect that infrastructure. 
Why Analysts Need a Massive SAR Database 
Figure 2 lays out a simplified representation of intelligence-led SAR support to law 
enforcement. As shown by the two arrows leading to law enforcement actions, there are 
two ways SAR-based intelligence reaches police authorities. The direct approach was 
discussed above and is straightforward. In the rare cases where a SAR is a clear 
indicator of threat, the SAR information moves quickly and directly from the 
intelligence realm to law enforcement for investigation.  
The “indirect” method is fundamentally distinct from the direct method. In the 
indirect case, each new SAR is processed and evaluated by both intelligence and critical 
infrastructure analysts to determine whether there are non-obvious reasons for law 
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enforcement follow-up. To accomplish this task, the analysts must determine whether 
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Here is a brief summary of how such models and their results are generated. First, 
intelligence analysts format and evaluate all new SAR (a major task as noted above) and 
add them to the “complete historical SAR database.” This database is then used with a 
similar (in that both are geo-rectified) database that holds information on critical 
infrastructure (CI) to feed the pattern analysis models, which, in turn, yield the “Normal 
Pattern of SAR” for each element of the CI. Critical Infrastructure analysts are 
responsible for generating the CI Database, which contains GIS and other information 
on each facility.  Now for a closer look. 
The Theoretical Foundation of the Indirect Approach 
Given the obvious problems with using SAR as “intelligence,” a number of professional 
intelligence officers have resisted spending scarce resources collecting and analyzing 
them. In the foreign intelligence world, a significant premium is placed on recruiting 
well-placed, reliable sources that can report raw intelligence that addresses specific 
collection requirements. Obviously, there is an effort by domestic law enforcement to 
utilize similar human sources (confidential informants) and technical collection (court 
approved wiretaps) to collect high-grade information. In the foreign arena, our 
intelligence agencies have been successful in collecting significant information on 
terrorist groups, their numbers, leaders, tactics, and techniques. This reporting has been 
used extensively in preparing analyses (target studies) at both the tactical and strategic 
levels. But within the U.S. domestic theatre, there just have not been many specific, 
credible reports on planned terrorist attacks within the U.S. since the 9/11 attacks.  
Although few in numbers, specific, credible intelligence reports have been critical in 
preventing terrorist attacks and both intelligence and law enforcement are actively 
seeking to acquire more such information. 
On the other hand, there have been tens (possibly hundreds) of thousands of 
domestic suspicious activity reports collected in the U.S. by state and local law 
enforcement since 9/11. Statistically, the probability of any single SAR being an 
indicator of an actual terrorist plot is so small that it is insignificant. But the greater the 
number of SAR, the greater the overall probability that at least a few real indicators of 
threat exist within the total body of SAR reporting.   
Most domestic intelligence practitioners characterize the counter-terrorism problem 
as separating the signal (the very rare true indicator of a terrorist threat) from the noise 
(the huge number of meaningless or benign SAR). For example, in 2009-2010 the FBI 
reports that of the 3,400 SAR entered into its system,11 only fifty-six of these (less than 2 
percent) merited an actual investigation.12  
The indirect approach for using SAR to identify true threats harnesses the power of 
statistics and analysis to solve the signal/noise problem. Here is an example of the 
technique. Let’s say there are 100 widget factories in the country and that we think 
(based on credible, specific intelligence regarding terrorist intent) that there is a near-
term plot to attack one such factory. The challenge is to identify which particular widget 
factory is being targeted. Our understanding of how terrorists plan an attack tells us that 
operatives are likely to conduct at least a few surveillance operations before an attack.  
Further, we have collected a large number of SAR at or near the 100 widget factories 
over the past nine years – let’s say 90,000 – roughly 100 SAR per plant per year.  
Obviously, if we are very lucky we will be able to identify the four or five of these 90,000 
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SAR that are true terrorist surveillance and immediately notify law enforcement and 
critical infrastructure protection to take appropriate actions. 
But the likelihood of being so fortunate in identifying the actual SAR that are strong 
indicators of the targeted factory by examining each of the 90,000 relevant SAR is 
remote. 
We have a much better chance of identifying a real indication of a threat if we 
characterize the challenge as defining the “normal” laydown of SAR at a widget factory 
with enough specificity to enable us to recognize a situation or SAR that is not normal.  
For example, if we can use our complete data set of SAR to develop a reliable expected 
pattern of SAR on any given target or area, then a significant deviation from that pattern 
is by definition an anomaly that deserves further investigation.   
This approach is grounded in the “Law of Large Numbers.” 
In probability theory, the Law of Large Numbers (LLN) is a theorem that describes 
the result of performing the same experiment a large number of times. According to the 
law, the average of the results obtained from a large number of trials should be close to 
the expected value, and will tend to become closer as more trials are performed. 
For our widget factory, here is how the LLN might work in action. We take the full 
dataset of 90,000 SAR on widget factories and if this total number of SAR is large 
enough and if every facility is collecting and reporting SAR in a uniform and consistent 
fashion, then we should be able to develop a model which will tell us if there are an 
unusually large number or type of SAR at any given widget plant. We can do this 
because quantitative methodologists, working with intelligence and critical 
infrastructure analysts, can now construct a model that defines the normal pattern of 
SAR for each unique widget plant. This model actually forecasts the number and 
characteristics of SAR expected at each widget plant during a particular time period and 
a statistically significant deviation from this expected value would constitute an 
indicator of unusual (and possibly terrorist) activity. Obviously, from the LLN we know 
that the larger our complete database of SAR, the more reliable our “expected value.”  
Note that intelligence analysts do not require any personal information on those 
conducting the suspicious activity to conduct their analysis. 
While theoretically feasible, the practical problems involved in constructing and 
maintaining a SAR database in which there is consistency and uniform treatment of the 
collection and coding of the data (SAR) might well be impossible to overcome, at least in 
the near term. For example, the data set on SAR must be huge, relatively consistent, and 
comprehensive to enable robust analysis.  One need only consider the fact that there are 
over 18,000 local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations within the U.S. 
collecting and reporting SAR to begin to understand and to size the obstacles to full and 
effective implementation. On the other hand, the cost of overcoming these difficulties 
and uncertainties must be counterbalanced against the potential payoff of preventing a 
successful terrorist attack, either by direct law enforcement action or through improved 
critical infrastructure (CI) protection. 
SAR Support to Critical Infrastructure (CI) Protection 
The second argument for a robust SAR program is its largely unrecognized role in CI 
protection.  The DHS website states: 
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CI (Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources) is an umbrella term referring to the 
assets of the United States essential to the nation's security, public health and 
safety, economic vitality, and way of life. CI is divided into 18 separate sectors, as 
diverse as agriculture and food, emergency services, and cyber networks. [See 
below.] 
Because this critical infrastructure provides our country with the enormous 
benefits, services and opportunities on which we rely, we (DHS) are very mindful 
of the risks posed to CI by terrorists, pandemic diseases and natural disasters. At 
the Department of Homeland Security, we know that these threats can have 
serious effects, such as cutting populations off from clean water, power, 
transportation, or emergency supplies. 
Secretary Napolitano is working to raise awareness about the importance of 
our nation's critical infrastructure, and strengthen our ability to protect it 
[emphasis added]. The Department oversees programs and resources that foster 
public-private partnerships, enhance protective programs, and build national 
resiliency to withstand natural disasters and terrorist threats.13  
 
 
The 18 DHS Defined Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
Agriculture & Food Emergency Services 
Banking & Finance Energy 
Chemical Government Facilities 
Commercial Facilities Information Technology 
Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials, & Waste National Monuments & Icons 
Critical Manufacturing Postal & Shipping 
Dams Telecommunications 
Defense Industrial Base Public Health & Healthcare 
Drinking Water & Water Treatment Facilities Transportation Systems 
!"#$%&'A)'BC0'B&?"-&9'D%","4./':-?%.5,%$4,$%&'0&4,+%5' '
 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) sets forth a comprehensive risk 
analysis and management framework and clearly defines critical infrastructure 
protection roles and responsibilities for DHS and other federal, state, local, tribal, and 
private sector CI partners. The NIPP provides the coordinated approach used to 
establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for infrastructure protection to 
ensure that funding and resources are applied effectively. The goal of the NIPP is to 
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build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the 
nation’s CI to prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by 
terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen national 
preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, natural 
disaster, or other emergency.14  
Just as in the intelligence support to law enforcement case, intelligence support to CI 
protection goes well beyond SAR-based information. National, homeland security, and 
law enforcement intelligence organizations all produce and disseminate reports on 
terrorist techniques, historical terrorist targets and tactics, and many other studies to 
help those responsible for protecting CI. In fact, such studies are used to develop and 
validate sets of indicators of pre-operational activity. But SAR-based intelligence also 
has an important role to play.   
The central player in bringing intelligence to bear on CI protection at the national 
level is the DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) 
which conducts integrated threat and risk analyses for CI sectors. HITRAC is a joint 
fusion center that spans both the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) – a member 
of the Intelligence Community – and Infrastructure Protection. As called for in section 
201 of the Homeland Security Act, HITRAC brings together intelligence and 
infrastructure specialists to ensure a sufficient understanding of the risks to the nation’s 
CI from foreign and domestic threats.15  
HITRAC, partnering with the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 
(NISAC), has the mandate to lead in the development, testing, and evaluation of SAR-
based models of “normal patterns” of SAR at CI. As noted above, HITRAC is unique in 
bringing together intelligence and critical infrastructure analysts at the national level. It 
also has been aggressive in working with state-level CI protection organizations and 
fusion centers to develop intelligence support to CI protection. On the other hand, 
NISAC has the sophisticated expertise needed to conduct statistical modeling. In fact, 
NISAC is a congressionally-mandated modeling, simulation, and analysis program.16 
The Center already prepares and shares analyses of CI including their 
interdependencies, consequences, and other complexities, so moving on to model the 
relationship between SAR and CI is a natural extension.  
We can now move on to Figure 4, which displays the role of intelligence based on SAR 
in improving CI protection. Intelligence analysts are responsible for developing, 
updating, and improving the “complete historical SAR database.” Similarly, critical 
infrastructure analysts are responsible for bringing their sector-specific expertise to bear 
in developing and maintaining a GIS-rectified CI database. These two teams of analysts, 
working in tandem, operate the models that yield a picture of the “normal pattern of 
SARs [sic] to specific CI facilities”. This understanding of what constitutes a normal 
versus an abnormal situation at sector specific potential targets can then be used by the 
CI analysts to develop a more effective protection regime at that facility. Finally, in the 
process of advising CI stakeholders and partners, the CI analysts will encourage them to 
gather more and better reports of suspicious activity – a positive feedback loop 
strengthening the SAR process. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
This paper has presented two SAR-based, data-intensive analytic techniques that have 
the theoretic potential to improve our counter-terrorism efforts by warning of terrorism 
activity and by assisting in the development of better CI protection regimes.  Civil liberty 
activists point out the potential dangers to our privacy posed by a massive, national SAR 
program. They also question the effectiveness and efficiency of such a SAR effort. 
Before national policymakers decide which way to go on this issue, it seems 
reasonable to conduct a validation test to determine whether or not the theoretic value-
added of a robust SAR program can be proven in the real world. Such a validation 
program would begin with selection of a representative sample of the most important 
target sets (i.e. mass transit systems, bridges, dams, etc) and a concerted effort to collect 
a comprehensive data set of “suspicious activity” for this sample. Analysts from both the 
critical infrastructure and intelligence disciplines, supported by quantitative 
methodologists, would then be tasked to develop models of “normal” suspicious activity 
for each sample facility. If the models simply are not sensitive enough to detect 
simulated precursor terrorist activity or to provide insights into ways to improve 
protection of these facilities, then it is reasonable to constrain the SAR program. But if 
the models can do the job and actually are shown to constitute a unique, intelligence-
driven capability to prevent terrorist attacks or at least to better protect our critical 
infrastructure, then further debate is in order before we simply discard that capability.  
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THE PROBLEM  
Governments, non-governmental organizations, and community leaders in many 
countries face a daunting task: the design and implementation of policies, programs, 
and systems that help local communities cope with a panoply of threats ranging from 
terrorist attacks to natural disasters. In highly developed societies, this task is often 
compounded by associated problems such as aged, overburdened, and complex critical 
infrastructure systems;1 the catastrophic potential of chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threats; and the increasing interconnectivity of many 
global systems of transportation and communication.   
The idea of building resilience to natural and man-made disasters is now a dominant 
strategic theme and operational goal in the current U.S. national security policy 
discourse.2 Yet, even with unlimited resources, it is highly unlikely that a community 
can prevent or protect itself from all the possible dangers it may face. In the United 
States for example, complex distribution systems are now the primary mechanism for 
supplying populations with food and water. Gasoline-powered vehicles remain the 
dominant mode of transportation. Individuals and organizations build their everyday 
activities around complex systems over which they have little control, such as electricity, 
computerized systems, and communication networks supported by distant satellites. 
Each of these modern conveniences allows communities to function more efficiently. Yet 
few people maintain a stockpile of food and water or possess alternative modes of 
transportation, power generation, or communication in the event of an emergency.  
Meanwhile, governments, communities, and individuals have never been so devas-
tatingly unprepared to cope with disturbances to infrastructure, vital resources, or 
public goods and services. Part of the problem is that the efficiencies inherent within 
these complex systems of modern life reduce resilience through a loss in redundancy 
and diversity. Another aspect is that few systems are designed with resilience as a 
specification. The ability of these systems to bounce back after a disaster will have a 
direct impact on the ability of a community to respond and recover. It is thus important 
to consider all the resources that a community must count on when assessing resilience.  
Researchers in varied and distinct disciplines have struggled with the concept of 
resilience in their respective fields for decades.3 Scholars and practitioners continue to 
wrestle with this concept in hope of developing useful prescriptive homeland security 
policy guidance,4 and community-level assessment tools.5 While there is still much to 
debate about how to draft precise definitions of resilience and its attributes, and how to 
operationalize and apply resilience concepts within each discipline, overlap in the 
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research of each discipline is significant enough to be instructive as to what makes 
systems resilient.      
The recent focus on resilience marks a shift from resistance strategies focused solely 
on the anticipation of risk and the mitigation of vulnerability to more inclusive 
strategies that integrate both resistance (prevent, protect) and resilience (respond, 
recover) in the face of disasters. In the past, some scholars have maintained that 
anticipation strategies should be used to focus on known problems, while those geared 
towards resilience are better suited for the unknown. It is important to point out that 
individually, both aspects have shortfalls. Just as planning based on anticipated threats 
can lead to resource investments to counter hazards that never materialize, planning 
from the broader resilience standpoint may call for the short-term diversion of 
resources in an effort to ensure long-term sustainability.6  
Compounding the challenge is the difficulty in developing a flexible planning process 
that responds to changing conditions.7 The greater the uncertainty, the greater the need 
for flexibility.8 Yet, the pervasiveness of “worst-case,” “probabilistic” planning lacks the 
“possibilistic thinking” needed to face both the dangers and the opportunities that no 
one can predict.9 Finding the right balance between anticipation and adaptation, order 
and chaos, resistance and resilience is the challenge each community must face and calls 
for an approach based on continuous learning and transformation,10 rather than 
anticipation and control.11 
This article moves beyond debating definitions of resilience, towards the 
development of a preliminary conceptual framework for assessing community 
resilience. We recognize that not all frameworks are created equal, nor do they satisfy all 
constituent audiences.12 The proposed framework presented herein is consistent with 
Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s stated purpose of a framework: to “identify the 
elements (and the relationships among these elements)...to consider for 
analysis...organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry...[and] provide the most general 
set of variables that should be used to analyze all types of settings relevant for the 
framework.”13 It does not outline a cookie-cutter solution for all communities to apply, 
but rather an approach that allows community leaders and policymakers to begin to 
think about resilience as it pertains to their own community’s unique circumstances. 
While sacrificing operational specifics in the interim, it summarizes the core attributes 
of resilient systems (resource performance, resource diversity, resource redundancy, 
institutional memory, innovative learning, and connectedness) in the context of five key 
community subsystems (ecological, economic, physical infrastructure, civil society, and 
governance). Through the examination of each community subsystem, a preliminary, 
community-based, resilience assessment framework is proposed for continued 
development and refinement. 
In leading up to this conceptual framework, however, the article presents the 
definition of resilience used here, an argument for a community-based approach, and a 
description of what we believe the research shows are the core attributes of resilience 
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WHAT IS RESILIENCE? 
In current policy debates, the meaning of resilience varies by disciplinary perspective.  
For most, resilience (with its roots in the Latin word resilio) means to adapt and 
“bounce back” from a disruptive event.14  Similarly, resilience also refers to the ability of 
a system to absorb, change, and still carry on.15 As applied to social systems, resilience 
refers to the capacity of a community system, or part of that system, to absorb and 
recover from disruptive events.16 We have adopted the definition used by scholars at the 
multi-disciplinary Resilience Alliance because it is applicable across the relevant 
systems examined here: the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, undergo 
change, and retain the same essential functions, structure, identity, and feedbacks.17 It 
can be a characteristic of individuals, small groups, networks, organizations, regions, 
nations, or ecosystems. This definition retains the core concepts of those definitions 
semi-officially adopted by federal agencies responsible for homeland security.18  
Note that resilience does not necessarily mean that the system will look just as it did 
before a disturbance or “surprise.” It will maintain its functions but individual parts of 
the system may have changed (adapted) to new conditions in the environment. For 
example, sometimes, when part of a system is not resilient and fails, other parts of the 
system must assume its functions and appropriate its resources. Thus, a resilience 
strategy does not guarantee short-term stability, but rather survivability of the system’s 
essential functions in the long term. Resilience is often an emergent property of the 
system,19 and therefore often difficult to measure and predict. 
Resilience is sometimes confused with the concept of “resistance” – an attempt to 
prevent or stop disruptive events from happening. Resistance strategies include physical 
countermeasures such as trying to stop terrorists from boarding aircraft and building 
firewalls to protect computer systems from intruders. Resilience strategies, on the other 
hand, assume that resistance may not always be possible and thus include the provision 
of or access to alternative resources and services if the resistance strategy fails.  
Resistance is not antithetical to resilience. Rather, resilience subsumes it. If a 
community can resist a disturbance, its resources are robust enough to prevent the 
disturbance from reducing community functioning without any need for adaptation. 
However, a strategy that only directs resources toward resisting threats would almost 
certainly be costly, and possibly conflict with societal norms and individual liberties.  
Moreover, when resistance strategies fail, they have a tendency to fail catastrophically.20   
A COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH  
We do not assume that government is the primary guarantor of resilience, although it 
can be an important facilitator. Similarly, we do not assume that there is one optimal set 
of choices or resource allocations for all societies preparing and planning for potential 
“surprises” that may come their way. Nor do we assume that the choices that social 
groups make today will work in the future. Although resilience can be fostered on 
multiple scales, the community is an appropriate level for building basic resilience.  
A central reason we focus on resilience at the community level is because most 
disasters are local and affect communities differently – a flood or earthquake would not 
affect residents of Singapore the same way that it would affect residents of San 
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Francisco, California. Communities are unique and have their own local needs, experi-
ences, resources, and ideas about prevention of, protection against, response to, and 
recovery from different types of disasters. Each community has access to resources and 
the ability to manipulate and make decisions that single individuals do not. Since all 
disaster planning and response requires the immediate involvement of a wide range of 
local institutions (often in concert with state and national organizations), they are 
typically the appropriate level of focus for emergency planning and response activities. A 
community-level focus on resilience – as opposed to a “one-size-fits-all” or “top-down” 
approach – results in local participation, ownership, and flexibility in building 
resilience.21 Moreover, because communities are parts of greater wholes (states, regions, 
and nations), a bottom-up community resilience approach builds state, regional, and 
national resilience concurrently.22 Strengthening local coping capacity can help 
empower local communities rather than foster institutional dependency.23 
A community is a group of people who share a common physical environment, 
resources, and services, as well as risks and threats.  It is also a collective body that has 
boundaries (often geographic), internal and external feedbacks, and “a shared fate.”24 
Because of this, a community is a complex physical and social system comprised of 
many sub-systems.25 For example, a typical metropolitan area encompasses a diverse 
collection of districts and neighborhoods within the central city and its suburbs, with 
very different land-use norms, social interactions, income levels, and access to 
resources. Some experts refer to the “footprint” of a community as the region from 
which a city pulls its resources, that receives the city’s waste, or that depends on the 
city’s economy. This footprint usually reaches well beyond the city limits.26 Disruption 
of community systems can come from external points and have broad effects within and 
without. For instance, the source that generates and provides power to an urban energy 
system is part of that system, but may be located well outside of the given urban area.27 
In contrast, a rural community might be limited to a smaller collective of residents 
inhabiting a valley or mountainous region. Likewise, rural subsystems will vary in form 
and significance to overall community functioning. For instance, the family (as an 
institution) and religious organizations may play a more dominant role in rural settings 
than they do in urban settings.  
Within both communities and regions, there is usually a high level of interaction 
among government, corporate, nonprofit, and individual participants when addressing 
common needs.28 Indeed, many communities already engage in comprehensive 
community planning. Therefore, we presume that communities will define themselves 
in conducting any resilience self-assessment. Also, our analytical model seeks to close 
the practical gap between state-provided security, human safety challenges such as 
disasters and terrorism, and trans-boundary connections between public and private 
resources as well as multiple planning and response levels within communities.29  
Attributes of Community Resilience 
What makes one community bounce back from a disruption quickly while another will 
struggle for years? What is resilience in a community setting? Simply put, it is the ability 
of a community to absorb a disturbance while retaining its essential functions. This does 
not mean that its degree of functionality remains in a constant state but that 
functionality will return in one form or another in a relatively short period of time. To be 
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resilient, the community must have both the resources available and the ability to apply 
or reorganize them in such a way to ensure essential functionality during and/or after 
the disturbance. Furthermore, since the community governance process will differ based 
on each geographical setting, measures taken with the aim of improving a community’s 
assessment of its own resilience must be highly context-specific.30 After a 
comprehensive literature review of resilience in multiple disciplines,31 such as 
organization theory, political science, economics and specific grounding in the tradition 
of ecological resilience and the work of the Resilience Alliance,32 we propose a model 
that allows communities to evaluate and plan for their resilience based on an analysis of 
the robustness of their available resources and adaptive capacity to utilize their 
resources. 
Before elaborating further on what resource robustness and adaptive capacity entail, 
we note the broader implications for communities. Communities with a highly robust 
pool of resources and a high degree of adaptive capacity will be the most resilient. 
However, few communities will have the luxury of possessing high levels of both. If a 
community is either high in resources or high in adaptive capacity, they can afford to 
have somewhat less of the other and remain relatively resilient if they take these assets 
into account in their planning. However, when communities possess low levels of 
resources and low levels of adaptive capacity, they will be less resilient. So, if a 
community is lacking in resources, it should concentrate on building its adaptive 
capacity. For example, if a community lacks funds (resources) for advanced 
communications equipment, it can utilize resources on hand and self-organize in such a 
way (adaptive capacity) to perform the desired function. Hypothetically, two 
communities could have an equal amount of resilience, but a different mix of resources 
and adaptive capacity.  
 
 
Figure 1. Resource Robustness and Adaptive Capacity 
Resource Robustness   
Resources are critical to a community’s sustained functioning and provision of public 
services under a variety of conditions, in times of normalcy or crisis. Communities can 




Community A Community B 
LONGSTAFF  ET AL., BUILDING RESILIENT COMMUNITIES 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
6 
redundancy of what is available to them. Resources are defined as “objects, conditions, 
characteristics, and energies that people value.”33 Importantly, this definition 
emphasizes the localized, value-laden quality of such an object or condition. Resources 
considered valuable to one community may not have the same inherent value to 
another, especially across different regions and cultures. Resources that are objects or 
conditions could range anywhere from snowplows to schools, from hospitals to food and 
water supplies, or from social cohesion to economic wealth. Likewise, characteristics 
and energies such as leadership, education level and ethical values could also be 
considered resources to a community. 
Performance “describes the general level of capacity and quality at which an element 
or elements of a system performs an essential role.”34 Performance answers the 
question, “how well does this resource accomplish a particular function?” For example, 
a hammer performs better than a wrench for sinking a nail, because it is designed 
specifically to drive nails into solid objects. Performance of an object or condition also 
includes a quality relative to those of a similar nature. Thus, a stronger, more durable 
hammer performs better than those of inferior design, and thus has a higher relative 
quality. When looking at the function of water distribution within a community it would 
be important to know how well the water system works under average conditions and 
what might make it vulnerable to collapse. 
Diversity is a measure of different types of available resources that perform a 
particular function.35 A community that has high diversity in its available resources for 
critical functions will have a multitude of options for accomplishing those particular 
functions. Hammers, nail guns, and other hard objects all provide a diversity of options 
to sink nails. Yet, if the function is to attach one object to another, adhesives such as 
glue, screws and screwdrivers, staples and staplers, if available, provide a diversity of 
resources to draw upon, albeit with varying degrees of performance. Likewise, if there 
are several communication systems in a community (i.e., radio and reverse-911) there 
will be more chance to reach all citizens with important information and more 
likelihood of reaching people if one of those communication systems becomes 
inoperable.  
Diversity can also come in the form of information and ideas for approaching a 
particular task.  All else equal, a planning team comprised of individuals that come from 
a variety of backgrounds and experiences possesses a greater collective diversity of ideas 
and knowledge and, thus, a greater number of options to tackle a problem, compared to 
a team of individuals from similar backgrounds. 
Redundancy is a quantifiable measure, or count, of a single resource type that 
performs a specific function.36 Redundant resources provide a failsafe, or back-up, when 
any individual unit fails. Redundancy is also a form of operational slack, or buffering 
from external shocks. Having many hammers provides a high degree of redundancy for 
sinking nails. If one breaks, there are more to use. Likewise, emergency savings 
accounts are a form of redundancy in financial terms and allow for the continuance of 
an individual or family’s lifestyle in the event of a job loss or unexpected event. A 
seventy-two-hour emergency preparedness kit allows a household to sustain itself in the 
event of a disaster, until a community response organization can respond and restore 
power and other basic services. 
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However, redundancy is often expensive. It means that there are resources sitting in 
reserve that may not be used – even while the community pays to maintain them.  This 
becomes an important tradeoff that each community must make and depends in large 
part on how valuable a resource is to them and how likely it is that resource will be 
disrupted. 
When combined, the performance, diversity, and redundancy of available resources 
determine a system’s overall robustness.37 That is, its ability to provide critical functions 
under a variety of conditions. For example, the robustness of a water system would be 
greatest when the system has high performance (i.e., sound delivery mechanisms, pipes, 
pumps, etc.), redundancy (i.e., multiple water lines), and diversity (i.e., multiple sources 
such as rivers, lakes, aquifers, and runoff). Every community, and each system within a 
community, must decide how to allocate time and money between performance, 
redundancy, and diversity, keeping in mind that it may be best to have a balance of the 
three attributes – not maximizing one to the detriment of the others.38 
Adaptive Capacity 
A community’s adaptive capacity is a function of the ability of individuals and groups 
to: 1) store and remember experiences; 2) use that memory and experience to learn, 
innovate, and reorganize resources in order to adapt to changing environmental 
demands; and 3) connect with others inside and outside the community to communicate 
experiences and lessons learned, self-organize or reorganize in the absence of direction, 
or to obtain resources from outside sources.39 Thus, institutional memory, innovative 
learning, and connectedness determine the foundation of adaptive capacity on a 
community level. 
Institutional memory is the accumulated shared experience and local knowledge of a 
group of people. Over time, institutional memory is amassed through group-level 
observation and stored in a variety of ways such as documented records or repetitive 
rituals and ceremonies that are carried on as group membership evolves over time.40 
Rituals reinforce institutional memory by facilitating and reinforcing the recollection of 
rules and policies as well as the interpretation of changes or disturbances in the 
environment. Information and knowledge management systems that store, distribute, 
and aid in interpretation of large quantities of data are helpful in retaining institutional 
memory but only if they are accessible by people who need them, when they need them.   
Innovative Learning is the ability of the group to use its information and experience 
to create novel adaptations to environmental changes or to avoid repeating old mistakes. 
Innovation is a form of dynamic learning that places emphasis on the capacity to 
identify and “create new responses or arrangements.”41 Innovative institutions 
sometimes encourage trial-and error type learning by allowing “errors and risk-taking 
behavior.”42 Other times innovations occur in a more deliberate way by putting new 
ideas or resources together with old ones when current strategies are not working. It is 
true that necessity is often the mother of invention. Innovative learning can be reduced 
by a failure to admit that something is not working to provide an important resource or 
function. This kind of learning can be especially difficult when it has to happen as an 
unanticipated disruption is unfolding. During a disruption, spreading information about 
the innovative learning going on in a community (both what is working and what is not 
working) requires a trusted source of information that may or may not be government 
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or the media. Identification of these trusted communication channels and maintaining 
that trust becomes critical.43 
Innovation and learning are mutually increased through the practice of “adaptive co-
management” which combines a management culture that places a premium on risk 
taking and experiential learning with the linkages and partnerships associated with 
cooperative management.44 Leadership – a vital community resource – plays a pivotal 
role in establishing such a culture.  
The creation of new ideas, resources, processes, and forms of organization are all 
results of innovative learning.45 A community is in a position to learn and innovate 
when individuals and groups are able to experiment through trial and error. Repeated 
variations on experiments create knowledge – and hopefully institutional memory – of 
what new ideas, processes, and organizational designs work and those that do not. 
Ultimately, innovative learning allows the ability of a social group to anticipate both 
future opportunities and future hazards.   
Finally, interpersonal and group connectedness is critical to the diffusion of 
institutional memory and innovative learning throughout the community. Community 
systems and subsystems typically have a variety of internal and external links between 
their various component parts of the system and the higher or lower levels of the system. 
These links are commonly characterized as social (informal) and organizational (formal) 
networks.46 In the absence of formal direction, these connections – which often vary in 
strength47 – contribute to a community system’s ability to exchange, store, and recall 
knowledge, and take collective action in light of changing conditions.   
However, the tightness or looseness of these connections can be both the 
community’s strength and its vulnerability.48 In tightly coupled systems, a change in 
one component (individual or subsystem) of the system engenders an immediate 
response from (or impact on) the other components. For example, an apartment 
complex is a tightly coupled shelter system because a fire in one living unit is likely to 
have an effect on the others. In a rural area, a fire at one farm will not have an 
immediate effect on the others as they are more loosely coupled. The efficiency of 
apartment complexes comes at the cost of less resilience to fires for individual units.  
Yet, in loosely coupled systems, the components have weak enough links that they 
can ignore local disturbances. Since loosely connected units have more independence 
from the full system than tightly coupled ones, they can maintain their equilibrium or 
stability even when other parts of the system are affected by a change in the 
environment. Thus, if either innovation or localized responses to particular problems 
are specified goals, then loosely coupled systems seem most appropriate. For example, a 
more tightly coupled emergency management system would take longer to respond or 
have inappropriate responses for some unanticipated surprises if all the units in the 
system had to wait on centralized, bureaucratic decision making before they could act. 
Still, if the goal is standardization across the entire system, then a tight coupling is more 
likely to yield a desired outcome.  
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Figure 2. Aspects of Community Resilience 
 
When a community possesses a high level of all three traits – institutional memory, 
innovative learning, and connectedness – it, in turn, possesses a high capacity to adapt 
to changes in the environment. If it has a relatively low level of one trait, it can often 
make up for this deficiency by addressing it directly or increasing the levels of the other 
two traits. For example, a large city with low levels of connectedness between ethnic 
groups could address this problem directly by creating bridges for dialogue and 
communication that will, in the event of a disruption, facilitate sharing and diffusion of 
institutional memory and innovative learning across groups. This requires that 
communities build connections and trust before a disruptive event. However, if such a 
strategy proves unfruitful, it may still be able to improve adaptability by increasing the 
access of these groups to a shared knowledge center, or by encouraging innovation and 
learning across all groups. 
Living, or coping, with change and uncertainty requires the capability to integrate 
and apply learning, collective memory, innovation, and collaboration in ways that 
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sustain critical functions over time. A tall order – communities, governments, and 
organizations must continuously look forward, plan for multiple alternative futures, and 
test for or experiment with new ideas, while recalling and interpreting the past. In 
recognizing the directional nature of current hazards and changes, and by identifying 
external drivers of change, these social institutions have the opportunity to design the 
flexibility necessary to anticipate and adjust to change.  
APPLYING A RESILIENCE APPROACH TO COMMUNITY SYSTEMS 
With the ability to make sound self-assessments of their resilience to disasters and 
disruptions, communities can more appropriately prioritize preparedness efforts, 
allocate funding, and develop more innovative ways to organize their material and 
human resources. In order to help communities think about their resilience, our 
approach employs the concepts described above to assess each one of five key 
community subsystems: ecological, economic, civil society, governance, and physical 
infrastructure.49  
These five were chosen based on an exhaustive review of academic and policy-
oriented literature, and lengthy discussions on a set of sub-systems that, together, 
captured the core functions within a community. For example, earlier in our research, 
we included information and communication systems as a stand-alone system for 
analysis, but concluded it overlapped considerably with all other subsystems. We 
recognize that these subsystems are inherently interdependent, overlapping, and 
complex, even in small communities. Ultimately, the set of five key community 
subsystems represents a pragmatic choice between parsimony and exhaustiveness.50 
These five subsystems are a starting point for community analysis and individual 
communities may well identify other subsystems that are important to them. 
Within each subsystem described below, we illustrate some of the attributes and 
characteristics of what we believe indicate resilience in each subsystem; that is, the 
robustness of the resources that make up the subsystem and its adaptive capacity. 
Attributes of resilience will vary depending on the type of system in question. For 
example, diversity in an ecosystem may be the number of different types of species, 
while diversity in an economic system may include the range of skill sets within a labor 
force. The discussion of each subsection is for explanatory purposes only. We do not 
attempt to “prove” the applications suggested or to offer a “how to” for each system. 
However, we hope that more specific guidance for communities will be developed as this 
research progresses.  
Ecological Subsystems 
Ecological systems are the combined biological and physical elements of the 
environment in which a community is located.  
[An] ecosystem is the complex of interconnected living organisms inhabiting a 
particular area or unit of space, together with their environment and all their 
interrelationships and relationships with the environment. An [e]cosystem is 
characterized by the description of populations; [the abundance] of individual 
species; interspecies relationships; activity of organisms; physical and chemical 
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characteristics of environment; flows of matter, energy, and information; and 
description of changes of these parameters with time.51  
Humans are an important part of a community’s ecosystem but they are not the only 
important part. Without outside resources, humans cannot survive if the local 
environment does not support agriculture or provide enough clean water. 
Some parts of an ecological subsystem will be beyond the control of a community, but 
are nonetheless helpful in describing a community’s setting and the natural resources 
the community can use to provide for critical functions in times of disruption. The 
important natural resources might include items such as water supplies, wind patterns, 
climate, soil quality, and topography. The important task for each community is to look 
at the aspects of the ecological systems most valued in order to consider them when the 
community is forced to bounce back from a surprise. For example, it would be 
important to know wind patterns if you must respond to a cloud of volcanic ash or a 
biological attack. It may also be important to know the amount of available land for new 
uses such as temporary shelter construction. In addition, a diversity of habitats would 
allow some flora and fauna to survive if one habitat is rendered uninhabitable. Will 
these habitats support local food production? Does the environment support growing 
other crops if the current ones become economically unsustainable? 
The adaptive capacity of ecological subsystems might be measured by how quickly 
key elements of the local environment can regenerate in the event of a disaster such as 
flooding or fire.52 Grasses and insects will regenerate much faster than trees and 
mammals due to the length of their life cycles. Through evolution, many plants have 
developed adaptive capacity that allows them to be resilient because they “remember” 
how to bounce back from dangers such as fire by developing protective surfaces on their 
seeds. For agriculture, this adaptation period will be the time it takes to prepare the land 
and then plant either the existing crop or a new one that is more appropriate to new 
ecological (or economic) conditions. New crops may need new machinery and 
specialized knowledge to accomplish successful adaptation. Indicators of adaptive 
capacity include the ability of the environment to support a diversity of crops and 
wildlife.  
Economic Subsytems 
Economic systems are comprised of people, firms and institutions that interact to 
accomplish the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. A 
resilient economy can be essential for recovery efforts in a post-disaster setting.53 The 
resources of an economic system are robust if they can deliver critical goods and services 
under a variety of conditions. The changes in conditions may happen quickly, like a 
flood. Or they may occur over a longer period of time, like climate change or the 
movement of firms to new markets. 
A major disaster or catastrophic event could potentially put many economic activities 
at risk. Resilient local economic systems will have plans to get small businesses up and 
running to ensure that people feel safe going to markets, and to assure the public that 
the flow of currency is secure and individual bank accounts are protected. The first 
decision will be whether to try to return the economic system to its previous state or to 
adapt to new conditions. 
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Resource robustness in an economic subsystem would generally include 
performance, diversity, and redundancy within the labor markets and capital markets 
and ‘land’ or natural resources within a given community. According to some 
economists, the measure of these resources denotes the potential for “shock-
absorption.”54 To assess the resources within an economic subsystem, economists might 
look at the conditions of the labor market, the make-up of the community’s businesses, 
the preferences of consumers, measures of unemployment, and growth and/or inflation, 
among other signals. 
Adaptive capacity in an economic subsystem might come in the form of policy options 
available to business or government leaders, such as whether to borrow, trade, finance, 
or substitute goods. Such tools increase the potential for “shock-counteraction,”55 and 
amount to the ability of the economic subsystem to innovate and learn. To assess the 
adaptive capacity in an economic subsystem, experts could consider the fiscal position 
of the community – a healthy position would allow leaders to cut taxes or raise expenses 
to counteract the harmful shock. Economists might also look at the community’s 
freedom to trade or make adjustments to trading relationships. In the labor market, 
economists might look at the ability of workers to change jobs or get new training in 
various industries. 
Physical Infrastructure Subsystems 
Physical infrastructure “refers to the substructure or underlying foundation or network 
used for providing goods and services; especially the basic installations and facilities on 
which the continuance and growth of a community, state, etc., depend...[and] include 
roads, water systems, communications facilities, sewers, sidewalks, cable, wiring, 
schools, power plants, and transportation and communication systems.”56 The 
practitioners, engineers, and policy makers that use, design, and manage these assets 
are included within the subsystem as well. 
Assessing the resource robustness within a community’s physical infrastructure 
subsystem would require an accounting for each of the infrastructure sectors listed 
above, especially considering that the robustness of each sector could vary dramatically 
within the same community. A community could have a superior transportation system, 
but a woefully inadequate water system. In addition, communities have varying control 
over the complex, networked infrastructure systems on which they rely. For example, 
many communities rely on power from the electric grid. Thus, they are unable to affect 
the performance or redundancy of their own energy infrastructure because it is 
managed and regulated on a broader scale. Realizing this, communities might work to 
require these higher levels of regulation to include appropriate redundancy to ensure 
that the system can bounce back after a disruption. Potentially costly, redundant 
telephone switches or electric generation and transmission capacity would almost 
certainly be paid for through increased rates for businesses and consumers. This 
illustrates tradeoffs that must be made between increasing resilience and reducing costs 
in the short term.  
An adaptive capacity assessment in a given infrastructure sector depends, in part, on 
the nature of the component under consideration. Some components are structured or 
designed to adapt. The internet, for example, automatically reroutes information around 
damaged networks. Other components that consist of fixed resources, like a 
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transportation system that consists of bridges and roads, can only adapt in the short 
term through innovation by the system’s users and managers that reroutes traffic 
around damaged areas.   
Civil Society Subsystems 
For our purposes, “civil society” refers to the formal and informal modes of social 
organization and collective action outside of governmental authority (i.e., non-
governmental and philanthropic organizations, health and human service organizations, 
faith-based organizations, unions, associations, etc.). These institutions contribute to 
community values, provide forums for civic action and dialogue, and enhance quality of 
life and social welfare. They are often key players in recovery from a sudden disruption 
such as a natural disaster. 
Assessing the resource robustness within a community’s civil society subsystem 
would entail accounting for the diversity (number of different types) of civil society 
organizations, their redundancy (total number by category), and the performance of 
these diverse organizations in accomplishing their missions. A large number of 
volunteer organizations in a community may appear to offer high redundancy, but if 
these organizations experience difficulties maintaining membership, mobilizing 
support, or accomplishing meaningful projects for the community, they may not nec-
essarily be considered robust resources. 
An adaptive capacity assessment in a given community would require a careful 
examination of the mechanisms and procedures the civil society uses to retain and recall 
its collective experiences, the production of new and innovative techniques for achieving 
community goals, and the strength of ties between civil society organizations. Using the 
volunteer sector again as an example, indicators such as organizational longevity, 
employee turnover, and growth of new organizations would provide a general sense of 
institutional memory. However, this should also take into account how organizations 
retain and embed their experiences in processes and individuals. 
Governance Subsystems 
Systems of governance include the public organizations (political, administrative, 
legislative, and judicial institutions) that contribute to the administration of government 
functions of the community. There may be overlap into the social and private spheres 
through public-private partnerships. Governance also includes the processes through 
which government institutions, or any group of people with a mandate or with a 
common purpose, make decisions.57 Governance also sets the parameters for ordered 
rule, cooperative action,58 decision-making, and power sharing through institutions.59 
Assessing the resource robustness of a community’s governance subsystem is often 
limited to a performance assessment in terms of the governing entities themselves 
because competing governing entities sometimes undermine the functions of the 
system. This is apparent in post-conflict communities that suffer from diverse governing 
structures (tribal, national, and intervening structures) all operating at once. 
Performance may be measured in multiple ways – from the cost and quality of services 
delivered in relation to the resources collected from the citizens, to the strength of the 
government’s mandate to act on the citizens’ behalf.60 In some communities there may 
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be great value in having redundancy and diversity in staffing, especially for critical 
functions and resources, even if this is not efficient and costs more in the short term. 
An adaptive capacity assessment in a given community would entail a range of 
inquiries. Does the government have the capacity to institutionalize and adapt lessons-
learned, such as modifying emergency response plans following an event? How 
extensive is the discretionary authority granted to government officials during a crisis 
(for example, the authority to commandeer resources or waive regulatory restrictions as 
needed)? How connected are the various units of government in times of disruption? 
DEVELOPING AN ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
The critical elements of a local resilience assessment include an unflinching look at the 
five subsystems as they really are and a willingness to see possibilities for putting 
resources together in new ways in the event of a disruption. At a minimum, a 
comprehensive community resilience assessment would entail an examination across 
each of the five subsystems that make up the community, as briefly described above. 
Communities should assess each subsystem’s resource robustness in terms of 
performance, diversity, and redundancy as well as its adaptive capacity in terms of 
institutional memory, capacity for innovation, and internal and external connectedness. 
Each system must be initially assessed separately because the attributes of resilience are 
manifested differently. Overlaps between these subsystems should then be dealt with to 
form a picture of the whole. 
The following list of questions represents the most basic level of examination to 
assess the resilience of a community subsystem. 
  
Basic Questions for Resilience Assessment 
! Which functions are vital to our community within this subsystem? 
! What resources are available to perform this function? 
• How well does this resource perform a particular function? How well would it 
perform in a disruption? (Performance) 
• How much of this resource do we have? (Redundancy) 
• Are there other resources available that could perform this function? 
(Diversity) 
! To what extent do organizations and informal social groups within this subsystem instill 
and maintain a common memory? (Institutional Memory) 
! To what extent do organizations and informal social groups within this subsystem foster 
a culture of continuous learning and innovation? (Innovative Learning) 
! To what extent are organizations and informal social groups within this subsystem 
internally and externally connected?  Are they loosely connected or tightly connected?  
How will a disturbance that affects one organization or social group impact others?  
(Connectedness)  
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While this list of questions appears rudimentary, it can easily lead to a lengthy set of 
functions and resources under each subsystem, accompanied by evaluative criteria 
and/or indicators for each resilience attribute (performance, redundancy, diversity, 
institutional memory, innovative learning, and connectedness). The boxes below 
provide a simple breakdown of how an analysis would be organized by subsystem with 
one or two example indicators. The potential depth and comprehensiveness of such an 
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Figure 3. Resilience Analysis Breakdown (with example indicators) 
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As stated previously, this article outlines a preliminary conceptual framework for 
assessing resilience. It is a first step toward moving beyond academic debates and 
toward a useful policy tool. While discussion and debate will – and should – continue on 
the exact nature of resilient systems in the various disciplines, we believe there is a 
significant enough overlap in the research to propose this framework for more concrete 
analysis. Just as no one definition of resilience will fully satisfy participants in this 
diverse field of research and practice, no one tool will be equally satisfying or sufficient. 
What matters is that communities have an approach that is relatively easy to understand 
and use to guide decision-making. 
Notably, this framework is community-based, holistic, and scalable. The design 
allows planners and policy-makers to conduct a resilience assessment that is adapted to 
fit their own particular circumstances, based on the assumption that communities 
themselves are best able to identify and make value judgments regarding which 
functions and resources matter most. Communities are also better equipped than 
outside evaluators to determine the scale and scope of the geographic and political 
boundaries that define them. In addition, because the proposed framework is scalable, it 
can potentially allow for application on multiple levels of state, regional, and 
international governance. 
We acknowledge that this framework requires further development both in academic 
circles and communities. Options include assembling experts from each subsystem to 
evaluate how to best measure the resilience attributes (resource robustness and adaptive 
capacity) quantitatively, qualitatively, or in combination. Researchers might develop a 
catalog of evaluative questions to be assessed, scaled, and normalized according to 
subsystem, and then aggregate these questions to form a collective resilience index. 
Another option involves extensive case study analysis. 
Lastly, the resilience approach described here is no panacea for addressing the wide 
range of natural and man-made threats to society. Nor should it completely supplant 
risk- and vulnerability-based approaches to homeland security. Rather, all of these 
efforts should be mutually supporting. But until researchers and practitioners move 
beyond the definitional debate and get on with developing something useful in the field, 
resilience will remain nothing more than just another good concept and meaningless 
buzz-word. 
  
This article is based on research presented in P.H. Longstaff, N. Armstrong, and K. Perrin, 
“Building Resilient Communities: Tools for Assessment,” Project on Resilience and Security 
white paper, Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University 
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Homeland Security and Support for Multiculturalism, 
Assimilation, and Omniculturalism Policies among Americans 
 
Fathali M. Moghaddam and James N. Breckenridge 
 
 
This article presents data suggesting that Americans’ views of policies toward 
immigrants are pertinent to matters of homeland security. “Homeland” is a concept 
shaped partly by how people psychologically differentiate “citizen” from “immigrant.” 
The differentiation of these categories is critical to individuals’ political and social 
identity. Homeland security scholars are unlikely to be aware, however, of this country’s 
substantial majority preference for an alternative to the traditional, yet deeply divided, 
incompatible policies of assimilation and accommodation. Moreover, the publics’ 
appraisal of the threat of terrorism, the priority they assign to homeland security 
institutions, their trust and confidence in homeland security organizations, and their 
support for counter-terrorism measures are linked to their immigration policy 
preference even after accounting for their race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status. 
Homeland security professionals would do well to consider the potential implications of 
these preferences. 
Practitioners and researchers in the domain of security have been engaged for several 
decades in an important debate concerning the relative merits of a “realist” versus a 
“human security” approach.1 The realist approach focuses primarily on military security, 
and represents the dominant school in the domain of security studies. The human 
security approach is newer and involves an emphasis on health security, food security, 
shelter security, and other “humanitarian” concerns that are argued to be a priority for 
ordinary people in their everyday lives. Although the debate between the realist and 
human security camps has been constructive, there is a danger that both approaches are 
being left behind by new challenges created by accelerating globalization. Among the 
most important of these challenges is rapid and large-scale movement of people around 
the world bringing about “sudden” intergroup contact.2 
Humans have always been migrating, starting from Africa to reach all the major 
landmasses by about 10,000 years ago.3 But until fairly recently, migrations were 
relatively slow. The human groups in interaction had more time to adapt to one another. 
In the modern era, using jet planes and rapid trains, large numbers of people can move 
long distances in a relatively short time. The availability of rapid transportation systems 
has been coupled with the globalization of the economy, so that a demand for cheaper 
labor in one part of the world can be met with a speedy supply of cheaper labor from 
other parts of the world. Consequently, in the last few decades there has been a rapid 
increase of South Asians in the United Kingdom, North Africans in France, and Turks in 
Germany, with the result that there are now about twenty million Muslims in the 
European Union.  
Rising intergroup contact in recent decades has created new tensions in the European 
Union, and these tensions have been further intensified by a series of terrorist attacks. 
The most well-publicized of these attacks are the March 11, 2004, bomb explosions on 
trains in Madrid which resulted in close to 200 deaths and over 1,000 serious injuries, 
and the July 7, 2005, bomb explosions on the London public transportation system, 
which also resulted in multiple fatalities and serious injuries. An outcome of terrorist 
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attacks has been a re-examination of policies for managing diversity; Europeans have 
been forced to ask, are we integrating minorities the best way? For example, Andrew 
Jakubowicz assessed reactions to the London terrorist bombings in this way: “The 
updraft from the bombings carried a message about the critical importance of working 
out what ‘multiculturalism’ could continue to mean.”4 This question was brought into 
sharp focus when the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was brutally murdered in 
Amsterdam by an Islamic fanatic on November 2, 2004. Van Gogh’s “crime” was that he 
had, in collaboration with the Dutch Muslim feminist Ayaan Hirsi Ali, made a short film, 
Submission, critical of the treatment of women in Islamic societies. Van Gogh’s murder 
put the spotlight on the Muslim fanatics in Europe, and forced Europeans to critically 
re-think their policies for managing diversity. Similarly, the threat of home-grown 
terrorism in the United States, highlighted by the case of about twenty young Somali-
Americans apparently recruited by violent Islamic fanatics, has fueled a debate about 
the best policies for managing diversity in the United States, as well as the threat of 
terrorism, trust in government, and related security issues.   
Two main policies have been used to manage cultural and linguistic diversity:  
assimilation, the washing away of intergroup differences, and multiculturalism, the 
highlighting, strengthening, and celebration of intergroup differences.5 Both these 
policies are founded on psychological assumptions, some of which are questionable.6 An 
assumption underlying assimilation policy, for example, is that intergroup differences 
can be washed away through contact, to eliminate any important basis for group-based 
divisions.  But social identity research using the minimal group paradigm demonstrates 
that group members can use even trivial criteria as a basis for intergroup differentiation 
and ingroup favoritism.7 By implication, no matter how similar the members of a society 
become through assimilation, it will be possible to manufacture dissimilarity, even on 
seemingly trivial criteria. Some of the key psychological assumptions underlying 
multiculturalism are also questionable, including the multiculturalism hypothesis, the 
idea that confidence in one’s own ethnic heritage will lead one to be open and accepting 
toward the outgroup members. Empirical evidence does not provide solid support for 
this hypothesis,8 nor do historical examples, such as the Nazis, who arguably showed 
high confidence in their ingroup heritage, but were not open and accepting toward 
outgroups (although there is support for some interpretations of multiculturalism, 
particularly among minorities).9  
There is continued debate between supporters of multiculturalism and assimilation,10 
and some efforts to compare the two policies using empirical evidence.11 However, given 
that the psychological assumptions underlying both policies are in important ways 
flawed, we should also explore alternative policies that are already an implicit part of 
psychological discussions of intergroup relations.12 Muzafer Sherif’s concept of 
superordinate goals,13 and Gaertner and Dovidio’s Common Group Identity Model both 
suggest a third alternative policy, whereby groups emphasize commonalities such as 
identities and goals.14 This third alternative is reflected in the policy of omniculturalism, 
which proposes a two-stage process in the socialization of individuals: during stage one, 
the focus is on human commonalities; during stage two, intergroup differences and 
distinctiveness are introduced.15 The objective of omniculturalism is to establish a solid 
basis of commonality between people within the framework of a primary identity, before 
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adding an emphasis on how people also belong to groups that in some respects differ 
from one another. 
The present study examines three research questions. The first concerns the extent to 
which Americans would support omniculturalism, as compared with multiculturalism 
and assimilation. The second concerns the support of majority and minority group 
members for the different policies. Some previous research has demonstrated that 
African Americans and other minorities show stronger support for multiculturalism, 
whereas white Americans show stronger support for assimilation policy.16 A third set of 
research questions – the central focus of this article – concern possible differences in 
the attitudes of supporters of assimilation, multiculturalism, and omniculturalism, 
toward homeland security threats, how America should react to such threats, and the 
extent to which individuals trust authorities to do the right thing.  
In summary, terrorist attacks in Western democracies, such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain, have resulted in a re-assessment of multiculturalism and 
other policies for managing diversity.17 Because assimilation has been endorsed to a 
greater degree by majority groups (primarily of western European descent), and because 
terrorist attacks are perceived as arising from minority (primarily Middle Eastern) 
communities, we expected support for assimilation to be associated with greater 
concern about future terrorist attacks, as well as stronger American reactions to terrorist 
attacks. Growing concerns about the possibility of  “home grown” terrorism may 
increase the salience of these issues for American security practitioners and researchers, 
especially in light of current population projections, which suggest that by 2050 whites 
will represent a minority and one out of five Americans will be an immigrant.18 
Methods 
Participants in this research were a nationally representative probability sample of 
4,000 adults age eighteen and older selected randomly from an internet-enabled panel 
maintained by Knowledge Networks (KN) in November 2008. KN panel members are 
recruited through a random digit telephone dialing system based on a sample frame 
covering the entire United States. In contrast to “opt-in” Web surveys, which recruit 
participants of unknown characteristics via “blind” Internet solicitations, KN panel 
members are selected on the basis of known, non-zero probabilities. Individuals are not 
permitted to volunteer or self-select for participation in the KN panel. In addition, 
individuals who lack either computers or Internet access are provided equipment or 
access without charge. KN panel-based surveys have demonstrated acceptable 
concordance with a variety of “benchmark” large-scale surveys.19 
In the present study, the response rate to invitations to participate was 71 percent. To 
reduce the effects of potential non-response and non-coverage bias, post-stratification 
sample weights,20 incorporating the probability of participant selection based on age, 
gender, race, and ethnicity benchmarks from the most recent available Census Bureau 
Current Population Survey and supplements were employed in all statistical analyses 
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MEASURES 
Cultural policy preferences. Participants were grouped into one of three 
perspectives on cultural differences policies according to participants’ response to the 
following question: 
“Which statement below best fits your view about immigration to the United States: 
When people come to America, 
 1. People should set aside their cultural differences and “melt into” the American 
mainstream; 
 2. People should maintain and celebrate their distinct group culture 
 3. People should first recognize and give priority to what they have in common with 
all other Americans, and then at a second stage celebrate their distinct group 
culture.” 
We label responses 1 thru 3 Assimilation, Multiculturalism, and Omniculturalism, 
respectively.  Participants could also choose not to declare any preference. 
Political ideology. Participants identified their favored political ideology as 
“extremely liberal,” “liberal,” “somewhat liberal,” “moderate or middle of the road,” 
“slightly conservative,” “conservative,” or “extremely conservative.” In the following 
analyses, participants were grouped into three categories: liberal (extremely liberal or 
liberal), conservative (extremely conservative or conservative), or other (all other 
responses). 
Terrorism risk perceptions. Participants rated the probability over the next five 
years of terrorist attacks using an anchored scale from zero (“totally unlikely to occur”) 
to 100 (“absolutely certain to occur”) and assessed the probability of acts of terror within 
the country  (risk to nation – “How likely do you feel a terrorist attack is somewhere 
within the United States?”), as well as attacks directly involving the participant (risk to 
self – “How likely do you feel that you personally will directly experience an act of 
terrorism?”).  An additional dichotomous indicator variable was included representing 
participants who reported that they were “very concerned” or “extremely concerned” 
about terrorism (“How concerned or worried are you about a terrorist attack happening 
in the area of the country where you live sometime during the next 12 months?”). 
Emotional response to the threat of terrorism. Following the instructions, 
“Please help us to understand how you feel when you think about threats of terrorism 
using the following scale,” participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule – Expanded Form,22 which requires participants to rate sixty emotional 
adjectives on a five-point scale from one (“slightly or not true of your feelings”) to five 
(“extremely true of your feelings”).  Composite subscales assessing the degree of fear 
and anger were employed in the present study. These subscales have demonstrated good 
psychometric properties in other samples and have been significantly correlated with 
public perceptions about terrorism and support for various counterterrorism policies.23 
Confidence in government, preparedness, counterterrorism measures, and 
security priorities. Participants were also asked whether they “agreed,” “strongly 
agreed,” “disagreed,” or “strongly disagreed” with a series of statements related to 
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terrorism and terrorism policies. To simplify the presentation of results, responses were 
collapsed into categories indicating either agreement or disagreement. Statements 
assessed confidence in certain government organizations (i.e., the federal and state 
governments, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, the Border Patrol, in 
response to the statement “This organization will do a good job carrying out its role in 
fighting terrorism”), community terrorism preparedness (“I believe my community is 
sufficiently prepared for a terrorist attack if it happened here”), and the importance of 
revenge (“It is important for United States to take revenge on the people and countries 
responsible for terrorist acts against this country”). In addition, participants were asked 
whether they agreed that in order to “protect against terrorism” the government should 
adopt certain measures, including “Engage in racial or ethnic profiling,” “Restrict the 
rights of non-citizens and foreign visitors,” or “Require all Americans to have a national 
identification card.” Finally, participants were asked to rank terrorism-versus disaster-
related activities as the top “homeland security priority for the United States.” 
RESULTS 
More than three out of five American adults preferred omniculturalism.24 Among those 
who preferred another policy, more favored assimilation over multiculturalism (Table 
1). Gender, age, race and ethnicity, education, income, political ideology, and urban 
residential status distributions within policy preference groups are listed in Table 2.  
Cultural View Percent 95% C.I. 
Assimilation 
“People should set aside their cultural differences and 
‘melt into’ the American mainstream.” 
19.67% (18.19 – 21.24) 
Multiculturalism 
“People should maintain and celebrate their distinct 
group culture.” 
13.81 (12.43 – 15.30) 
Omniculturalism 
“People should first recognize and give priority to what 
they have in common with all other Americans, and 
then at a second stage celebrate their distinct group 
culture.” 
62.71 (60.77 – 64.61) 
Elected not to respond 3.81 (3.04 – 4.77) 
Table 1!"Distribution of Endorsements 
Though most members of each sociodemographic category preferred omniculturalism, 
distinct sociodemographic profiles differentiated proponents of assimilation or 
multiculturalism. Significantly greater proportions of women, adults under age forty-
five, members of non-white races or ethnicities, urban residents, or political liberals, 
characterized multicultralists. Conversely, white non-Hispanics, older adults over age 
fifty-nine, individuals with annual household incomes from $10,000 to $20,000, and 
MOGHADDAM AND BRECKENRIDGE, HOMELAND SECURITY AND PREFERRED DIVERSITY POLICIES 
     
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME VI, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
6 
political conservatives were more prevalent among assimilationists. Assimilationists 
were also more apt to have partial or full high school educations, but were less likely to 
have pursued or completed college educations.!











Gender      
 Female 47.5% 60.8% a 49.5% 51.3% 
Age      
 18-29 15.4 32.0 a 21.4 21.7 
 30-44 24.3 31.4 a 26.7 26.9 
 45-59 30.1 25.5 28.3 28.3 
 60+ 30.2 11.1 a 23.6 23.2 
Race/Ethnicity     
 
White, Non-
Hispanic (NH) 77.7 56.9
 a 75.9 73.5 
 Black (NH) 8.6 12.9 a 8.8 9.4 
 Other (NH) 3.6 8.6 a 4.1 4.6 
 Hispanic 9.2 20.6 a 10.1 11.4 
 
Multiple 
Race/Ethnicities 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 
Education      
 < High School 16.6 b 14.1 9.9 11.9 
 High School 38.6 b 25.6 29.6 30.9 
 Some College 24.1 b 31.4 29.4 28.6 
 B.A. or higher 20.7 b 28.9 31.1 28.7 
Income      
 
< $10,000 
($10k) 6.3 5.3 4.9 5.3 
 $10k - $19k 12.9 b 6.3 8.7 9.2 
 $20k - 39k$ 25.9 25.1 22.5 23.6 
 $40k - $59k 20.1 23.6 20.0 20.6 
 $60k - $99k 23.4 25.8 26.8 26.0 
 $100k -$174k 9.0 11.6 14.0 12.6 
 $175k + 2.4 2.4 3.0 2.8 
Urban-Rural Classification     
 Urban 81.3 86.9 a 82.3 82.8 
Political Ideology     
Conservative 26.1 b 13.6 22.5 21.9 
Liberal 11.6 24.8 a 16.0 16.2 
Table 2: Distribution of Sociodemographic Variables by Policy Preference 
a  Differs significantly from Assimilation and Omnicultural groups   p < .005 (two-tailed) 
b  Differs significantly from Multicultural and Omnicultural groups  p < .003 (two-tailed) 
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Average predicted probabilities of a terrorist attack on the nation or against the self, 
as well as average levels of fear and anger experienced in response to terrorism within 
each group are shown in Figure 1. Responses for the omnicultural group closely tracked 
the average national response. Assimilationists reported the most elevated appraisals of 
the probability of attacks against the nation or self, as well as the greatest degree of 
anger in response to terrorism. Omniculturalists, however, reported significantly less 
fear than either assimilationists or multiculturalists, but averaged significantly higher 




Figure 1: Average Perceived Threat and Emotional Response by Cultural Policy Preference 
(Vertical axis indicates deviation from national averages as a percentage of one standard deviation. 
Differences are significant at p < .01) !
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Participants’ priorities and support for particular responses to the threat of terrorism 
reflected these divergent views of threat and emotional response (Table 3).  Intense 
worries about terrorism were least common among multiculturalists and most prevalent 
among assimilationists. Significantly more assimilationists – in contrast to significantly 
fewer multiculturalists – viewed terrorism as the top homeland security priority, and 
also asserted the importance of seeking revenge against terrorist actions. Moreover, 
support for modifying civil liberties to prevent terrorism – racial profiling, restricting 
the rights of non-citizens, and requiring a national identity card – was most prevalent 
among assimilationists  and once again, least prevalent among multiculturalists. While 
more assimilationists had confidence in the federal government’s capacity to counter 
terrorism, more multiculturalists had confidence in the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement. Omniculturalists were more likely to view disaster preparedness as the 
top homeland security priority and to judge their communities as better prepared for 
crises.   
 
Cultural Policy Preference Variable 
Assimilation Multiculturalism Omniculturalism 
“Very” or “extremely” worried 
about terrorism 26.7% 
b 12.8% a 22.6% 
Top priority for Homeland 
Security:    
Terrorism 77.7 b 64.4 a 68.5 
Disasters 11.6 12.7 18.8 c 
Confidence in:    
Federal Government 71.1 b 65.9 65.9 
Immigration & Customs 
Control  53.3 61.2
 a 53.2 
Border Patrol 66.4 65.6 59.9 c 
State Government 66.1 65.6 66.8 
Views community as 
unprepared for terrorist attack 60.5 61.2 66.7 
c 
Believes it is important for 
U.S. to seek revenge 75.1 
b 54.1 a 64.7 
In order to prevent terrorism, 
supports:    
Racial profiling 46.9 b 21.8 a 35.2 
Restrict rights of non-citizens 
and foreign visitors 78.2 
b 54.7 a 70.5 
Require national ID card 68.6 b 49.6 a 56.4 
 
Table 3: Terrorism Concerns, Priorities, Confidence & Support for Aggressive 
Measures by Cultural Policy Preference 
a  Differs significantly from Assimilation and Omnicultural groups   p < .001 (two-tailed) 
b  Differs significantly from Multicultural and Omnicultural groups  p < .001 (two-tailed) 
c  Differs significantly from Multicultural and Assimilation groups   p < .001 (two-tailed)  
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With respect to security priorities and responses, omniculturalism was situated 
between the extremes of the alternative cultural policy preferences. Moreover, when 
multivariate procedures were employed to adjust statistically for sociodemographic 
differences among cultural preference groups, the differences among omniculturalists, 
multiculturalists, and assimilationists in perceived threat, emotional response, security 
priority, confidence in government, perceived community preparedness, and support for 
aggressive responses to terrorism were sustained. 
DISCUSSION 
The objective of this study was to explore attitudinal support among Americans for the 
traditional policies of assimilation and multiculturalism, as well as the new policy of 
omniculturalism. A second research question focused on the support of majority and 
minority groups for the different policies. Third, we explored the relationship between 
support for different policies for managing cultural diversity and security issues, 
specifically related to the threat of terrorist attacks, how America should react to attacks, 
feelings about the possibility of terrorist attacks, and trust in authorities to do the right 
thing in response to terrorist attacks. 
With respect to support for different cultural diversity policies, omniculturalism 
represented a clear majority preference across all sociodemographic groups, although 
there were some sub-group differences: whites, men, and older adults were more 
prevalent among assimilationists; non-whites, women, and younger adults were more 
prevalent among multiculturalists. Consequently, any future exploration of the 
omnicultural perspective must also attend to the generational and diversity differences 
that underlie dissenting perspectives among a significant portion of the population. That 
such differences predicted the roughly 4 percent of participants who declined to state a 
cultural preferences, as well as the 29 percent of those who declined to participate in 
this survey further,25 underscores the need for careful scrutiny of the pattern of minority 
preferences identified in the present study. 
Preferences for cultural policies were correlated significantly with terrorism threat 
perceptions and emotional responses, as well as attitudes towards homeland security 
priorities, confidence in certain governmental organizations’ capacities to carry out their 
counterterrorism missions, and willingness to modify civil liberties to prevent terrorism. 
Although assimilationists did not differ from multiculturalists in reported fear, 
assimilationists expressed the highest levels of anger, an affective response associated 
strongly with support for aggressive counterterrorism policies in other studies.26 Indeed, 
support for aggressive measures was most common among assimilationists, a group 
which also judged the likelihood of future attacks as more probable than those who 
endorsed alternative cultural policies, and least prevalent among multiculturalists, a 
group which appraised national threats of terrorism as less likely than other groups. In 
several respects, the attitudes towards homeland security among omniculturalists 
represented a middle ground between the divergent views of assimilationists and 
multiculturalists. 
Omniculturalism arises in part out of well-researched ideas in the social psychology 
of intergroup relations. Both the earlier field research of Sherif and the more recent 
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experimental research of Gaertner and Dovidio have demonstrated that the re-
categorization of the members of different groups as a single group can reduce the 
original intergroup biases.27 The applied benefits of superordinate goals have been 
demonstrated in culturally and ethnically diverse classrooms.28 The Common Ingroup 
Identity Model has taken the further step of carefully exploring potential antecedents, 
consequences, and mediating processes of re-categorization that results in a 
superordinate category.29 However, missing from this picture has been empirical 
evidence to suggest that a “third alternative” along these lines would be supported 
among the general population. 
This study presented participants a third alternative, omniculturalism, with two 
steps: First, recognizing what is common to all Americans, second, celebrating distinct 
group cultures. Endorsement of this alternative policy represents positive feedback for 
research exploring the path of re-categorization, but it also highlights a need for 
additional research on developmental questions. In particular, at what age should the 
education of children emphasize what is common to everyone, and at what age should 
the focus be on distinct group cultures? Input from developmental science should guide 
schools and other socialization agents on this question. In future research, more 
attention also needs to be given to the difference in support shown by majority and 
minority group members for the three policies for managing diversity. An important 
limitation to the present study is that perspectives on cultural policy were measured by a 
single item. Future studies should include multiple measures, as well as, perhaps, 
comparisons among each pair of alternatives. Our statistical analyses utilized post-
stratification weights to adjust for sampling biases. Nevertheless, the sociodemographic 
factors we found associated with a preference for assimilation or multiculturalism in 
this study also tended to characterize individuals in the KN panel who declined to 
participant. Thus, the magnitude of support for omniculturalism – albeit, considerable 
(i.e., 60 percent) – could well have been attenuated if all invited participants had been 
recruited successfully for the survey. 
We believe that the alternative policy of omniculturalism also has potential to both 
gain support from diverse populations internationally and serve as an effective policy at 
the international level. This is because omniculturalism presents opportunities for 
groups to both find common ground in shared human characteristics and establish their 
own special (and perhaps unique) characteristics at a secondary level. A challenge in 
future research is to further explore these possibilities internationally.   
Support for different policies for managing diversity was systematically associated 
with different patterns of attitudes toward security issues. Support for assimilation was 
associated with greater concern and anger about the possibility of a terrorist attack, as 
well as support for stronger reactions in the case of an attack. This included greater 
willingness to seek revenge, to carry out racial and ethnic profiling, and to restrict the 
civil liberties of foreigners in case of a terrorist attack. In contrast, supporters of 
multiculturalism policy downplayed the possibility of a terrorist attack and were least 
likely to seek revenge and agree to racial and ethnic profiling, as well as to impose 
restrictions on the civil liberties of foreigners as a protection against terrorism. We 
believe this pattern of results is explained in part by the fact that support for 
multiculturalism was most prevalent among minority groups, whereas support for 
assimilation was most prevalent among majority groups. At the same time, terrorist 
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attacks have been seen as emanating from Islamic communities (within and outside 
Western societies), and the target of such attacks have often been major urban centers 
in the West, such as New York, London, and Madrid. Thus, majority groups support 
assimilation of minorities into mainstream society, and perceive terrorism (emanating 
from minority communities) as a greater threat and something to be angry about and 
avenged.   
The pattern of distrust toward authorities shown by supporters of assimilation and 
multiculturalism was also different. Whereas supporters of assimilation expressed 
greater confidence in the counterterrorism capacity of the federal government, 
supporters of multiculturalism expressed greater trust and confidence in the present 
capabilities of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These differences might be 
attributed to controversy regarding illegal immigration. Multiculturalists’ confidence in 
the status quo perhaps reflects a reluctance to support strengthening immigration 
controls; conversely, assimilationists’ lack of confidence might reflect greater 
willingness to strengthen immigration controls. 
The finding that support for different policies for managing cultural diversity was 
systematically related to attitudinal differences toward security issues reflects back in 
important ways on the traditional debate between the two main sides in debates about 
security, suggesting an interactive link between factors identified by realists and human 
security advocates. On the one hand, the large-scale movement of people and sudden 
contact between human groups can result in “host” majority groups feeling threatened, 
desiring the minority to assimilate, and wanting revenge for terrorist attacks.30 
Furthermore, in this context the majority seems to have less confidence in federal and 
immigration authorities to do the right thing. These trends are no doubt to some extent 
associated with the majority groups perceiving the influx of “aggressive” minorities as 
increased competition for scarce resources. However, more than material resources are 
involved: minority groups support multiculturalism and seem to want to maintain their 
distinct identities. They are less fearful about terrorist attacks and do not support 
America “avenging” such attacks. Clearly, both material factors, identified by realists, 
and “soft” factors such as identity, identified by advocates of human security, are 
involved in these intergroup processes.  
Since the 1990s there has been increased focus on the approximately 12-15 million 
illegal immigrants believed to be in the United States. For many, illegal immigrants 
represent a “threat” that requires an immediate solution. However, even if the 
“problem” of illegal immigration is solved, the far greater challenge of managing an 
increasingly diverse population of United States citizens looms ahead of us. In the long 
term, even if all 12-15 million illegal immigrants either become legal or leave the country 
(an unlikely event), effective policies are still urgently required for managing inter-
group relations among the enormously diverse population of over 300 million 
Americans, which today includes 37 million legal first-generation immigrants. Such 
policies must receive greater attention from authorities, researchers, and others 
concerned with homeland security. The findings of this study highlight the value of 
exploring alternative policies for managing diversity, as well as critically re-thinking 
links between both alternative and traditional policies and homeland security. 
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